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ABSTRACT 
Development interventions are aimed at promoting positive change, but they can 
equally have negative impact, especially in conflict-prone contexts. Whereas existing 
studies on Odi and the Niger Delta at large mainly focused on the history, environ-
ment, culture, conflict and security situations, the peace and conflict impact of Nige-
rian government‘s socio-economic interventions in the area have not been fully ex-
plored. This study, therefore, assessed the Niger Delta Development Commission‘s 
(NDDC) interventions, to determine their relationship with the Commission‘s man-
date, strategies, and community needs; their interactions with the community; and 
their impact on the dynamics of peace and conflict in Odi, a community that has at-
tracted many interventions after the 1999 massacre.    
 
The study adopted the grounded theory and case study research designs. Primary and 
secondary data were collected through key informant and in-depth interviews, official 
documents and non-participant observation. Fifty-four key informant interviews were 
conducted with seven members of the Traditional Ruling Council and the Community 
Development Committee, six religious leaders, five women leaders, five Youth Coun-
cil executives, 24 project beneficiaries, 12 NDDC staff, and five NDDC consultants. 
Forty-seven in-depth interviews were also held with six school teachers, ten politi-
cians, and two law enforcement agents in Odi, five international/non-governmental 
organisations staff, six activists, and eight academics and professionals. The Niger 
Delta Regional Development Master Plan, the NDDC Act, and website contents were 
consulted. Non-participant observations were carried out at NDDC project sites in 
Odi. The data gathered were content analysed.  
 
The NDDC integrated development strategy correlated with NDDC‘s mandate and 
people‘s needs. However, the Commission, in implementing its interventions, contra-
vened some of its articulated guiding principles and policies like promoting good gov-
ernance, transparency, participatory decision-making, and impact assessment. Also, 
inadequate community consultation caused dissonance in NDDC‘s and community‘s 
prioritisation of needs. Moreover, due to inadequate consideration for peace and con-
flict sensitivity, the interventions produced series of positive and negative impact on 
peace and conflict dynamics in Odi. Construction of roads and educational facilities, 
rural electrification and training in modern agricultural practices impacted positively 
on the structural causes of conflict. They brought federal government‘s presence to 
Odi; provided income for male youths employed as labourers and for construction ma-
terials‘ suppliers as well as capacity building in modern agricultural practices. How-
ever, the community perceived the NDDC interventions as resources and competed for 
in a socio-political environment characterised by pervasive corruption and bad gov-
ernance. This provided sufficient conditions for spirals of negative consequences that 
ultimately reduced the overall effectiveness of the interventions. The negative impact 
included entrenching corruption in intervention cycle, power disequilibrium between 
NDDC and Odi community, oppression and division, and gender inequality, commu-
nal conflicts, and apathy.   
 
The Niger Delta Development Commission‘s interventions, intended for positive 
change, also had many negative consequences in Odi because the Commission failed 
to mainstream peace and conflict sensitivity in the interventions. The NDDC should 
therefore adhere strictly to its guiding principles and policies as well as international 
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best practices in intervention programming in order to maximise the positive and 
minimise the negative impacts of its interventions.  
 
Keywords:  Peace and conflict impact assessment, intervention programme, Niger 
Delta Development Commission, Odi. 
Word count:  499
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the study 
In over two decades, there has been a growing realisation that development is es-
sentially interconnected with conflict and peacebuilding. Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali‘s 
oft-quoted statement, ―[t]here can be no peace without economic and social develop-
ment, just as development is not possible in the absence of peace‖ (cited in McCan-
dless, 2007b, p. 47) reflects thinking on this interconnectedness. Such thinking in-
formed the emergence of the Peacebuilding and Development subfield in the field of 
Peace Studies (McCandless, 2007b). In the words of McCandless, ―[s]cholarship, prac-
tice, policy-making, and programming in the area of peace-building and development 
have arisen in response to the compelling recognition that conflict and development 
are deeply intertwined, and consequently, so are the building of sustainable peace and 
human development.‖ (2007b). Twenty-two of the twenty-four countries estimated by 
the UNDP as furthest from achieving the Millennium Development Goals are affected 
by conflicts (McCandless, 2007b). This further confirms the existence of some rela-
tionship between conflict and development. Since the tragic events in the Rwanda 
genocide, the international community became increasingly aware of the role of devel-
opment intervention in conflict and peacebuilding as well as demand to make explicit 
the underlying assumptions concerning the effects of these interventions on peace and 
conflict (Paffenholz, 2005).  
The interconnectedness of development interventions, conflict, and peace is 
more complicated in contexts characterised by conflicts —latent, open, or violent. For 
instance, the need to intervene in a conflict situation may require that developmental 
intervention be introduced in such settings, especially when indicators of underdevel-
opment or poverty are identified as part of the causes of the conflict. However, while 
such interventions aim at positively influencing a situation to bring about an improve-
ment or forestall deterioration, there have been convincing arguments that they can 
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equally produce negative impact on the conflict situation. Indeed, interventions do not 
necessarily translate into peace in a conflict setting (Bush & Opp, 1999). Notable 
works in peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) reveal that intervention projects 
or programmes (in conflict settings) impact on the context of the intervention, and vice 
versa (Resource Pack 2004; Anderson 1999 & 2004; Bush 2003c and Bush 2009, 
Paffenholz, 2005). They have shown that each stage of an intervention project or pro-
gramme, that is, conception and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
can impact and be affected by each element of the conflict area such as causes, actors, 
profile, and dynamics of the conflict. These interactions can have positive and/or nega-
tive impacts on both the stages of intervention and elements of the context of the inter-
vention. Hence, first, interventions interact with its context and, second, the interaction 
can have both negative and positive impacts on the intervention and the context. 
This potential of intervention to impact and be impacted by its context negatively 
and/or positively has been recognised by scholars, researchers and practitioners as 
early as the 1990s. In ―A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment 
(PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones‖. Working Paper No.1., The Peace 
building and Conflict reconstruction Program initiative and evaluation Unit., 1998‘, 
Kenneth Bush submits that development interventions introduce new dynamics into 
the conflict environment. These dynamics can support or oppose conflict and/or peace. 
According to him, intervention has the potential to challenge traditional values or au-
thority structures, disrupt gender, or other socially-determined roles, and raise the 
stakes of economic competition, creating ―winners‖ and ―losers.‖ He argues further 
that the politics of project siting, selection of beneficiaries and the whole process of 
project planning, implementation and monitoring has serious implications for peace 
and conflict dynamics in a community experiencing violent conflict. In other words, a 
well-conceived, innocently-executed development intervention can tilt the scale of 
events in favour of conflict in a given locale.  
The mild outcome of this could be the strengthening of feelings of hatred, suspi-
cion, prejudice, marginalisation, superiority, and inferiority among groups. A more 
serious outcome could be violent or armed conflict. Therefore, intervention in a con-
text characterised by conflict is somewhat a risky venture, and Bush concludes, 
‗‗[d]evelopment is inevitably conflictual, destabilising, and subversive because it chal-
lenges existing political, economic, and social power structures that stop individuals 
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and groups from attaining their full potentials‘‘ (Bush K. , Resource Kit, 2003a, p. 77). 
This is especially in conflict-prone regions. Nevertheless, a development intervention 
can also have peacebuilding impacts in an environment. This is possible when it dif-
fuses inter-group tension through encouraging positive behaviours among groups. For 
instance, it may foster actions or projects that are inclusive of hostile groups. Alterna-
tively, it may include actions that are exclusively building peace, that is, peacebuilding 
intervention (Bush K. , 1998).   
Fischer and Wils observe that ‗‗[o]ver the last ten [now twenty] years, interest in 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities has increased significantly. Relief and 
development organisations working in places of civil war have raised awareness of 
conflict-sensitive planning and are seeking to integrate peacebuilding activities into 
their work‘‘ (2003, p. 4). In consonance with this, Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, 
and Sheriff (2005) note that over the last decade, there has been a growing realisation 
that humanitarian assistance sometimes feeds conflict rather than alleviate it.  
Also, development aid sometimes exacerbates tensions. Several factors, scholars 
argue, influence the contributions an intervention will make to a given conflict situa-
tion (Akinyoade D. , 2010; 2011; Bush K. , 2009; Lange, 2004; Paffenholz, 2005; 
Anderson M. B., 1999). Some of the factors are the peace and conflict sensitivity ca-
pacity of the intervening agency; how‘ the intervention agency does what it does (that 
is, operational procedure of its intervention programming) and external factors. The 
capacity of the intervening agency for peace and conflict sensitivity is a critical factor. 
This is because how an intervention is carried out will be significantly influenced by 
the capacity of the intervening agency or individual. How the intervening agency does 
what it does is also a critical factor. Bush (1999) argues that how an intervention is 
done is far more important than what is done in conflict settings. Some external factors 
also influence the impacts of intervention and its context on each other. External fac-
tors include the establishing authority, the policy framework, and the wider socio-
political context in which the agency operates. 
There has also been a growing interest to develop tools, methods or approaches 
to understand the relationship of intervention, peace, and conflict (2004, p. 1). The 
overriding intent is to maximise the positive and minimise the negative impacts of in-
tervention and its conflict-prone context on each other. The most prominent of these 
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tools, methods or approaches are Kenneth Bush‘s Peace and Conflict Impact Assess-
ment (PCIA), Mary Anderson‘s Do no Harm/Local Capacities for Peace Project, Bar-
bolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff‘s Conflict Sensitive Approaches (CSA), and 
Thania Paffenholz‘s Aid for Peace Approach. (Schmelzle, 2005; Paffenholz, 2005). 
Other terminologies that have been used to describe similar approaches are: Conflict 
Impact Assessment; Conflict Sensitive Programming; Peace and Conflict Development 
Analysis; Conflict Impact Assessment System; Conflict Assessment; Conflict Risk 
Analysis; Strategic Conflict Assessment; Peace and Conflict Assessment Model 
(PCA); and Conflict Development Analysis; and Third Generation PCIA (Bush K. , 
2005, p. 7; 2009, p. 5). The Strategic Conflict Assessment has been conducted on Ni-
geria by Nigeria‘s Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) in collaboration 
with the Department for International Development (DFID), United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), UNDP (United Nations Development Pro-
gramme) and the World Bank. Some of these and similar approaches and/or methods 
are presented in Table 2.1 in the next chapter. Fifteen years into the introduction, de-
velopment, use and adaptations of these approaches, the term Peace and Conflict Im-
pact Assessment (PCIA) has arguably emerged as the dominant or reference terminol-
ogy for all approaches, methods and frameworks for pre-intervention assessment, dur-
ing intervention and post-intervention measurement of peace and conflict impacts 
(Abitbol, 2013). Bush denotes these terminologies as essentially synonyms of his own 
PCIA (Bush K. , 2009, p. 5). PCIA can, therefore, be said to have become a generic or 
an umbrella term for assessing impacts with peace and conflict concerns, especially in 
conflict-prone contexts (The eventual dominance of the term PCIA might have been 
favoured by the popularity of a much older terminology in Environmental Studies—
Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA]). The PCIA frameworks, therefore, seeks to 
assess potential or measure actual impacts (in peace and conflict terms) that interven-
tion has had or will have in a conflict-prone context.  
The Niger Delta Region (NDR) located in the southern part of Nigeria, with a 
long history of conflict, is conflict-prone. It comprises nine oil-producing states and is 
home to about 40 ethnic groups speaking 250 languages and dialects (Niger Delta Re-
gional Development Master Plan, 2006, henceforth, ‗Master Plan‘, p.53.). Conflict in 
the resource-rich NDR has a long trajectory, predating Nigeria‘s independence. Causes 
of the conflict in the NDR are complex and interrelated. They include ‗‗...oil based en-
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vironmental degradation, induced productivity losses and occupational disorientation, 
inadequate compensation for damages caused by oil industry, poor channels of com-
munication by the oil companies, failed community development programmes…‘‘ 
(Ibaba, 2007, p. 1). In addition, feelings of neglect by the central government and mar-
ginalisation in mainstream national development, underdevelopment, bad governance, 
endemic poverty, systemic corruption, among others are other causes of conflicts that 
scholars have identified in the region. Except religious, all types of conflict —
resource-based, psychological, environmental, and ethnic are present in the region 
(Albert, The Niger Delta Conflict, 2008). Principal actors in the conflict are the Niger 
Delta people (especially at the community level), the Federal Government of Nigeria 
(FGN), and multinational oil-producing companies. At some point, the Niger Delta 
(ND) conflict gradually became intractable, typified in various forms of violent con-
flict, armed conflicts, youth militancy, inter and intra communal conflicts, guerrilla 
warfare by militants against government forces, vandalism, hostage-taking among oth-
ers. The ensuing culture of violence evolved into a war economy and proliferation of 
small and light weapons in the NDR. These have wide-ranging implications for the 
socio-economic life of individuals and communities in the region. In addition, at the 
national level, violence in the region disrupts oil production and thus affects national 
foreign exchange earnings. 
The ND conflict situation is in its sixth decade. Each decade has its peculiar 
characteristics. The first decade (1960s) was largely a period of complacency with the 
prevailing illusion that development would automatically trickle down with oil-sector 
activities. This situation was possible due to a low level of education and widespread 
ignorance. The second decade (1970s) was characterised by passive resistance, as peo-
ple began to ask questions. However, the general belief was that the existing institu-
tional mechanisms were adequate to address the problems. Oil companies responded 
with mere tokenism in form of scholarship programmes, medical trips, and other pal-
liatives. The third decade (1980s) witnessed improved education, an increase in popu-
lation and greater masses‘ awareness of their relative deplorable condition compared to 
other parts of the country. The tempo for the demand for a more equitable and trans-
parent formula to the Niger Delta question was thus heightened. This perceived griev-
ance increased the possibility of group mobilisation for collective action.  
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By the time the conflict entered its fourth decade in the 1990s, the patience of 
the people had not only thinned out but also exploded into strident agitations and pro-
tests of unprecedented proportions that shook the Nigerian nation. Nigeria returned to 
civil rule in 1999 —the end of the fourth decade. Year 2000-2009 marked the fifth 
decade of conflict in the NDR. Agitation in the NDR continued throughout the first 
eight years of democratic rule in Nigeria. It assumed a new dimension of militancy 
during this period. It was characterised by armed confrontations between militant 
groups and the Nigerian Armed Forces, kidnapping of expatriate oil workers and, later, 
affluent Nigerians. In its sixth decade (and post-Amnesty Phase), violent conflict and 
militancy in the region subsided. Militants responded massively to the Federal Gov-
ernment granting amnesty in the second half of 2009. The amnesty was followed by a 
reintegration process (Niger Delta Development Commission, 2012). 
Like conflict, intervention also has a long history in the Niger Delta Region 
(NDR). Intervention in this context refers to development aid, humanitarian assistance, 
or peacebuilding initiatives. Development intervention is a package of ―[l]ong-term 
efforts aimed at bringing improvements in the economic, political, and social status, 
environmental stability and quality of life of the population especially the poor and the 
disadvantaged‘‘ (Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assis-
tance and peacebuilding: A Resource Pack, 2004, henceforth ‗Resource Pack‘, p. 3). 
Humanitarian aid/assistance refers to ―[a]ctivities designed to rapidly reduce human 
suffering in emergency situations, especially when local authorities are unable or un-
willing to provide relief.‘‘ Peacebuilding interventions are ―[m]easures designed to 
consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic, and cul-
tural institutions capable of mediating conflict, as well as strengthen other mechanisms 
that will either create or support the creation of necessary conditions for sustained 
peace‘‘ (p. 3). Local and international actors have intervened at various times and lev-
els of the NDR conflict. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs), intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), com-
munity-based organisations (CBOs), multinational oil companies (MOCs), and the 
Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) have all intervened. Their interventions have 
been at the project, programme, or policy levels; at the level of the community or re-
gion and with diverse objectives such as aid (development, humanitarian, and peace-
building), democracy, and good governance among others. FGN has the longest his-
 7 
 
tory of intervention in the NDR. Its various intervention strategies have included secu-
rity responses, relief responses, political responses, and socio-economic responses 
(Isumonah A. V., 2003).  
The socio-economic responses of the FGN involve setting up development 
agencies to cater for the needs of the region. The Balewa administration set up the Ni-
ger Delta Development Board (NDDB) 1960-1966. The Presidential Task Force was 
set up in 1980 by the 1979/1983 Shagari administration and was allocated 1.5% of the 
Federation Account to tackle developmental problems of the region (Master Plan 
2006).  In 1992, the Babangida administration established the Oil Mineral Producing 
Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) for the provision of infrastructure in 
the area. OMPADEC operated from 1992-1999. Through these establishments, the 
people of the NDR have suffered rising expectations, relative deprivation, and frustra-
tion. The result has been to engender more aggression and violent conflicts among the 
people  (Niger Delta Development Commission, 2006). By the late 1990s, the Niger 
Delta had become a region where youths disrupted oil production and communities 
frequently engaged in destructive communal strife. This was the situation of things be-
fore the Federal Government established the Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC) by an Act of Parliament in 2000 as an intervention agency for the sustainable 
development and peacebuilding in the NDR. In the words of President Obasanjo, 
―[t]he Niger Delta Development Commission has the potential to offer a lasting solu-
tion to the socio-economic problems of the Niger Delta people.‖ (Master Plan 2006). 
The NDDC‘s vision is to ―offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic difficulties of 
the Niger Delta Region‖. It has the mission ―...to facilitate the rapid, even and sustain-
able development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, so-
cially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful‖ (2006, p. 103). 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Literature in peace and development studies and, especially, in peace and con-
flict impact assessment has long argued for the existence of a relationship or nexus of 
development, conflict and peace. There are claims of the existence of mutual impacts 
(interactions) of intervention and its operational context and that these interactions 
have potentials to support conflict (by exacerbating conflict and/or undermining peace) 
or peace (by reducing conflict and/or building peace) in the context (Schmelzle, 2005; 
Bush, 1999; 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; Resource Pack). The potential of interventions to 
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impact (and be impacted by) its operational context negatively and/or positively sug-
gests that the NDDC, in over a decade-long intervention in the region, could have ex-
acerbated the conflict or built peace in the NDR. In other words, while the NDDC as 
an intervention agency might have a well-intended vision and mission, its interventions 
might have had/be having both negative and/or positive impacts on the ND contexts. 
On the other hand, the ND contexts might have impacted/be impacting on the NDDC 
interventions negatively or positively. The nature, dynamics, and implications of these 
potential/actual impacts of the NDDC interventions and the ND contexts have not been 
adequately/rigorously studied, using a PCIA approach (which has an overriding goal of 
minimising negative impacts and maximising positive impacts of an intervention in its 
operational context). PCIA involves mapping the nature, dynamics and implications of 
the interactions of intervention and its operational context with the aid of appropriate 
indicators. There is therefore the need to use the PCIA approach to assess the peace 
and conflict impacts of the NDDC interventions (projects and programmes) on the Ni-
ger Delta conflict situation. This will engender understanding the nature, dynamics and 
implications of the interactions of the NDDC interventions and the NDR context and 
how to maximise the positive and minimise the negative impacts. 
Such investigation is pertinent at this period because scientific knowledge on 
peace and conflict impact assessment has grown significantly since the establishment 
of the NDDC. The pre-NDDC government‘s intervention agencies earlier identified —
NDDB, Presidential Task Force, and OMPADEC— above were established in periods 
when research, scholarship and practice in peace and conflict impact assessment were 
in all practical sense non-existent. The periods were characterised by the assumption 
that development intervention would automatically lead to peace in the context of the 
intervention. Scholars and practitioners began to question this assumption in the early 
1990s. Around late 1990s, when the NDDC was conceived by President Obasanjo, 
empirical evidence had emerged to reveal the fallacy of such assumption. Indeed, it has 
been realised that such interventions are never neutral in conflict or in contexts; rather, 
they have the potential to support either conflict or peace. Nonetheless, we are yet to 
apply the PCIA logic to the Commission‘s intervention in a rigorous academic study. 
For instance, existing works on the NDDC have not assessed its capacity for peace and 
conflict-sensitive intervention, which indicates the Commission‘s potential to maxi-
mise its positive and minimise its negative contributions in peace and conflict terms. 
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Also, while empirical works on gender issues in the Niger Delta exist (Aina, Adeyemi, 
Waziri, & Samuel, 2009), a gender-based assessment of the NDDC interventions and 
its implications for the operational context has not been adequately covered. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The overarching aim of the study is to map the interactions of the NDDC interventions 
and the NDR context with the view to understanding and explaining their nature, dy-
namics, and implications for peace and conflict dynamics in the region. Specific objec-
tives include to:  
1. determine the relationship between NDDC mandate and its intervention strate-
gies as well as between the strategies and the needs of the Niger Delta people; 
2. determine the extent to which peace and conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed in 
the NDDC and its interventions; 
3. assess the peace and conflict impacts of the NDDC interventions on Odi com-
munity context; and 
4. explain the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions of the NDDC 
interventions and Odi community context. 
1.4 Research Questions 
1. What is the relationship between the NDDC mandate and its intervention 
strategies; and between the strategies and the needs of the Niger Delta people? 
2. To what extent is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in the NDDC and 
its interventions?   
3. What are the peace and conflict impacts of the NDDC interventions on Odi 
context? 
4. Why and how do the NDDC interventions and Odi community context inter-
act? 
1.5 Significance of Study 
Investigating the impacts of the relationship of the NDDC interventions and the 
NDR context has both scientific and policy relevance. In the context of scientific 
knowledge-production enterprise, the NDDC interventions and its operational context 
—the NDR— presents a good case for the application of the PCIA approach, that is, 
for empirically investigating its claims and arguments. Peace and conflict impact as-
sessment makes ontological claims about the existence of such things as interventions 
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(developmental, humanitarian and peacebuilding), intervention operational context, 
‗interactions and impacts (positive impact, negative impact, peacebuilding impact, and 
conflict impact). Justifying and knowing and understanding and explaining these onto-
logical propositions is a purely scientific quest within the scope of empirical peace 
studies; indeed, it is one of the three epistemological branches of peace studies identi-
fied by Galtung (McCandless, 2007a).  
However, since peace studies grapple with more complex situation of which 
empirical peace studies is only the beginning, this study moved from empirical peace 
studies to critical peace studies. Critical peace studies, ‗‗…based on criticism, taking 
explicit stands with respect to data and values with reference to the future particularly 
in terms of policy‘‘ (Galtung, 1996, pp. 6-9). Findings from the study will therefore 
enrich the literature and advance research in the area of impact assessment. Concep-
tions and propositions developed in this study are transferable to other settings towards 
understanding and explaining similar phenomena. By this, it connects the well-known 
need for development of concepts that cut across the peace and conflict impact assess-
ment. The study helps in better conception and understanding the potential interactions 
of intervention and context. This may inform better intervention programming in con-
flict contexts, such that interventions will do more good and less harm. 
The study is also worthwhile because it is policy-relevant. The NDDC is the 
Federal Government‘s most comprehensive socio-economic and peacebuilding inter-
vention in the NDR to date. It must therefore have contributed, in peace and conflict 
terms, to the NDR at the micro (individual and community) and meso (state or re-
gional) levels. This study, due to its policy relevance, has normative value orientation 
for peace, social justice, and gender equity amongst other values to which the field of 
Peace and Conflict Studies is explicitly committed. Findings will shed light on the con-
tributions of the NDDC to the NDR. This may inspire the review of the NDDC legal 
and policy framework by the Nigerian government to reflect sensitivity to peace, con-
flict and gender issues. The NDDC may also be inspired to adopt an institu-
tional/operational policy that is sensitive to peace, conflict and gender. Similar inter-
vention policies in the West Africa sub-region, the African continent and the world at 
large may draw from the findings and be adjusted to reflect such concerns. Actors —
NGOs, CBOs, INGOs, MOCs and others— intervening in the NDR conflict and simi-
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lar conflicts in Africa will be able to draw insights from the findings for intervention 
programming that build peace rather than exacerbate conflict.  
1.6 The Study Area 
A detailed description of setting is important in a case study research, hence the 
need to describe the study area. This section therefore describes the geographic, politi-
cal, social and cultural context of the study area. It includes information on the Niger 
Delta Region, Ijaw people and, specifically, on Odi community in Bayelsa State. It 
profiles cases of the Ijaw‘s involvement in conflicts, including Warri crisis and the oil 
conflicts in the Niger Delta. It then narrows down to profiling the 1999 Odi massacre. 
Profiling the study area in this manner is important to the study in order to understand 
Odi community as a context characterised by conflict and thus relevant in an endeav-
our to assess the impacts of intervention on the context and vice versa.  
1.6.1 The Niger Delta Region 
The Niger Delta Region (NDR) is the delta of River Niger at the Gulf of 
Guinea in the Atlantic Ocean (Hogan, 2013). The NDR, the third largest body of wet-
lands in the world, is located in the southern part of Nigeria and home to about 40 eth-
nic groups speaking 250 languages and dialects (Master Plan, 2006). The ethnic groups 
are the Anang, Bekwarra, Bini, Efik, Ekpeye, Engenne, Etche, Ibeno, Ibiobio, Igbo, 
Ijaw, Ika-Igbo, Isoko, Itseriki, Obolo, Ogba, Okrikan, Oron, Ndoni, Nembe, Urhobo 
and Yoruba amongst others (Master Plan, 2006). They live in 13,329 settlements scat-
tered across the region. Ninety-four per cent of the settlements have a population be-
low 5,000 inhabitants; 99% of these settlements have populations below 20, 000 peo-
ple (Master Plan, 2006). Based on their population sizes, less than one per cent —only 
98 settlements— can be regarded as urban centres (Master Plan, 2006). Major urban 
centres include Aba, Akure, Asaba, Benin, Calabar, Ondo, Owerri, Port Harcourt, 
Umuahia, Uyo, Warri, and Yenagoa (Master Plan, 2006). Settlements in the region are 
predominantly small and scattered hamlets. They are largely rural communities in dis-
persed villages. A typical community comprises compounds, which are closely-spaced 
groups of small buildings housing 50 to 500 folks who are mostly farmers or fisher 
folks. Most of these communities lack basic amenities including power supply, safe 
water, medical facilities, adequate transportation and commercial facilities (Master 
Plan, 2006). Hence, the NDR people are predominantly rural dwellers with low stan-
dard of living.  
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Plate 1. Niger Delta in the Context of Nigeria 
Source: Ministry of Land and Survey: Ondo State, 2011. 
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 Currently, the NDR comprises nine states consisting of Abia, Akwa-Ibom, 
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. Historically and carto-
graphically, the Niger Delta comprises Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States. Notably, there 
has been a distinction, in literature and public debates, between core/ecological Niger 
Delta and political Niger Delta, the latter being the creation of Obasanjo‘s administra-
tion, which included other oil-producing states in the current Niger Delta Region. 
The unique ecology of the NDR makes physical development difficult as com-
pared to the other parts of the country. Minority groups in the NDR had expressed fear 
of neglect and marginalisation before Nigeria‘s independence in 1960. Therefore, the 
need for a deliberate developmental plan for the region has been identified since then. 
After the discovery of oil in the 1950s, environmental degradation consequent on oil 
exploration activities and neglect by the multi-national oil companies and Nigerian 
government compounded the problem. This culminated in serious agitation by the 
people of the region (An overview of the instability is presented in section 2.1, while 
intervention efforts by different actors, especially, the Federal Government are pre-
sented in 2.2 of Chapter two) 
1.6.2 The Ijaw People 
The term Ijaw is the anglicised version of Ijọ, Izon or Ejo, a variation of Ujo or 
Ojo, the ancestor who gave the Ijo people their name,.Ijọ. With a population of about 
14,000,000 people, it is the largest of the 40 ethnic groups in the Niger Delta Region 
and the fourth largest in Nigeria. The Ijọ ethnic communities have lived in the Niger 
Delta for over seven, possibly, 10,000 years (Alagoa E. J., 2003). In 1500 AD, they 
were identified by Portuguese pilots as the largest ethnic group occupying all the 
coastal marshlands of the Nigerian coast from the Escravos to the Rio Real 
(Bonny/New Calabar) Rivers (Alagoa 2004:1 cited in Raji, forthcoming). The Ijọ live 
in all parts of the Niger Delta, from the coast up to the point where the Niger River bi-
furcates into the Nun and Forcados Rivers as well as the many other tributary rivers of 
the Niger Delta from east to west (Alagoa E. J., 2003). 
Like many traditional African nations, the Ijọ live in clans, known locally as 
Ibe. An Ibe is headed by a chief priest who is provided with an office for the effective 
running of the clans (Raji, forthcoming). There was an early evolution of a centralised 
monarchy in the ancient commercial states of Nembe, Kalabari, Okrika, Bonny and 
Opobo where unified state authority was developed (Isumonah & Gaskia, 2001). Ijo   
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Plate 2. Map of Nigeria Showing Bayelsa State 
Source: Nigerian Geology Survey, 2015 
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languages are grouped into Ijoid and the Benue-Congo branch of the Kwa-Congo sub-
family of the Volta family of the Niger-Congo phylum of languages (Isumonah & 
Gaskia, 2001, pp. 25-26). The Ijoid languages are divided into two: the Defaka and Ijo. 
Defaka is a language spoken by relatively smaller people in Rivers while Ijo is a large 
language group spoken in Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo and Ondo states. Williamson 
(cited in Alagoa E. J., 1999) argues that the Ijọ language did not originate from Edo, 
Yoruba or Igbo. Rather, it originated and had existed in the Niger Delta region for 7, 
000 years. Isumonah and Gaskia (2001) opine that the Ijọ ethnic groups, Edo and 
Ibibio are the oldest indigenous inhabitants of the Niger Delta, owing to the fact that 
several Ijọ communities in the western and eastern areas traced their roots back to cen-
tral Ijọ. In fact, Ijọ traditions do not recall any place of origin outside the Niger Delta. 
The earliest ancestors, of whom little is known, are said to have ―dropped from the 
sky‖ (that is to say that the Orus have divine origin). They were later joined by the 
Kumoni-Orus between about 400 CE and 650 CE (AD). The Kumoni-Orus first settled 
in the Nupe and Borgu regions, then the Ile-Ife region before moving to the Benin re-
gion via 
Nupe and Ife. Conclusively, Horton (cited in Alagoa E. J., 1999) suggests River Niger 
was the major route of early migration into the Niger Delta in the pre-Christian era. 
In contemporary Nigeria, the Ijọ population and political significance spread 
across 47 local government areas (LGAs) in Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, Edo, Ondo and 
Akwa-Ibom states (Isumonah & Gaskia, 2001, p. 24). This makes the Ijọ minorities in 
most of these states. However, the Ijọ population is predominant in Bayelsa State 
where they occupy eight LGAs— Brass, Ekeremor, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Nembe, 
Ogbia, Sagbama, Southern Ijọ, and Yenagoa of Bayelsa State (Alagoa E. J., 1999). The 
Ijọ are found in Ese-Odo LGA in Ondo State; Warri South, Burutu, Bomadi and Patani 
local government areas (LGAs) of Delta State; and in 10 LGAs of Rivers State – Ogu-
Bolo, Andoni, Opobo, Abua-Odual, Asari Toru, Akaku Toru, Degema, Okrika, Bonny 
and Ahoada West. The Ijọ occupy Ovia South and Ovia North LGAs of Edo State; and 
Eastern-Obolo and Ibeno LGAs of Akwa Ibom State.  
The geographical territory occupied by the Ijọ is divided into three —eastern, 
central and western zones (Efere and Williamson, 1999 cited in Raji, forthcoming). 
The eastern zone, in Rivers and Akwa Ibom states, comprises Andoni including Ataba, 
NgaUnyeada, Eastern Obolo, Ibenu in Rivers and Akwa Ibom states; Bille (an 
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autonomous Kalabari-speaking community; Ibani (Bonny Kingdom); Kalabari; Nkoro, 
Okrika, and Opobo (also Ibani, and was created out of Bonny through the migration of 
one of the two Bonny ruling houses led by Jaja in 1869). The central zone (mostly in 
Bayelsa State) comprises Abua (Rivers State), Akassa (Akaha), Apoi, Bassan, Boma, 
Engenni (also in Rivers), Ekpetiama, Epie- Atisa, Gbaran, Iduwini, Kabowei, Kolo-
kuma/Opokuma, Koluama, Nembe, Odual (located in Rivers State) Ogbia, Ogboin, 
Ogbobiri-mein, OkordiZarama, Biseni, Kou, Olodiama, Oporoma, Oyiakiri, Takakiri 
and Kumbo/Tungbo.  The western zones are Akugbene- mein,Apoi (Ondo), Arogbo 
(Ondo), Egbema (Edo), Gbaramatu, Iduwini, IsabaKobowei, Kumbo, Ngbelebiri – 
Mein, Ogulagha, Obotebe, OgbeIjo, Ogbolubiri-mein, Okomu/GbaraunFumpagba, 
Olodiama, Oporoma, Seimbiri, Taraki and Tuomo (Efere and Williamson, 1999 cited 
in Raji, forthcoming). Notable Ijọ organisations include the Ijaw National Congress, 
the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Ijaw Elders Forum, the Ijaw Youth Congress, Con-
gress of the Niger Delta Youths, and the National Union of Izon-Ebe Students. 
1.6.3 The Ijaw and Conflicts in the Niger Delta 
In tracing the origin of the Ijaw and conflicts in the Niger Delta, one needs to 
go back to the pre-colonial period. The first recorded contact of the Niger Delta with 
visitors from the outside world, specifically the Portuguese, was in 1471 (Stakeholder 
Democracy Network, 2014). The subsequent relationship that developed between both 
sides led to mutually-beneficial trade, exchanges which saw the Oba of Benin offer 
pepper, ivory and slaves in exchange for coral beads, textiles and other products from 
the European markets (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2014). Slave Trade led to 
some breakdown of the inter-community trade relationships. However, the trade dwin-
dled due to a more lucrative opportunity provided in the palm oil trade. The palm oil 
market boom coincided with the Industrial Revolution in Europe because there was a 
surge in the demand for factory machine lubricant. Also, secondary demand for palm 
oil-based products, for example soaps and margarine grew, increasing the demand for 
the natural oil due to growth in European wealth and population  (Okonta & Oronto, 
2001; Omoweh, 2005; Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2014). However, with the 
growing oil trade, conflict soon ensued among Niger Delta middlemen. This was be-
cause the middlemen, who were from different tribes and regions, wanted a better 
share of the market. This gave the European better profit as they had better market ad-
vantage. This situation led to the first major conflict involving the Ijaw people over 
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resources in the Niger Delta (Okonta & Oronto, 2001; Omoweh, 2005; Stakeholder 
Democracy Network, 2014). 
Tensions rose to a point where the first major conflict occurred, the rebel-
lion of King William Koko of Nembe, who from 1894-1895 resisted the 
Royal Niger Company's attempts to shut out the Nembe people from the 
lucrative trade in palm oil. This was a major event and is particularly 
noteworthy as it marks the feeling of imposition that the residents of the 
Niger Delta have felt since the 19th Century. (Stakeholder Democracy 
Network, 2014) 
 
In contemporary times, conflict in the NDR is rooted in the peculiar ecological 
and environmental problems, the condition of abject poverty under which most inhabi-
tants of the Niger Delta live, perceived threats to claim to land by other groups along-
side the concern over loss of control over their homeland and their own lives due to oil 
industry activities. These have caused and fuelled several conflicts in the Niger Delta 
Region. Conflicts in the region have not left out the Ijaw. Within the last two decades, 
the Ijaw have been involved in many ethnic and resource conflicts. Notable among 
them are the Ijaw-Itsekiri Conflict (the Warri Crisis) and the recurrent resource control 
or oil-related conflicts, which has become characteristic of the Niger Delta Region. 
The Warri Crisis started in March 1997 as an ethnic conflict between Ijaw and Itsekiri 
militants especially in Warri town. The remote cause is traceable to the age-old rivalry 
over the European trade, dating back to the 16
th
 century, between the two groups. The 
rivalry was nurtured by retitling the Olu of Itsekiri as Olu of Warri by the Awolowo‘s 
Western Nigeria Government in 1952 (Human Rights Watch, 2003, pp. Vol. 15, No.18 
(A)). It was an act which the other two main ethnic groups with aboriginal claims to 
Warri —the Ijaw and Urhobo— interpreted as an attempt to impose an Itsekiri rule 
over them. The immediate cause of the Warri Crisis was the relocation of the head-
quarters of the newly-created Warri South-West Local Government Council from 
Ogbe-Ijoh (in Ijaw area of Warri) to Ogidigben (in Itsekiri area of Warri). In the ensu-
ing riots, hundreds died, and six Shell Nigeria installations were seized, leading to a 
drop in oil production (Manby, 1999). The LGA headquarters was later relocated to 
Ogbe-Ijo by the Delta State House of Assembly, bringing relative peace to the region. 
However, there has been recurrence of the Warri Crisis in 1998, 1999, 2003, 2007, and 
2009. At the heart of the crises, which has pitched the indigenous ethnic groups against 
each other at different times is the question of ownership. This ―…is not only unre-
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solved to date but [is] at the root of all crisis affecting Warri city and its surrounding 
areas.‖ (Courson, 2007, p. 8) 
Also, the Ijaw people have taken active part in the Niger Delta struggle for re-
source control. The highpoint of Ijaw‘s involvement in the struggle is the All Ijaw 
Youths Conference in December 1998 culminating in the formation of Ijaw Youth 
Movement (IYM) and the issuing of the Kaiama Declaration. The IYM pledged ―to 
struggle peacefully for freedom, self-determination and ecological justice,‖ and 
planned a campaign —Operation Climate Change— of celebration, prayer, and direct 
action beginning on December 28, 1998. As the Ijaw Youth Movement mobilised for 
the campaign later in the month, the Nigerian troops occupied Bayelsa and Delta states 
with 10 to 15,000 troops and two warships. On December 30, 2,000 youths, dressed in 
black, singing and dancing were fired upon with machine guns and tear gas. Three pro-
testers were killed and 25 others were arrested.  Three more protesters were killed in a 
march demanding the release of those detained by the soldiers. The head of Yenagoa 
rebels was burned alive in his residence on December 28, 1998 (Ijaw Youth 
Movement, 1998; Ezeaku, 2006). 
The military government declared a state of emergency throughout Bayelsa 
State. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed and meetings were banned. Military road-
blocks, beatings of local residents and rape of women and girls at night were common-
place. Two Ijaw communities in Delta State —Opia and Ikivan- were attacked on 
January, 4, 1999 by 100 soldiers from the military base at Chevron‘s Escravos facility. 
Other atrocities committed by the soldiers included shooting the traditional leader of 
Ikiyan, a seven-year-old girl and some others, setting villages ablaze, destruction of 
canoes and fishing equipment, livestock, churches and shrines. (Ijaw Youth 
Movement, 1998; Human Rights Watch, 2003; Ezeaku, 2006). In spite of these, Op-
eration Climate Change continued, disrupting the nation‘s oil supplies by turning off 
oil-pipe valves in Ijaw territory through much of 1999. In the context of the conflict 
between the Ijaw and the Federal Government of Nigeria, the civilian government un-
der former president Olusegun Obasanjo ordered military action against Odi (Section 
1.6.5). This incident has become historic in Odi (and Nigeria), to which a discourse on 
the community, such as this one, must make reference (Ijaw Youth Movement, 1998; 
Human Rights Watch, 2003; Ezeaku, 2006). 
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 Plate 3. Map of Bayelsa State showing Local Governments Areas 
 Source: Nigerian Geology Survey, 2015 
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1.6.4 Odi community 
Odi is a community in Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA (with headquarters in 
Kaiama). It is located beside one of the tributary rivers of River Niger, bordered in the 
north by Odoni and Agbere, in the south by Sampou and Kaiama along the River Nun 
bank. Its western neighbours are Patani and Abari, while in the east is OkordiaZarama. 
Its built-up area is 3.85 km north-south and 2.6 km east-west (Google Earth Image, 
2011). Odi has 27 communities (formerly referred to as compounds but rechristened 
communities for political reasons). It is divided into north and south parts. There are 13 
communities in the north while the south has 14 communities. Communities in the 
north are Amakiriebi-ama, Amatus, Ebereze, Ede-ama, Ekpevama, Fisin, Ifidi, Kemi-
nanabo, Mamuagha, Osiakeme-ama, Ogien-ama, Payo, and Timbo-ama. The south 
omprises Ayakoro-ama, Bethlehem-ama, Bolou-ama, Burudani-ama, Ikiri-ama, 
Ineinfagha/Akangele-ama, Obimo, Oboribengha, Obuka-ama, Ofouwara/Gbagba-ama, 
Ogboloma, Sounbiri, Tamukunoun, Tonbere-ama (Source: Fieldwork interview, 2011). 
The community has three wards. 
There are four cardinal groups in Odi community. These are the Traditional 
Council, the Community Development Committee (CDC), the Youth Council, and the 
women‘s group. The Traditional Council is headed by His Highness, the 
Amananaowei (King) and has 27 chiefs representing each of the communities in Odi. 
Membership in the Traditional Council is by election. While the Amananaowei is 
elected for life, the chiefs are elected for three years. Upon the demise of the King, his 
first son acts as a regent for two years before election is conducted for the next King 
(Source: Fieldwork interview, 2011). Membership of the Youth Council is open to any 
female and male youth age between 15 and 45 who has a maternal or paternal affilia-
tion to the community. Interested individuals in this category register with a token fee 
to become a member. Any member can vie for elective post by campaigning and seek-
ing vote through election. Elections are held every two years through the open or secret 
ballot system. The Youth Council is a vibrant and formidable organisation in the 
community, with well-articulated 12-point objectives covering almost every facet of 
community life (Source: Fieldwork interview, 2011).  
Divergent views between the Tradition Council and the Youth Council often 
lead to tension between the two groups. However, in Odi, the Youth Council usually 
defers to the Traditional Council on many occasions out of respect for the elders and in 
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order to ‗‗allow peace to reign‘‘. The Women Group, headed by the Ereamini da-aru, 
comprises every community woman by default. The Ereamini da-aru is chosen by the 
women themselves to manage their affairs. The current Ereamini da-aru has been in 
office since the 1999 Odi Massacre (Source: Fieldwork interview, 2011). The Com-
munity Development Committee is a group set up for the development of the commu-
nity. It is supposed to be the community‘s contact with any development initiative in 
the community. Each of the 10 members is elected democratically from communities. 
No community can have more than one member. The group is headed by a chairman. 
At the time of the fieldwork, the CDC was being reconstituted in Odi. It is a strong and 
viable structure for development in the Niger Delta (Source: Fieldwork interview, 
2011). 
1.6.5 Odi Massacre 
Much has been written about the Odi Massacre. It is profiled here to describe 
the social and political contexts of the study area and thereby fulfil one of the criteria 
for increasing external validity or transferability of the findings of this study (Tables 
3.1 and 3.3). The massacre occurred within the context of the conflict between the Ijaw 
and the Federal Government; and between the Ijaw resident in Lagos and the militant 
Yoruba group —Odu‘a People‘s Congress (OPC) (Environmental Rights 
Action/Friends of the Earth, 2002). The immediate cause of the conflict was the mur-
der of seven policemen by hoodlums who were operating from Odi. These hoodlums 
were reported to be the political thugs employed by the People‘s Democratic Party 
(PDP) to win the 1998 and early 1999 elections. Since their services were no longer 
needed by their benefactors after the elections, they became unemployed. They there-
fore took to terrorising residents of Yenagoa. Dislodged from their base in Yenagoa, 
they operated from Odi. On November 10, the Federal Government gave a 14-day ul-
timatum to the Bayelsa State government to arrest and prosecute the hoodlums or face 
imposition of a state of emergency on the state. However, on November 20, 1999, four 
days to the expiration of the ultimatum, soldiers surrounded Odi and neighbouring 
communities. According to the report of ERA/FOE, Nigeria, ―by the time the military 
operation ended, 2,483 people, including women and children, lay dead. Many more 
were displaced, injured, and traumatised and an inestimable number of properties de-
stroyed.‖ (2002, p. 6). Most of the community‘s 60,000 inhabitants, who were not 
killed, were arrested, or fled into the forest. 
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Plate 4. Map of Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA showing Odi  
Source: Nigerian geology Survey, 2015  
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Plate 5. Google Earth Image of Built-up Area of Odi  
Source: Fieldwork, Google Earth, 2011. 
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At the time of the fieldwork —11 years after the massacre— Odi community 
had become a peaceful community. There were no open conflicts, however, as re-
vealed by the study, low profile and latent dissatisfaction abound. Moreover, the mas-
sacre was a reference point in discussions with all the community people interviewed, 
hence the need to profile it here. 
1.7 Scope of the Study 
The study assessed the interactions of the NDDC community development interven-
tions —Infrastructural Development Projects (IDPs) and Human Capacity Develop-
ment Programmes (HCDPs) and Odi community context. The interventions included 
all the NDDC undertaken in the community between 2006 and 2011. These interven-
tions generally fall within the NDDC Quick Impacts Projects (QIPs) and the early 
phase (years 1-5) of the implementation of the Niger Delta Regional Development 
Master Plan. The study limited its investigation to how these interventions were pro-
grammed by the NDDC and its implications for the peace and conflict dynamics in the 
community. Specifically, it examined how each stage of the intervention impacted 
upon the context (that is, its elements such as conflict causes, actors, profile and dy-
namics of conflict in the community) and vice versa; and the consequences of these 
interactions on both the intervention and the community context. It assessed the Com-
mission‘s capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity.  
The interventions evaluated were: 
Infrastructural Development Programmes 
1. Construction of roads, including the Odi-Trofani Road and Agberiye-Odoni to 
Sampo Road. 
2. Pavement of the concrete link roads within the community.  
3. Electrification of Odi (uncompleted at the time of the fieldwork). 
4. Provision of science laboratory and construction of classrooms in public 
schools in Odi.  
5. Replacement of community school converted to government school.  
6. Rehabilitation of community guest house. 
Human Capacity Development Programmes 
1. Agricultural support programme (training in aquaculture, mushroom, grasscut-
ter rearing, beekeeping, and snail rearing).  
2. Rice plantation.  
3. Distribution of flying boats.  
4. Training of youths on nonviolence. 
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Plate 6. Researcher and an Elderly Respondent in Odi Community 
Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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Plate 7. Researcher with Godwin Unumeri (Expert on PCIA and Niger Delta) 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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    Plate 8. Rural Electrification Project 
     
    Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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      Plate 9. NDDC Water Project in Odi 
      Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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Plate 10. Odi-Trofani Road 
Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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Plate 11. Odi Internal Concrete Link Road by the Women’s Leader’s House 
Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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Plate 12. Internal Concrete Link Road, Odi 
Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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Plate 13. A Block of Six Classrooms at Government Secondary School, Odi 
Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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Plate 14. Six-room Science Laboratory at Government Secondary School, Odi 
Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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Plate 15. Staff Quarters at the Government Secondary School, Odi 
Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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    Plate 16. Bioresource Development Centre (BIODEC), Odi. 
   Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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    Plate 17. Bioresource Development Centre (BIODEC), Odi     
    Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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1.8 Limitations of Study 
The study was mainly limited by the frequent violence in the Niger Delta re-
gion. Incidents of road blockade, violent demonstrations, and armed confrontations 
delayed collection of data at some point in the research. Also, the 2011 sacking of the 
NDDC Board hindered access to information from NDDC staff as they were instructed 
not to ‗‗talk to anybody‘‘ about the Commission. The research had to be delayed until 
the members of staff were again willing to provide needed information. These limita-
tions, however, did not in any way compromise the integrity of the data collection, 
analyses and findings.   
1.9 Conceptual Discourse 
Community context: This is a locality, a specific geographical, political or so-
cial environment where conflict exists. It is a conflict zone. It could be at micro, meso 
or macro levels, that is, it could be community, district/province, region, country, or 
transnational. A context comprises four elements —actors, causes, profile and dynam-
ics— which confer on it its characteristic features.  
Actors: These are individuals, groups, institutions who contribute to the con-
flict, who are affected by the conflict (positively or negatively) and/or involved in 
dealing with the conflict. Interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships with 
other actors differentiate actors from one another. Actors include external actors and 
community actors.  
Community actors: These are resident and non-resident community members 
including individuals and groups. Resident community members are also referred to as 
the critical stakeholders in an intervention programme.  
Ward 12 constituency: This is a unique set of actors in Kolokuma-Opokuma 
LGA. It includes influential individuals such as politicians, the NDDC staff and other 
government officials who are non-resident indigenes of communities in the LGA but 
lobby for government assistance on behalf of their community.  
External actors: These are people who originally are not constituent parts of 
the conflict but became involved mainly to intervene in conflict. They include the 
FGN, the NDDC —its board, management and staff— the NDDC contractors and con-
sultants, I/NGOs, IGOs, and politicians from outside the community. 
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Causes of conflict: These are factors that contribute to people‘s grievances. 
They may be structural, proximate or triggers.  
Structural factors: These are pervasive factors that have been built into the 
policies, structures and fabric of a society and which may increase the likelihood of 
violence.  
Proximate factors: They are those that make for an atmosphere conducive to 
violent conflict or its escalation.  
Triggers: These are single acts, events, or their anticipation setting off or esca-
lating violent conflict. They affect the timing of the onset of a violent conflict explain-
ing why the conflict started at that moment and not why it started.  
Profile: This is a brief characterisation of the context in which an intervention 
will be situated. It includes political, economic, socio-cultural context, emergent is-
sues, and history of conflict. 
Dynamics: This is the interaction between conflict causes, actors and profile, 
including current conflict trends, windows of opportunity and scenarios that can be 
developed from the analyses of the causes, actors and profile of conflict (The Resource 
Pack, 2004). 
Conflict situation: This is a particular set of prevalent circumstances existing 
in a particular place at a particular time as a result of two or more parties disagreeing 
and acting in pursuant of perceived incompatible goals in the distribution of material or 
symbolic resources (Adapted from the Resource Pack, 2004). It is the prevalent con-
flict trend between/among parties to the conflict. 
Intervention: This is a range of deliberate initiatives or activities, which aim at 
positively influencing a situation to bring about an improvement or to forestall deterio-
ration. In conflict settings, these initiatives or activities aim to forestall exacerbation of 
the conflict and weakening of peace on one hand and reduce violent conflict behav-
iours and build peace on the other. Peacebuilding and conflict transformation (in its 
broadest sense) are critical goals of intervention in settings characterised by violent 
conflict. Intervention has three main stages —planning (including conception), imple-
mentation, and monitoring and evaluation. Intervention in this discourse refers to aid 
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interventions, that is, developmental and humanitarian; and peace intervention, that is, 
peacebuilding.  
Developmental interventions: These are long-term efforts aimed at bringing 
improvements in the economic, political, and social status, environmental stability and 
quality of life of the population especially the poor and disadvantaged (The Resource 
Pack, 2004: 4). 
Humanitarian interventions: These are activities designed to rapidly reduce 
human suffering in emergency situations, especially when local authorities are unable 
or unwilling to provide relief (The Resource Pack, 2004: 4). 
Peacebuilding interventions: These are measures designed to consolidate 
peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic, and cultural institu-
tions capable of mediating conflict, as well as strengthen other mechanisms that will 
either create or support the creation of necessary conditions for sustained peace (The 
Resource Pack, 2004: 5). 
Impacts: This describes an interaction in terms of its contribution to exacerbat-
ing or mitigating violence or the potential for violence. 
 
Intervention-Context Interaction (ICI): These are inevitable reciprocal and 
combined interactions between stages of intervention and elements of context. That is, 
each of the three stages of intervention programming relate, inevitably, with each of 
the four elements of the context. In a conflict situation, ICI could have negative or 
positive impact. 
Negative Impacts: These refer to both conflict-supporting impacts and peace-
undermining/destroying impacts of interactions.  
 
Positive Impacts: These are impacts that support the dynamics and structures 
of peace (peacebuilding) and weaken the dynamics and structures of violent conflict.  
Planning: This is the process through which certain problems are identified, 
their causal linkages analysed, and effective solutions developed. The result of this 
process is often embodied in a programme designed with predefined objectives, activi-
ties, implementation process and verifiable indicators of progress. 
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Implementation: This is the process of realising objectives by enacting the ac-
tivities designed in the planning process – the operationalization of the proposal. Im-
plementation involves regular progress reviews to make plans adjustable if necessary. 
Monitoring: This is the regular process of examining a project‘s actual outputs 
and impacts. Carried out during the implementation phase, monitoring seeks to provide 
the project team with current information that will allow them assess progress in meet-
ing project objectives, and to adjust implementation activities if necessary. Addition-
ally, monitoring generates data that can be used for evaluation purposes. 
Evaluation: This is a one-off assessment that typically takes place at the end of 
a project, although it can also be undertaken as a mid-project review. On the basis of 
systematically-applied objective criteria, it seeks to assess an on-going or completed 
project, its design, implementation and overall results in relation to its stated goals and 
objectives. 
Peace and conflict sensitivity: This is the consciousness of the inevitable in-
teraction between an intervention and its context and its implication for peace and con-
flict dynamics; and programming the intervention in a manner to maximise positive 
and minimise negative impacts. It involves mainstreaming peace and conflict concerns 
in the full intervention programming cycle —planning, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation. 
Peace and conflict sensitive planning: Incorporating conflict analyses —
causes, actors, profile, and dynamics into traditional programme conception and plan-
ning for the purpose of maximising positive and minimising negative impacts. 
Peace and conflict sensitive implementation: Maximising positive and reduc-
ing negative impacts on the context as a goal of traditional implementation by closely 
scrutinizing the context through regular updating of the conflict analyses (The Re-
source Pack, 2004). 
Peace and conflict sensitive monitoring: This is when an understanding of the 
elements of context is incorporated into traditional monitoring processes and activities. 
Its goal is to better understand the context and intervention and interactions between 
them to maximise the positive while reducing the negative impacts of the intervention 
on the peace and conflict dynamics. Peace and conflict sensitive monitoring may in-
form changes or adjustments to intervention activities (The Resource Pack, 2004). 
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Peace and conflict sensitive evaluation: It involves incorporating detailed un-
derstanding of the operating context in terms of historical, actual or potential conflict 
into traditional evaluation activities and processes. It seeks ―…to understand the over-
all impact a given intervention has had on this context, and the context on the interven-
tion‖ (Introduction to the Resource Pack, 2004: 4). 
1.10 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the study. It provided background information on 
peace and conflict impact assessment in conflict setting and presented the research 
problem, objectives, questions, and significance. It identified the study‘s epistemology 
as empirical and critical peace studies. The study is clearly delimited in scope as cover-
ing all NDDC interventions from 2006 to 2011 in Odi community and it included six 
Infrastructural Development Projects and four Human Capacity Development Pro-
grammes. This study has relevance to theory, practice, policy, and it contributes to sci-
entific knowledge in the area of peace and conflict impact assessment.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
In scientific research, the review of literature is done to acquire scientific perspective 
about the subject of investigation, identify gap in the literature, avoid re-inventing the 
wheel as well as conceptual and procedural problems among others. Categories of in-
formation covered in reviewing literature include information on the content of the re-
search, theory, method and data analyses. This chapter presents a review of the extant 
literature in these core areas. It covers literature on the nature and trajectory of conflict 
in the Niger Delta Region in section 2.1 and peacebuilding efforts in the Niger Delta 
Region in 2.2. In section 2.3, it discusses theory verification and theory generation in 
scientific research and emphasises the need to generate theories of peace and conflict 
impact assessment. Section 2.4 presents the PCIA theoretical framework and section 
2.5 presents a tabular summary review of 15 PCIAs and a detailed review of the four 
most prominent approaches in academic discourse. These include Bush‘s Peace and 
Conflict Impact Assessment, Anderson‘s Do no Harm/Local Capacities for Peace Pro-
gramme, Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff‘s Conflict Sensitive Approaches 
and Paffenholz‘s Aid for Peace Approach. The Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Ap-
proaches —an integration and adaptation of the prominent approaches for the purpose 
of this study— is presented in section 2.6. Section 2.7 is a discourse on gender main-
streaming, introducing the gender dimension of this study. Section 2.8 discusses gaps 
in the literature on the Niger Delta and peace and conflict impact assessment that this 
study seeks to fill. The final Section 2.9 presents two conceptual frameworks used in 
this study —Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Capacity Framework and the Gender-
Based Analysis Framework. 
2.1 Conflicts in the Niger Delta 
In Trade and politics in the Niger Delta‖ Kenneth Dike provides a historical back-
ground to the Niger Delta Crisis, documenting the economic and political develop-
ments in the region from 1830 to 1885. The work focuses on the nature of relationships 
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between the region‘s people and their African neighbours alongside the relationship 
between the Niger Delta peoples and the Europeans in the Gulf of Guinea. It argues 
that conflicts in the NDR predate Nigeria‘s independence as well as oil discovery and 
exploitation in the region (Dike, 1956). Resource control, as a feature of NDR con-
flicts, also predates independence and oil. In Niger Delta Rivalry: Itsekiri-Urhobo Re-
lations and the European Presence 1884-1936, Obaro Ikime (1969) also provides in-
sight into the Niger Delta conflicts. Focusing on Itsekiri, Urhobo and Isoko ethnic 
groups, he contests that the primary cause of tension and violence among the ethnic 
groups was essentially the question of resource control. In addition, Ogbogbo (2004) 
explains that accumulated grievance consequent upon faulty management solutions 
over the years has contributed to the conflict. In the same light, Isumonah asserts: ―the 
success of the Obasanjo administration‘s management model for Niger Delta conflicts 
will be determined by the extent of its accommodation of the concerns of the people of 
Niger Delta that in the first instance gave rise to them (Isumonah A. V., 2003, p. 223). 
Ogbogbo and Isumonah‘s views border on the quest of this study —an investigation 
into how management solutions‘ in form of interventions have contributed to the con-
flict situation. In its description of the Niger Delta region, a United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) report supports their views as well as identifies other fac-
tors:   
―…the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, 
crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social 
deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor and endemic conflict… for 
most people of the Delta, progress and hope, much less prosperity, re-
main out of reach.‖ (United Nations Development Programme, 2006). 
This situation has led to festering violence, organised crime and economic 
sabotage, kidnapping, agitation and pervasive tension in the Niger Delta. This, analysts 
declare, is rooted in the feeling of neglect and unfairness the region bears against the 
Nigerian state. It gave rise to regional or ethnic political movements, such as the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Ijaw Youth Council 
(IYC); militant groups, such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND); and the essentially criminal organisations, servicing politicians at the state 
level, such as the Icelanders/Niger Delta Vigilantes and the Outlaws, both of Rivers 
State (Cole, Mitchell, Ohlsen, Rinaldi, & Unumeri, 2008).  In the region, ―[c]urrent 
levels of violence, driven by criminality, impunity and corruption, are very high. The 
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immediate causes of violent conflict, while rooted in the issues noted above, can be 
very local and demand specific analysis‖ (Cole, Mitchell, Ohlsen, Rinaldi, & Unumeri, 
2008, p. 4) 
Seeking an intervention in the situation, the International Crisis Group reports 
115 and 119 of August 3 and October 25, ―The swamps of insurgency: Nigeria‘s Delta 
unrest‖ and ―Nigeria‘s faltering Federal Experiment‖ espoused solutions to the Niger 
Delta crisis. The ICG calls for inputs from stakeholders —Nigeria‘s Federal Govern-
ment, state governments, energy companies, the US, the EU and EU member states 
with major oil interests in Nigeria (UK, France and Italy), the United Nations, and the 
wider international community. From the foregoing, conflict has a long history in the 
region. Alagoa (1999), in ―The Ijaw Nation in the New Millennium‖, observes that the 
Niger Delta conflict has been changing with time as the parties to the conflict —the 
antagonists and protagonists— also change with time. Also, attempts to stem the tides 
of the dynamic conflict are almost as old as the conflict itself. 
2.2 Peacebuilding Efforts in the Niger Delta 
According to the IPCR, there are three categories of responses to conflict in Nigeria —
tracks I, II and III, that is, governmental, non-government actors and civil society, and 
international responses (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, October 2002, p. 
30). This is the pattern in the Niger Delta conflicts. Non-government actors and civil 
society have led peace campaigns and participated in cross-communal peace initia-
tives. Moreover, they have been involved in providing and coordinating relief, con-
ducting studies of conflicts and organising workshops and various techniques of con-
flict resolution, and implementing peacebuilding initiatives. Transnational oil compa-
nies have also been supporting programmes to improve the conditions of host commu-
nities. This involves compensating them for environmental damage and instituting re-
cruitment policies that favour indigenous people from host communities (Institute for 
Peace and Conflict Resolution, October 2002, p. 33). 
The Human Rights Watch, in its reports, provides some insights into the devel-
opmental interventions of the multinational oil companies (MOCs) in the Niger Delta. 
It reports that Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) claims to have an ac-
tive community assistance programme (now community development programme) 
which as at 1996 spent about U.S $36million to execute development projects based on 
the needs of the people and in agreement with their communities. Mobil claims to have 
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spent an average of U.S $8million annually on community development projects be-
tween1990 and 1997. Chevron Nigeria Limited reports that it spent approximately U.S. 
$28 million on community development and other forms of assistance to its host com-
munities (Human Rights Watch, 1999). For instance, some of the most recent initia-
tives by MOCs include Chevron‘s Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) 
and Shell‘s Communities and Shell Together (CAST) Project. However, initiatives by 
MOCs are usually focused on specific locales of the region, usually, their areas of oil-
exploration activities. The involvement of international organisations in peacebuilding 
efforts has increased over the years. Notable among these are the Stakeholders of 
Peace Workshop and the Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria (including the 
NDR) jointly sponsored by the World Bank, DFID, UNDP, and USAID, (Institute for 
Peace and Conflict Resolution, October 2002, p. 34). Further efforts to build peace in 
the Niger Delta have been highlighted by Albert (2001) in Building Peace, Advancing 
Democracy: Experience with Third-Party Interventions in Nigeria‘s Conflict. He 
draws attention to the fact that USAID/OTI in collaboration with several NGOs, inter-
vened in more than a hundred social conflicts in different parts of Nigeria between 
April 1999 and September 2001, and many others in the Niger Delta (Albert, 2001a, p. 
7). 
On its own part, the Nigerian government has employed a mixture of measures 
to build peace in the region. Such peacebuilding measures range from security re-
sponses by the use of force to relief responses to victims of crisis. It also includes po-
litical responses by setting up panels of inquiry, creation of new administrative units, 
peace and security committees facilitating memorandum of understanding between oil 
companies and local communities as well as instituting and commissioning research. 
Finally, there are socio-economic responses that make development inputs through es-
tablishing such bodies as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) (Institute 
for Peace and Conflict Resolution, October 2002).  
Isumonah (2003) observes that government interventions in the Niger Delta 
crisis explains that before the exploitation of oil began in the NDR, a colonial govern-
ment commission of enquiry, the Willink‘s Commission of 1957/58, recognised its pe-
culiar developmental challenges and recommended a developmental board. Conse-
quently, subsequent administrations have set up various developmental agencies to 
ameliorate these problems. The Balewa administration set up the Niger Delta Devel-
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opment Board (NDDB) by an Act of Parliament in 1961. The 1979/83 administration 
set up a Presidential Task Force (popularly known as the 1.5% Committee) in 1980 
and 1.5% of the Federation Account was allocated to the committee to tackle the de-
velopmental problems of the region. In 1992, the Babangida administration established 
the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) for provi-
sion of infrastructure in the area. Due largely to the failure of OMPADEC and the con-
tinued restiveness in the area, the Obasanjo administration established in 2000 the Ni-
ger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). 
Furthermore, Isumonah highlights minor remedial programmes of government 
in the area, including the establishment of a technical training institute to provide voca-
tional training for school leavers of Bonny; mandating the Federal Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Productivity to create 1,000 jobs in each of Delta, Bayelsa and Riv-
ers states, under the pilot scheme of employment creation for the Niger Delta; also, a 
free school bus scheme was proposed for the area. In November 2000, the government 
rolled out a 12-point programme. This comprises the establishment of NDDC; achiev-
ing 2000 gas flaring by 2010; remediation and rehabilitation of impacted/spilled sites 
using state-of-the-art technology; conflict resolution/crisis management programmes; 
and community participation programme public/private partnership programme. In ad-
dition, the programme included integrated environmental management and develop-
ment programme; provision of basic infrastructure such as water, electricity, and tele-
phone; cottage/small-scale industries development/support programme, farmers‘ em-
powerment scheme, community health enhancement/promotion programme; and envi-
ronmental programme. 
The characteristic operations and outcome of government agencies in the re-
gion could be summed up in a review of the activities of the OMPADEC:  
―…but what is clear is that OMPADEC suffered from lack of focus, in-
adequate and irregular funding, official profligacy, corruption, exces-
sive political interference, lack of transparency and accountability, and 
high overhead expenditure. Most of its projects had little to do with 
poverty reduction and the vast majority of the people did not benefit 
from its activities. In brief, OMPADEC failed abjectly to abate discon-
tent and restiveness in the Region.‖ (The Niger Delta Regional Master 
Plan: 57). 
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On the eve of the departure of the Obasanjo government which covered 1999-2007, 
hitherto Nigeria‘s longest period of democratic rule, Richard Dowden, the director of 
the Royal African Society, which promotes cooperation between Britain and African 
nations, observed that:  
He (Olusegun Obasanjo) leaves bloody anarchy in the Niger Delta, 
which produces most of Nigeria‘s 2.5million bbl of oil a day and in-
creasing volumes of gas. At least 1,000 people a year are killed in bat-
tles on land and sea between the 50-odd militias who fight the authori-
ties as well as each other for opportunities to steal oil and kidnap oil 
workers for ransom‖ (Dowden, 2007). 
Dowden‘s observation aptly captures the fact that successive Nigeria regimes efforts to 
build peace in the region have failed woefully and that the Niger Delta situation has 
become more complicated and dangerous. In a United States Institute of Peace Special 
Report, Newsom contends: 
The situation in the delta remains fragile and will likely return either to 
intermittent conflict or full-blown insurgency within six to eighteen 
months if a ―business as usual‖ approach is taken to interventions. 
(June 2011, p. 1) 
2.3 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Frameworks 
A peace and conflict impact assessment mainstreams peace and conflict sensitivity into 
traditional assessment. In other words, it assesses a given programme or intervention 
with explicit bias for peace and conflict issues. As discussed in chapter one, various 
approaches, methods, frameworks and tools have been developed to map, assess, and 
evaluate the impacts of intervention in/on conflict settings. This section presents a 
summary of 15 of such approaches in Table 2.1 and reviews four prominent ones iden-
tified earlier in section 1.1.  
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Table 2.1. A Summary of some Approaches/Methods/Frameworks for Peace and 
Conflict Impact Assessments 
S/
N 
Framework/ 
Organisation/ 
Field of activ-
ity/ 
Authors/Year 
of issue 
Purpose  Level  Potential  
Users  
Assump-
tions  
Meth-
odology  
Resources 
1 Strategic Con-
flict Assessment 
(SCA)  
DFID;  
DEV* 
Jonathan Good-
hand, Tony 
Vaux, Robert 
Walker 
January 2002 
 
Country/ 
regional 
strategic 
planning, 
can also 
be ap-
plied 
to pro-
jects/ 
pro-
grammes 
Re-
gional, 
na-
tional, 
Local 
DFID and 
partner 
bilateral / 
multilateral 
agencies desk 
officers 
Combine 
political 
and eco-
nomic 
dimen-
sions; 
greed/gri
evance; 
struc-
tures and 
actors 
Combi-
nation of 
desk 
study 
and 
field 
consulta-
tions 
Assessment 
team 
(5 people). 
Consultation 
meetings in-
country 
2 Benefits / harms 
handbook 
CARE;DEV/HA 
Paul O‘Brien 
September 2001 
Analysis, 
impact 
assess-
ment and 
project 
(re)desig
n 
Local – 
mainly 
project 
level 
NGO project 
managers, 
field 
staff 
 
Focus on 
rights-
based 
approach 
Desk-
based 
and 
field re-
search 
and pos-
sible  
work-
shop 
consulta-
tions 
Varies – few 
hours in  
emergencies to 
more detailed 
workshops / 
consultations 
3 Conflict Analy-
sis Framework 
(CAF)  World 
Bank; DEV; 
Per Wam & 
Shonali 
Sardesai 
October 2002 
Country 
strategic 
planning 
 
Na-
tional, 
can 
also 
be 
adapted 
to (sub) 
re-
gional 
Multilateral 
organisation 
desk 
staff / plan-
ners 
 
Focus on 
socio-
eco-
nomic 
dimen-
sions of 
conflict 
 
Check-
list; Desk 
studies, 
work-
shops, 
stake-
holder 
consulta-
tions, 
consult-
ants 
Full CAF 
analysis 
resource inten-
sive 
(workshops, 
consultations, 
consultants); 
but 
can be simpli-
fied 
4 Conflict analysis 
and response 
definition 
FEWER, 
WANEP & 
CCR; PB 
FEWER 
April 2001 
Early  
warning, 
country 
strategic 
planning 
 
Na-
tional, 
local  
Diplomats, 
donor 
desk officers, 
NGOs 
 
Focus on 
conflict 
dynam-
ics 
 
On-
going  
analysis 
by local 
civil so-
ciety 
organisa-
tions 
Modest for 
desk 
study; more for 
training or 
workshops 
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S/
N 
Framework/ 
Organisation/ 
Field of activ-
ity/ 
Authors/Year 
of issue 
Purpose  Level  Potential  
Users  
Assump-
tions  
Meth-
odology  
Resources 
5 EC Checklist for 
root causes of 
conflict; 
European 
Commis-
sion(EC); DEV; 
EC  
2001 
Early  
warning, 
strategic 
and 
pro-
gramme 
planning 
Na-
tional, 
re-
gional 
Multi- and 
bilateral 
donor desk 
officers, 
diplomatic 
actors 
Focus on 
structural 
root 
causes of 
conflict 
 
Check-
list;  
external 
research 
capacity 
 
Limited as 
mainly 
desk-based 
6 Working with 
conflict: skills 
and strategies 
for action; Re-
sponding to con-
flict; PB 
Fisher et al.; 
2000 
Conflict 
analysis, 
pro-
gramme 
planning 
Local, 
national  
 
Local and 
INGO 
staff, field 
and 
headquarters 
Focus on 
under-
standing 
conflicts 
 
Collec-
tion of 
tools 
for par-
ticipa-
tory 
conflict 
analysis 
Limited de-
pending 
on format 
(workshop, 
consultation 
meetings etc) 
7 Making Sense of 
Turbulent Con-
texts (MSTC): 
Analysis tools 
for humanitarian 
actors; World 
Vision; DEV / 
HA 
Stephen Jackson 
&Siobhan 
Calthrop 
January 2003 
Conflict 
analysis, 
project 
planning 
Na-
tional, 
re-
gional 
NGO emer-
gency 
response, 
development 
and 
advocacy 
staff 
Focus on 
chronic 
political 
instabil-
ity, 
dovetails 
with Do 
No Harm 
Collec-
tion of 
tools, 
flexible 
applica-
tion 
 
Variable, 
depending on 
use 
of tools, desk 
study 
or consulta-
tions 
8 Do No Harm / 
Local capacities 
for peace pro-
ject; Collabora-
tive for Devel-
opment Action 
(CDA); Mary 
Anderson 
2001 
Conflict 
analysis, 
project 
monitor-
ing 
and im-
pact 
assess-
ment 
Local Donor, NGO 
(international 
and 
local) staff 
Focus on 
dividers 
and con-
nectors 
in 
conflict 
Work-
shop, 
integra-
tion into 
standard 
proce-
dures 
Limited, for 
workshop 
9 Conflict and 
Policy Assess-
ment Frame-
work (CPAF); 
Clingendael In-
stitute; DEV/F 
Suzanne Ver-
Conflict 
analysis, 
country 
strategic 
planning 
 
Na-
tional, 
secto-
rial 
Donor and 
embassy 
staff 
 
Focus on 
indica-
tors 
of inter-
nal con-
flict 
and state 
External  
research 
capacity, 
work-
shops 
Costs of  
preparing 
for and holding 
workshops, 
can 
include exter-
nal 
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S/
N 
Framework/ 
Organisation/ 
Field of activ-
ity/ 
Authors/Year 
of issue 
Purpose  Level  Potential  
Users  
Assump-
tions  
Meth-
odology  
Resources 
stegen, Luc van 
de Goor (to-
gether with 
Fund for Peace); 
Summer 2000 
failure 
 
consultant 
involvement 
10 Early Warning 
and Preventive 
Measures - UN 
System Staff 
College 
(UNSSC); 
UNSSC 
1999 
Early  
warning, 
conflict 
analysis, 
design 
Na-
tional  
UN staff (HQ 
and 
field), other 
donor 
agencies or 
NGOs 
Focus on 
human 
security 
and hu-
man 
rights 
frame-
work 
 
Training/ 
work-
shop 
Setting 
Training  
materials, 
facilitation, 
workshop /  
training 
costs 
11 Conflict assess-
ment frame-
work; USAID; 
DEV; 
Sharon Morris 
7 Jan 2002 
Conflict 
analysis, 
country 
and pro-
ject 
planning 
Na-
tional 
Donor desk 
officers, 
implementing 
partners, 
other US 
government 
officials 
Broad 
scope, 
synthesis 
of other 
tools 
Desk 
study, 
work-
shop, 
follow 
up inte-
gration 
into 
program-
ming 
strategy 
For desk study, 
in 
country visit 
and 
follow-up 
work 
12 Conflict analysis 
for project plan-
ning and  
implementation; 
GTZ; DEV 
Manuela Leon-
hardt 
2002asses 
Conflict 
analysis, 
country 
and pro-
ject 
planning 
Na-
tional, 
project 
Donor, NGO 
desk 
officers,  
project 
managers 
Broad 
scope, 
synthesis 
of other 
tools 
Combi-
nation of 
desk 
study 
and 
empirical  
research, 
tools for 
partici-
patory 
conflict  
analysis 
Costs of  
organising 
workshops and 
consultation 
meetings 
13 FAST method-
ology - Swiss 
Peace - DEV / 
FP 
Swisspeace, in  
collaboration 
Early  
warning, 
risk 
assess-
ments 
Na-
tional, 
can be 
sub-
re-
gional 
Government 
ministries, 
development 
agencies, 
NGOs, 
international 
Event 
data 
analysis 
(quanti-
tative 
and 
Field  
informa-
tion 
collec-
tion, 
desk-
Resource  
intensive 
for maintain-
ing 
local informa-
tion 
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S/
N 
Framework/ 
Organisation/ 
Field of activ-
ity/ 
Authors/Year 
of issue 
Purpose  Level  Potential  
Users  
Assump-
tions  
Meth-
odology  
Resources 
with VRA (Vir-
tual 
Research Asso-
ciates) 
1999 
organisations qualita-
tive) 
based 
analysis 
networks and 
specialist 
analysis 
network 
15 Better Pro-
gramming Ini-
tiative - IFRC - 
HA 
IFRC 
1998 
 
 
Conflict 
assess-
ment, 
training 
 
Pro-
gramm
e; local, 
na-
tional, 
re-
gional 
 
Red 
Cross/Red 
Crescent  
National 
Societies, 
delegation 
and 
other staff 
Focus on 
aid 
fostering 
long-
term 
recon-
ciliation 
and 
recovery 
Analysis 
and 
Training 
Depending on 
scope of 
assessment or 
length of train-
ing 
 
Key 
Field of activity 
DEV: Development 
HA: Humanitarian Assistance 
PB: Peacebuilding 
FP: Foreign Policy 
Source: Fieldwork, Adapted from Resource Pack, pp. 32-60 
 
 
According to Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, and Sheriff (2005, p. 12), ―…all 
users and promoters of the various concepts and terminologies [Bush‘s ‗PCIA-
derivative labels‘] have their own opinions‖ and probably biases as well. Nevertheless, 
in the words of Paffenholz, ―all PCIA approaches do have in common the thorough 
analysis of the conflict situation and the formulation of recommendations for coping 
with the situation, e.g. for reducing possible negative effects of an intervention on vio-
lent conflict and for enhancing its contribution to peacebuilding‖ (2005, p. 51). The 
intent, therefore, is that interventions will build rather than weaken or destroy peace; 
and reduce rather than exacerbate conflict. The underlying assumptions of the ap-
proaches include: 
 intervention in conflict situations is never neutral; 
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 intervention in a context has measurable impacts on the structures and dynam-
ics of peace and conflict of the context; 
 the structures and dynamics of peace and conflict of the context also have 
measurable impacts on the intervention; 
 these impacts can either be negative, conflict-exacerbating impacts or positive, 
peacebuilding impacts; 
 there is need for sensitivity to peace and conflict issues —structures, dynamics, 
and processes— to achieve positive impacts; and 
 the capacity of the intervening agency to peace and conflict-sensitise its pro-
grammes has implications for the overall impacts on the conflict situation. 
In spite of these common assumptions, there are key differences in the various 
PCIA approaches. These include the analysis process, the understanding of impact, 
level of intervention, purpose of PCIA, and level of actors addressed (Paffenholz, 
2006). According to Paffenholz, first, these approaches vary in the systematic linking 
of analyses to implications for intervention. Second, they differ in their understanding 
of impacts. While few define impacts as outcomes, majority see impact as including 
immediate outcomes and longer-term effects. Third, majority of the approaches focus 
on the project level of development interventions; only a few are applicable to country 
programme and policy level. Fourth, only few of them are useful in multiple ways or 
can be integrated in entire programming cycle. Some are best used for project planning 
or mid-term assessments. Finally, while ‗‗…some are tailored for a specific group, 
such as local or international NGOs, donors, joint multi-donor interventions, etc.‘‘ 
(Paffenholz, 2006, p. 2) most are suitable for all kinds of actors. Four of the most 
prominent PCIA approaches —Kenneth Bush‘s Hands-On PCIA, Mary Anderson‘s Do 
No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace (DnH/LCPP), Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald 
and Sheriff‘s Conflict Sensitive Approaches (CSA), and Thania Paffenholz‘s ‗Aid for 
Peace Approach— are presented below.   
2.3.1 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) 
Kenneth Bush coined the term Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) in 1996 
(Bush K. , 1998; 2005, p. 28; Paffenholz, 2005, p. 51). Bush submitted that he was in-
spired by the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in coining PCIA (Bush K. , 
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2003a, p. 75; 2009, p. 8) as the coinage coincided with the golden age of EIA. What-
ever inspired Bush, it could be argued that PCIA has become a reference term for as-
sessing impacts with peace and conflict concerns. Since then, following conceptual 
discourses in impact assessment and building on experiences from applying it in vari-
ous contexts, Bush has progressively evolved the term PCIA and attempted to make it 
more user-friendly. At different times, Bush has used Hands-on PCIA (Bush K. , 
2003a; 2003c; 2005) and PCIA/Aid for Peace (Bush K. , 2009). Bush defines PCIA as 
‗‗…a means of assessing the ways in which an intervention may affect, or has affected 
the dynamics of peace or conflict in a conflict-prone region‘‘ (2003, p. 77). PCIA is a 
process, ―…and not an add-on or a single-use tool‖ (Bush 2003a, p. 77). It concerns 
itself with peacebuilding impact and conflict-creating impact. Peacebuilding impact 
refers to those factors that strengthen the chances for peace and decrease the chances 
that violent conflict will break out, continue, or start again. It consists of two parts, 
namely construction of structures of peace and de-construction of the structures of vio-
lence. Conflict-creating impact refers to those factors that increase the chances that 
conflict will be dealt with through the use of violence (Bush, 1998; Bush and Opp, 
1999; Bush 2003). Impact here means actual effects of an intervention, intended and 
unintended on beneficiaries, and others beyond immediate project outputs.  
PCIA assumes that development is inevitably conflictual. It has three insepara-
ble components, including mapping, risk and opportunity assessment, and PCIA 
proper, rooted in a clear set of principles (Bush K. , 2009) discussed below. It is appli-
cable in all stages of an intervention, including pre-project, in-project and post-project. 
At the pre-project stage, PCIA is used as a planning tool for project design and formu-
lation. The objective at this stage is to anticipate future impacts and build-in conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding mechanisms. During project, it is used for performance 
monitoring and management tool with the objective of monitoring and implementing 
immediate impacts. At the post-project phase, it is used as a tool for strategic planning 
for future phases (Bush K. , 2009). Its objective at this stage is evaluation and institu-
tional learning (Bush K. , 2003a, p. 79; Bush K. , 2009). Bush discusses seven guiding 
principles of PCIA. They are: 
 PCIA is a process. 
 PCIA helps us to understand the specific rather than the general. 
 PCIA is not static. 
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 PCIA needs to be transparent, shared, and people-centred. 
 Building peace includes un-building the structures of violence. 
 Neither development nor peacebuilding on its own will magically create peace. 
 Haste makes waste —PCIA take time.   
The emphasis of PCIA/Aid for Peace is on process, responsivity, and owner-
ship, though the worksheets are mechanistic and onerous  (Bush K. , 2009). As a proc-
ess, Bush argues that PCIA is not a fix-all toolkit. Rather it must challenge and change 
the traditional way of working in conflict zones. It is less of what is being done but 
more of how it is being done. It makes us to ‗‗…see and to understand when, why, and 
how a particular factor, in particular situation is likely to contribute to peace, or violent 
conflict‘‘ (Bush 2003a, p. 79), thus helping us to understand the specific rather than 
the general. Moreover, PCIA is an ongoing and dynamic approach with pre-, in-, and 
post-intervention relevance. It emphasises core values of transparency and people 
ownership. The community people, men and women, boys and girls are the real ex-
perts in using PCIA. They are critical to conflict analyses and interpretation, selection 
and execution of projects, all issues involving decisions that will affect their lives. 
Otherwise, they will be disempowered. Hence, PCIA has an explicit orientation for 
people empowerment. In addition, peacebuilding must strategically include building 
the infrastructure for peace and un-building the structures of violence. The sixth prin-
ciple of PCIA states that, in and of themselves, peacebuilding and development initia-
tives will not create peace. Sustainable peace requires efforts of various actors. And 
finally, PCIA requires adequate time to ensure dialogue, learning and capacity-
building.  
Although Bush‘s PCIA is novel, it has few shortcomings for theory and prac-
tice. For instance, while the definition of peacebuilding impacts is robust, that of con-
flict-creating impact fails to fully capture the reality of unwanted negative impacts in 
context. He adequately defines peacebuilding impacts to include both constructing 
structures of peace (peacebuilding) and de-constructing structures of violence (un-
building conflict). However, Bush inadequately defines conflict-creating factors which 
necessarily include peace weakening impacts and conflict-exacerbating impacts by im-
plicitly limiting it to the latter. To avoid such conceptual confusion, this study uses the 
terms positive and negative impacts instead of peacebuilding and conflict-creating im-
pact. Positive impacts include peacebuilding impacts and conflict-reducing impacts 
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(since they have positive effects on the conflict situation). Negative impacts include 
peace-weakening or peace-undermining impacts and conflict-exacerbating impacts 
(since they have negative effects on the conflict situation). Another shortcoming of 
Bush‘s PCIA has to do with conception of impacts as being instigated by the interven-
tion. However, since both intervention and context interact to produce these impacts, 
impacts should have been conceptualised to reflect this reality (Akinyoade D. , 2011). 
This perspective, which sees impacts as joint-products of intervention and context or 
as by-product of the interactions of the two, is adopted in this study.       
2.3.2 Do no Harm/Local Capacities for Peace Project (DNH/LCPP) 
Mary Anderson‘s book, Do no Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace — or War (1999), 
popularised the Do no Harm approach. The book was written on the cumulative learn-
ing from the Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) —a collaborative effort of 
dozens of NGOs working in conflict zones. The LCPP involved hundreds of workers 
of NGOs and other assistance agencies brought together in 20 feedback workshops in 
explaining their works and analysing it to achieve better outcomes (Anderson M. B., 
2004).  In Anderson‘s words, the ‗‗…LCPP set out to consider how can international 
aid agencies (working in both humanitarian and development assistance) do the good 
they mean to do in conflict areas without, at the same time, having their aid feed into, 
exacerbate or prolong the conflicts. Further, how might such assistance be given so 
that, rather than having negative, conflict-worsening effects, it instead helps local peo-
ple disengage from conflict and begin to establish the systems they need for dealing 
with the issues that underlie the conflict?‘‘ (2004, p. 3) 
The book, Do no Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace — or War is divided into 
three sections. The first covers the general nature of violent conflict and the impact of 
external aid as relative resource transfer and its associated implicit ethical messages. It 
also presents the DnH analytical framework for mapping a particular conflict setting 
for which aid is intended. Through a series of questions, the framework seeks to iden-
tify the connectors or local capacities for peace that bring cohesion in a society as well 
as tension or dividers that could push a society into or keep a society in conflict. The 
second section discuses five case studies —Tajikistan, Lebanon, Burundi, India and 
Somalia. Through these cases, Anderson identified the positive actions by aid agency 
staff in catalysing peace initiatives as well as actions by the communities in which con-
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flict was rife, that showed a capacity to seek an end to the conflict. The third section 
summarises the main lessons learned from the first and second sections. 
The DnH/LCPP approach is an initiative of the Collaborative for Development 
Action issued in 2001. It is a tool for micro-conflict analysis, project planning and pro-
gramme quality, and impact assessment of programme on conflict. It is designed to be 
used by field staff of international or local NGOs, donor agencies (headquarters and 
field offices). Though primarily targeted at humanitarian organisations, agencies in-
volved in development and peacebuilding interventions can use it (Resource Pack, 
2004).The DnH/LCPP has the following conceptual assumptions: 
1. Aid is not neutral in the midst of conflict.  
2. Aid and how it is administered can cause harm or strengthen peace capacities in the 
midst of conflicted communities.  
3. All aid programmes involve the transfer of resources (food, shelter, water, health 
care, training, etc.) into a resource-scarce environment.  
4. Where people are in conflict, these resources represent power and wealth and they 
become an element of the conflict.  
5. Some people attempt to control and use aid resources to support their side of the 
conflict and to weaken the other side. If they are successful or if aid staff fail to 
recognise the impact of their programming decisions, aid can cause harm.  
6. However, the transfer of resources and the manner in which staff conduct the pro-
grammes can strengthen local capacities for peace, build on connectors that bring 
communities together, and reduce the divisions and sources of tensions that can 
lead to destructive conflict (Resource Pack, 2004). 
Hence, to do no harm and support local capacities for peace involves: 
1. careful analysis of the context of conflict and the aid programme, examining how 
aid interacts with the conflict, and a willingness to create options and redesign pro-
grammes to improve its quality; and  
2. careful reflection on staff conduct and organisational policies so that the ‗implicit 
ethical messages‘ that are sent communicate congruent messages that strengthen 
local capacities for peace (Resource Pack, 2004). 
The DNH/LCPP approach does not include explicit conflict and peace indicators. 
However, through a community-based process of indicator development, it can make 
many implicit indicators explicit. Such indicators could include:  
1. A just distribution of resources;  
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2. Creating or strengthening networks of relationships across divisions; 
3. Strengthening good governance; 
4. The use of participatory processes for decision-making;  
5. Supporting traditional or indigenous mechanisms for conflict resolution; and  
6. Reconciliation, inclusion of diversity of ethnic or religious groups, gender, or 
youth in programme activities and leadership structures (Resource Pack, 
2004). 
The LCPP has three important lessons for impact assessment. First, using various 
cases of assistance across different settings, the LCPP identified clear and repeated pat-
tern of the interaction between intervention and conflict. Aid exacerbates conflict 
through the transfer of aid‗s resources and through ―implicit ethical messages‖ 
(Anderson M. B., 1999). That is, there is a relative resource transfer as well as the im-
plicit ethical messages that often come with aid (Wakhweya, No Date). Second, LCPP 
has discovered that conflicts are characterised by two forces —dividers and connec-
tors. Dividers divide people within conflict areas from each other along the lines of 
subgroup identities while connectors are connecting people within conflicts to each 
other across divisional lines. Aid workers need to clearly understand these dynamics in 
order to avoid the harmful potentials of their work. Third, LCPP shows that the poten-
tials of aid programme‘s impacts to either reinforce divisions or connectors are in the 
details of the programme. ‗Programme decisions about whether to provide aid, where 
to work, when and for how long, who to hire locally, whom to target, the roles of in-
ternational staff, how to deliver goods —these and other basic management deci-
sions— all have effects on inter-group relationships in the areas where aid is provided 
(Anderson M. B., 2004, p. 4). 
DnH/LCPP approach‘s most significant relevance to this study is seen in its con-
ception and development of propositions, which makes its concepts very useful and 
applicable to other similar context. The concepts of ‗‗transfer of aid‘s resources‘‘, 
‗‗implicit ethical message‘‘ ‗‗dividers‘‘ and ‗‗connectors‘‘ are easy to grasp. Thus, 
they are useful in explaining some of the observations in the study area. Furthermore, 
they are useful to theory development, which is part of the focus of this study. More-
over, it underscores the fact that ‗‗details of the programme‘‘ constitute areas of poten-
tial impacts on the conflict situation. This is consistent with the view taken in this 
study. In addition, the approach is also relevant because of its special applicability at 
the project level.  
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2.3.3 Conflict Sensitive Approaches (CSA) 
The phrase conflict-sensitive or conflict sensitivity has been familiar in development 
practice since 1999 (Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff, 2005). It could be 
traced largely to several literature and thinking on Bush‘s Peace and Conflict Impact 
Assessment, Mary Anderson‘s  ‗Do No Harm, the writing of Jonathan Goodhand and 
macro-conflict assessment work undertaken by DFID, USAID, the World Bank and 
other donors. Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff‘s describe conflict sensitiv-
ity as  
―… an awareness of the causes of historical, actual or potential conflict, 
and of the likelihood of further conflict and its likely severity; and the 
capacity to work with all parties to reduce conflict and/or minimize the 
risk of further conflict. It involves understanding the operational con-
text; understanding the interaction between an intervention and that 
context; the capacity to act upon this understanding to avoid negative 
impacts and maximize positive ones.‖ (2004, p. 61). 
The Conflict Sensitive Approaches (CSA) was a product of a two-year project 
on conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace-
building. The project was undertaken by a consortium of six southern and northern 
NGOs including Africa Peace Forum, Kenya; Centre for Conflict Resolution, Uganda; 
Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Sri Lanka as well as Forum on Early Warning 
and Early Response, International Alert, and Saferworld, all in the UK.  Subsequently, 
the conceptual development of conflict sensitivity is captured in the publication Con-
flict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuild-
ing: A Resource Pack published in 2004 to convey lessons learnt from the project. The 
approach was articulated by researchers-practitioners Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald 
and Sheriff who were involved in the project and developing the Resource Pack 
(Schmelzle, 2005). The CSA was designed to ‗‗…strengthen local capacities and im-
prove the awareness and skill of project staff.‘‘ It was based on ‗‗…the need to sensi-
tise organisations and individuals for the conflict-related consequences and ramifica-
tions of their work over the fixation on infinitely refining assessment tool kits…‘‘ 
(Schmelzle, 2005). Conflict sensitivity approaches comprises a set of principles to 
guide a wide range of intervention activities including development, humanitarian, and 
peacebuilding. At the project and programme levels, CSA aims at integrating conflict 
sensitivity at the planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation stages of 
the project cycle. A thorough and regularly-updated conflict analysis is the foundation 
of conflict-sensitive practice. It is to this base rock that all project planning, implemen-
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tation, monitoring and evaluation are linked (Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & 
Sheriff, 2005).  
Conflict-sensitive planning is integrating conflict analysis of the actors, causes, 
profile and dynamics in a given context —with the aim of ensuring that the project or 
programme does not inadvertently increase the likelihood of violent conflict, but rather 
serves to reduce potential or existing violent conflict. It is required in contexts charac-
terised by conflicts along the conflict spectrum (from structural violence to violent 
conflict). It is applicable whether the project or programme is for humanitarian aid, 
peacebuilding, or development; or whether the intention is to address conflict directly 
or simply to avoid indirectly exacerbating tensions. Conflict-sensitive planning can be 
applied to both interventions that are defined through the conflict analysis, and to sen-
sitising pre-defined interventions (Resource Pack, 2004). A conflict-sensitive (inter-
vention) planning ‗‗…requires careful and detailed exploration of the potential im-
pacts, direct and indirect, (a) of the proposed activities on the actors, causes, profile 
and dynamics relating to conflict or potential conflict within the context, and (b) of the 
actors, causes, profile and dynamics on the proposed activities.‘‘ (2004, p. 65). There 
are five key steps for conflict-sensitive planning: defining intervention objective; de-
fining intervention process; developing indicators (conflict indicators, project indica-
tors and interaction indicators); linking project to scenarios and preparing contingency 
plans; and designing project conclusion. Some of the challenges of conflict-sensitive 
planning is likely to encounter are relations with central and local authorities, manag-
ing information networks, and relations with donors. 
Conflict sensitive implementation, in addition to traditional implementation, 
‗‗…involves close scrutiny of the operational context through regularly updating the 
conflict analysis, linking this understanding of the context to the objective and process 
of achieving the activities, and adjusting these activities accordingly. It builds on the 
conflict analysis and planning processes‘‘ (2004, p. 73). Key elements of conflict-
sensitive implementation are to:  
1. sensitively manage the process of implementation (activities, staffing, informa-
tion networks, finances, etc.);  
2. regularly monitor the operational context and the interaction between the in-
tervention and the context, using the indicators defined in the conflict 
analysis and planning stages; and  
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3. adjust the project in light of new information gathered through monitoring, fo-
cusing particularly on the objectives and process of implementation. 
Often, conflict-sensitive implementation work is undertaken at the planning phase and 
through the conflict analysis. The following key steps build on this prior work and are 
employed to sensitise the implementation and management process, namely refer back 
to the conflict analysis; set up the project (prepare and/or assess plans of operation, ne-
gotiate project contract issues and sites, coordination, define security procedures); im-
plement, monitor and adjust the project (implement and monitor, and adjust to the con-
text and the interaction); conflict-sensitive project phase out. Challenges conflict-
sensitive implementation may encounter include flexibility, learning lessons, and 
building and maintaining relationships. 
Conflict-sensitive monitoring incorporates conflict analyses into traditional 
monitoring processes and activities, with the intention of gaining a better understand-
ing of the context and the intervention as well as their interactions. It informs adjust-
ments and changes to project or programme activities so that the intervention has the 
optimum positive impact on conflict dynamics (Resource Pack, 2004). Conflict-
sensitive evaluation integrates a detailed understanding of actors, profile, causes and 
dynamics into traditional evaluation activities and processes. Thus, it is useful to un-
derstand the overall impact a given intervention has had on its context, and the context 
on the intervention. The evaluation can then be used to adjust subsequent phases of an 
on-going initiative, and/or provide lessons for future initiatives (Resource Pack, 2004).  
Traditional monitoring and evaluation processes follow five key steps, includ-
ing deciding when to monitor or evaluate; designing monitoring and evaluation proc-
ess; collecting information; analysing information; and recommending and redesign-
ing. However, there are four key issues in conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation 
process (2004, p. 86). First, like traditional monitoring and evaluation, conflict-
sensitive monitoring, can also be an extractive process (as interviewers take informa-
tion from respondents and offer little in direct return), or it can be more transformative 
(involving respondents in the process of indicator development and analysis, monitors 
and evaluators can help people understand their own place in – and possibly even their 
contribution to – a given context) with potentially-positive results, and attending risks.  
Second, it involves conflict-sensitising all existing steps in the process, from 
the design to reporting and beyond. This requires additional resources. For instance, it 
needs organisational and institutional support for increased staff capacity development. 
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Also, it requires sufficient time to review and adjust existing tools and processes, as 
well as additional time to monitor or evaluate conflict and interaction indicators. Third, 
understanding the context as it is expressed at various different geographic scales is 
fundamental to understanding the context at the level of the intervention. Hence, con-
flict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation includes adequate attention to the profile, ac-
tors, causes and dynamics that function at micro, meso and macro levels. Finally, con-
flict sensitive monitoring and evaluation requires an understanding of success qualita-
tively, in terms of impact on peace and conflict dynamics, and not only quantitatively 
in terms of number of houses built, and participants attending a meeting. This requires 
an institutional willingness and ability to think differently about how it measures im-
pact. A conflict-sensitive organisation will also want to place a high value on its pro-
jects‘ interactions with the contexts (2004, pp. 86-87).  
The CSA has a number of strong points as a process for conflict-sensitising 
proposed and measuring the impact of a completed intervention. For instance, it pro-
motes the use of indicators —perception-based and objective indicators— to capture 
the more intangible impacts of programming. For instance, whether a respondent feels 
more or less safe (perception-based indicator) compared to the recorded number of in-
cidents of violence (objective indicator) (Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff, 
2005). Also, the CSA conceives impacts as results of interactions between stages of 
intervention and elements of the context.  
Also, it includes elaborate procedures for incorporating-conflict analysis into 
the assessment process. A very strong point to its credit is its flexibility and robustness. 
However, for the purpose of this study, the CSA appears to lay too much emphasis on 
conflict. For instance, the nomenclature conflict sensitivity gives undue recognition to 
conflict and deemphasises peace. This may be taken as implying a tacit assumption 
that conflict reduction in context automatically leads to peacebuilding. This is in con-
trast to the Do No Harm approach which explicitly recognises the need to simultane-
ously work on reducing conflict and strengthening peace to maximise the positive im-
pact of intervention in context.  
2.3.4 Aid for Peace Approach (AfP) 
Thania Paffenholz and Luc Reychler‘sAid for Peace (AfP) approach builds on and fur-
ther develops the debate of PCIA. The AfP is a multi-purpose and multi-level process 
that facilitates the planning, assessment and evaluation of peacebuilding, development 
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as well as humanitarian aid interventions in situations of latent conflict, manifest vio-
lent conflict, or in the aftermath of violent conflict and war (Paffenholz, 2005; 2006). 
The AfP focuses on the needs for peacebuilding in a given context —country, region, 
or area— tailors the intervention‘s objectives and activities to these needs through 
identifying their peacebuilding relevance and developing peace and conflict result 
chains and indicators for monitoring. The approach has four parts, including needs, 
relevance, risks and effects. Part 1 involves analysis of the peacebuilding needs in a 
context —country, area or region. Part 2 assesses the peacebuilding relevance of the 
intervention. Part 3 assesses or anticipates expected or manifest effects of the conflict 
on the intervention activities (conflict risks). Part 4 assesses or anticipates expected or 
manifest effects of the intervention on the conflict dynamics and the peacebuilding 
process (peace and conflict outcomes and impact) (Paffenholz, 2006). 
The AfP has three modules and seven steps. Three separate modules are devel-
oped for planning (Module 1), assessment (Module 2) and evaluation (Module 3) pur-
poses from the four-part basic model. Part 1 is applied to all modules and, subse-
quently, different tools and processes are applied within the various modules. Integra-
tion of the AfP approach involves seven cumulative steps. The first step is preparation, 
which involves tailoring of the AfP process, including clarification of the module to be 
applied, developing terms of reference, team-building and preparation for implement-
ing the Aid for Peace process. Steps 2 and 3 involve the identification of the peace-
building needs, including analysing peace, conflict, and developing indicators to be 
used by all modules. Steps 4, 5 and 6 are applied in varying ways, using different tools 
and processes for different modules. In the final, 7th step, recommendations are made 
for adapting the intervention design according to the results of the Aid for Peace proc-
ess (Paffenholz, 2005, pp. 55-62).  
These modules and steps represent a framework for integrating the AfP into the 
Project Cycle Management useful for planning, implementing and a PCIA-like frame-
work for assessment or evaluating development and humanitarian interventions. The 
AfP provides a common methodological framework for different types of interventions 
by a broad range of actors (local and international, governmental and non-
governmental, peace and aid donors, agencies and communities) and for all levels of 
interventions (macro, sector, policy programme, project) (Paffenholz, 2006, p. 3; 2005, 
p. 54).  
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The objectives of the Aid for Peace approach are to help users to, first, plan 
new, or assess and evaluate existing intervention designs in such a way that they will 
reduce the risks caused by violent conflict; reduce the possibility of unintended nega-
tive effects on the conflict dynamics; and enhance the intervention‘s contribution to 
peacebuilding.  
Second, it helps users to develop a conflict and peace-monitoring system, or in-
tegrate the conflict and peace lens into standard planning, monitoring and evaluation 
procedures. And finally, the approach helps users assess the success or failure of peace 
processes on the macro level (Paffenholz, 2005).  
In peacebuilding interventions in conflict zones, the AfP ensures the relevance 
of the intervention in terms of peacebuilding; and monitors, assesses and, ultimately, 
improves the effects of the intervention on peacebuilding while avoiding risks and 
problems caused by violent conflict by engaging in a systematic planning, assessment 
and evaluation process. For other interventions in conflict zones, the AfP reduces the 
risks that the intervention will encounter in the violent conflict situation. Also, it en-
sures that the intervention will not have an unintended negative effect on the conflict 
dynamics while; finally, increasing the chance that it will also contribute to peace-
building. 
The AfP has relevance to this study. It places adequate emphasis on peace, 
unlike the CSA. Probably, its most remarkable asset for this study is the explicit con-
nection it makes between the conditions in a specific context (peacebuilding needs), 
the peacebuilding goal of an intervention (relevance) and the actual effects of the in-
tervention‘s activities on peace and conflict (peace and conflict outcome and impact) 
(Paffenholz, 2005). Like PCIA, it integrates various tools of other approaches in a 
transparent and systematic way and ―…stresses systematisation of assessment and 
evaluation‖ (Neufeldt, 2007, p. 5). However, in spite of its versatility, it appears 
mechanistic, especially because of its many forms and tools.  
2.3.5 Conclusion 
These four approaches are relevant for this study. First, each of them are applicable to 
the three types of interventions —development, humanitarian aid, and peacebuilding—
investigated by this study. Second, and to various extents, they are applicable to the 
different levels of the interventions —project, programme, policy, sector— at the 
community, regional, and national geographical levels of operation. Furthermore, these 
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approaches emphasise the need for people living in conflict zones (for which interven-
tion is intended) to own and drive impact assessment and evaluation. Most impor-
tantly, to a greater or lesser extent, they are flexible enough to be manageable by the 
researcher, with little or no assistance, for the purpose of this study. However, they 
have shortcomings (previously identified) that make it necessary for them to be 
adapted for the purpose of this study. Aspects of each of the four approaches relevant 
to this study are emphasised, put together and termed Peace and Conflict Sensitivity 
Approach (PCSA). The PCSA essentially builds upon the CSA and infuses important 
aspects of the other three approaches. This is elaborated in Section 2.4.  
2.3.6 Gender Mainstreaming in Intervention Programming 
People are born female and male, but learn to be boys and girls who 
grow into women and men. They are taught what the appropriate be-
haviour and attitudes, roles and activities are for them, and how they 
should relate to other people. This learned behaviour is what makes up 
gender identity and determines gender roles (Oxfam Journal, 1993, Vol. 
1, No. 2). 
PCIA as an emancipatory politics, ethics, or methodology (Abitbol, 2013) has 
normative commitment to values such as peace, justice and gender equality. Most 
PCIA frameworks, therefore, have gender impact analysis built into them. As gender-
sensitive frameworks, they seek to assess the gendered impact of interventions in the 
context. Gender-impact analysis refers to specific and observed effects of plans, poli-
cies, programmes, and services, such as increased income and improved skills on fe-
male and male gender.  
Gender mainstreaming was first coined at the United Nations‘ third World 
Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985 and then explicitly endorsed with the adop-
tion of the Beijing Platform for Action (PfA) ten years later at the Beijing Conference 
—the fourth World Conference on Women. The PfA remains the most important in-
ternational statement on gender equality (Watkins, 2004). Gender mainstreaming is  
the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any 
planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all ar-
eas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women‘s as well as 
men‘s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes 
in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men 
benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (ECOSOC Agreed 
Conclusions 1997p 2 in King, 2003, p3). 
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[a] set of processes and strategies that aims to ensure the recognition of 
gender issues on a sustained basis […] an approach that situates gender 
equality issues at the center of broad policy decisions, institutional 
structures and resource allocations, and includes women‘s views as pri-
orities in making decisions about development goals and processes‘ 
(NCRFW, n.d). 
A distinction between gender and sex is important in discussing gender main-
streaming. Sex refers to the natural distinguishing variable based on biological charac-
teristics such as a person‘s body contour, features, genitals, hormones, genes, chromo-
somes and reproductive organs used to classify people as being female or male. Gen-
der refers to cultural roles attitudes and values that a society assigns to its women and 
men, girls and boys, which define their behaviours and relationships. Gender roles are 
created and maintained by social institutions.  
It has been accepted that women in every society have been peculiarly disad-
vantaged as a result of marginalisation and subordination by the menfolk. Thus the in-
ternational community began showing special interest on women issues in 1946 when 
a commission on the Status of Women was set up as the first gender perspective on the 
International Bill of Human Rights. In 1967, the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women —a statement of moral and political, howbeit lacking 
in contractual force of a treaty— came into being. The Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in time to be 
presented at the World Conference of the UN Decade for Women, in Copenhagen 
1980. The Development Assistance Committee-Women in Development (DAC-WID) 
Guiding Principles on Women in Development came into existence in 1983. At the 
third World Conference on Women 1985, there was a shift from WID to Gender and 
Development Approach (GAD). GAD is an approach to development that focuses 
‗‗…on social, economic, political and cultural forces that determine how differently 
women and men participate in, benefit from, and control resources and activities.‘‘  
Gender equality and gender equity are two key concepts in gender mainstream-
ing. Gender equality means women and men should have equal value, enjoy the same 
status and conditions and should be accorded equal treatment. It refers to the full 
equality of men and women to enjoy the complete range of political, economic, civil, 
social and cultural rights, with no one denied access to these rights, or deprived of 
them, because of their sex. It means they should benefit equally from the results of de-
velopment (CEDAW, 1979).  
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Gender equality in intervention, therefore, will overcome stereotypes and 
prejudices, allowing both sexes to equally contribute to, and benefit from, the interven-
tion. WHO (2001) defines gender equity as ―fairness and justice in the distribution of 
benefits and responsibilities between women and men,‖ Gender equity goes beyond 
gender equality. It refers to giving to the disadvantaged gender on the basis of needs, 
taking steps to compensate for historical and social disadvantages that prevent women 
and men from operating on a level playing field. Equity is the means of achieving 
equality. 
According to Heyzer (2003) gender mainstreaming insists that every aspect of a 
given activity be assessed for its gender implications. King (2007) opines that engen-
dering intervention makes it more efficient, effective and delivers maximum good. The 
process of gender mainstreaming, in the words of Heyzer:    
…requires persistent effort, including regular monitoring, re-
porting, follow-up training, and evaluation of progress made and ob-
stacles encountered, as well as systems for holding the opera-
tion/organisation accountable for achieving its goals. All of this re-
quires resources and, above all, political will at all levels (2003)  
A gender-based analysis of interventions (GBAI) determines the gender responsive-
ness of NDDC plans, programmes and projects. It determines whether or not or the 
extent to which an intervention programming is gender-responsive. Gender respon-
siveness of an intervention refers to the consistent and systematic attention given to the 
differences between women and men in the intervention, with a view to addressing 
structural gender inequality in the context of the intervention. This is the rationale be-
hind Gender-Responsive Development Planning, also known as Gender-Responsive 
Planning (GRP). The logic of GRP is that integrating gender considerations makes de-
velopment planning and programming more people-oriented and people-focused, em-
phasising their impacts on women in particular. However, in the context of this study, 
a more relevant terminology will be gender-responsive intervention programming 
(GRIP), which has the same logic as the GRP. A GBAI Framework (Figure 4 under 
conceptual frameworks below) developed for this study will be used to determine the 
extent to which NDDC interventions are gender-responsive. 
Integrating a gender-based analysis of intervention (GBAI) in a post facto 
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment study on the NDDC intervention is important 
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because the need to pay attention to gender is mentioned in section five of Policy G1 
—Strategic Planning Principles— which reads: 
A sound planning process has to be based on participatory decision 
making. This entails meaningful involvement of the ‗Active‘ and ‗Pas-
sive‘ stakeholders—public sector, private sector, community and 
NGOs—and ensuring that their respective needs and constraints are 
taken into consideration when policies and proposals are formulated, 
including attention to issues such as gender and youth. 
Hence, the gendered analysis of the intervention will reveal the extent to which gender 
is mainstreamed in the interventions in the study area. That is, the extent to which 
women‘s as well as men‘s concerns and experiences are integrated into the design 
(conception and planning), implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the pro-
grammes and projects in the community as well as the policies guiding them. Of par-
ticular interest is the extent to which women and men benefit equally and equitably in 
the intervention and the implications this has for the community.  
The rationale behind mainstreaming gender in PCIA is that since women and 
men have been culturally assigned different social roles, responsibilities and different 
sources of power and influence, their perspectives on and experiences of a particular 
intervention, their needs and interests (which at times may be competing) necessarily 
differ. However, too often, intervention in context lumps all those affected by the con-
flict and intended beneficiaries of the proposed intervention into one tidy package 
called the population‘, community people or beneficiary community. Thus intervening 
agencies provide them with a set of package of assistance without truly recognising the 
peculiarities of each of the categories that make up the population or the community.  
  Consequently, the varying needs of each category of the people and the 
strengths and capacities they bring to bear in conflict analyses, conflict resolution, in-
tervention programming, peacebuilding and post-settlement reconstruction are often 
neglected. GBAI involves the analysis of how the intervention impacts gender —
gender impacts analysis (GIA). Gender impact analysis is the study of how a policy or 
programme affects women and men differently. Indicators for assessing the impact of 
programmes on gender dynamics are whether the programmes: 
1. entrench the traditional roles of women and men or it challenges them; 
2. build the capacity of a gender at the expense of the other; 
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3. foster tension among the genders; 
4. increase the vulnerability of women and girls both socially and economically. 
The goal of gender mainstreaming in intervention programming is to ensure 
gender equality and gender equity. Gender-Responsive Intervention Programming 
(GRIP) is therefore be an intervention in which gender is fully mainstreamed. Gender-
Based Analysis of Intervention (GBAI) Framework was adopted to assess the degree 
of gender-responsiveness of the NDDC intervention. Introducing gender-sensitive lens 
to peace and conflict sensitivity will help understand women and girls as well as men 
and boys‘ roles as actors (participants in planning, implementation and monitoring and 
evaluation and beneficiaries) and victims of intervention programming. 
2.4 Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach/Framework: An Assess-
ment Framework 
Fifteen of the various approaches of mapping the impacts of interactions between in-
terventions and project context were reviewed to build an assessment framework for 
this study (Table 2.1). These include DFID‘s Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA), 
World Bank‘s Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF), FEWER, WANEP and CCR‘s 
Conflict Analysis and Response Definition, World Vision‘s Making Sense of Turbu-
lent Contexts (MSTC), USAID‘s Conflict Assessment Framework, GTZ‘s Conflict 
Analysis for Project Planning and Implementation. Four very influential approaches —
Bush‘ Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), Anderson‘s Do No Harm/Local 
Capacity for Peace (DNH/LCP), Barbolet et al‘s Conflict Sensitivity, and Paffenholz‘s 
Aid for Peace Approach were critically reviewed and integrated into the Peace and 
Conflict Sensitivity Approach for this study. The integration is necessary because each 
has its strengths, weaknesses, and suitability for different types and levels of assess-
ment. Aspects of each of the four approaches relevant to this study were emphasised, 
put together, and termed Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach (PCSA). The PCSA 
essentially builds upon the CSA and infuses important aspects of the other three ap-
proaches. 
Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff‘s describe conflict sensitivity as  
―… an awareness of the causes of historical, actual or potential conflict, 
and of the likelihood of further conflict and its likely severity; and the 
capacity to work with all parties to reduce conflict and/or minimize the 
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risk of further conflict. It involves understanding the operational con-
text; understanding the interaction between an intervention and that 
context; the capacity to act upon this understanding to avoid negative 
impacts and maximize positive ones.‖ (2004, p. 61) 
There are three key things that demonstrate or define peace and conflict sensi-
tivity in the above extract. First, understanding of the operational context; second, un-
derstanding of the interaction between an intervention and that context, and third, the 
capacity to act upon this understanding to avoid/minimise negative impacts and en-
sure/maximise positive impacts. These three conditions constitute the mainframe 
around which Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach/Framework is built. They are 
about the intervening agency/organisation. Indeed, for an organisation to be peace and 
conflict sensitive in its intervention programming, it must satisfy these three conditions 
— understand its operational context, understand the interaction between its interven-
tion and that context. Equally, it must possess the capacity to act upon this understand-
ing to minimise negative and maximise the positive impacts of its intervention.  
Commenting on the next step in peace and conflict impact assessment (2005, p. 
44), Bush used the term Peace and Conflict Sensitivity (PCS). The context of use sug-
gests expression of an idea similar to conflict sensitivity, with PCIA as the means of 
achieving it. Whatever Bush‘s intention, Peace and Conflict Sensitivity is adopted in 
this study since it places equal emphasis on the two major concepts in impact assess-
ment and evaluation —peace and conflict. The term peace and conflict sensitivity at 
least in nomenclature, makes up for the overt emphasis laid on conflict (to the detri-
ment of peace) in the CSA. It also integrates explicit peace concerns into the CSA 
framework and translates into peace and conflict sensitivity approach. In the minimum, 
therefore, Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach (PCSA) describes all the ideas of 
the CSA and goes beyond it to explicitly integrate peace in its processes. Peace and 
conflict sensitivity can thus be described as the consciousness that intervention in any 
context, especially one characterised by conflict, is never neutral; and acting in such 
manner to maximise the positive impacts (peacebuilding and conflict reduction) and 
minimise the negative impacts (peace-weakening and conflict-exacerbation) on the 
conflict situation. The PCSA adopts the intervention-context interaction perspective in 
conception of impacts (ICI— see section 5.1). The ICI conceptualises impacts as a 
product of the mutual interactions between intervention and its context alongside 
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measuring the impacts of these interactions on the project context (and its conflict 
situation) as either positive or negative.  
Positive impacts and negative impacts are thus the two main concepts used to 
describe the impacts or outcome in PCSA. Negative impacts refer to both conflict-
supporting impacts and peace-destroying/undermining impacts of interactions. Con-
flict-supporting impacts lead to conflict exacerbation through increase in tension, sus-
picion, distrust/ among conflicting groups, acts of violence, and so on (Bush K. , 1998; 
Bush & Opp, 1999). Peace-destroying/undermining/weakening impacts lead to de-
crease in tranquillity, trust and mutual confidence amongst groups, weakening of the 
local fabrics, capacities and infrastructure of peace (Akinyoade D. , 2011).  
Positive impacts on the other hand are impacts that support the dynamics and 
structures of peace (peacebuilding) and weaken the dynamics and structures of violent 
conflict (Bush‘s deconstructing or un-building violence). Supporting the dynamics of 
peace includes harnessing or exploiting what cultural or contemporary opportunities 
exist for peacebuilding (Anderson‘s local capacities for peace), leading to increase in 
tranquillity, confidence-building, consensus, cooperation/collaboration among conflict 
parties, empowerment in peacebuilding for parties, recognition, social justice, 
strengthening old and building new local capacities for peace. Conflict-reducing im-
pacts include decrease in tension, ill will, frustration, suspicion, distrust among con-
flicting groups, acts of violence, empowerment in creative conflict transformation and 
so on through conflict management workshops and consensus workshops among oth-
ers (Bush K. , 1998; Bush & Opp, 1999). Positive impact tilts the balance of conflict 
situation in favour of peace by directly supporting peace and/or by reducing the likeli-
hood of violent conflict.  
The PCSA explores the interaction of conflict, peace, and interventions in a 
conflict setting. It sensitises an intervention for peace and conflict with the aim of en-
suring that interventions in contexts contribute positively rather than negatively to the 
conflict situation. This involves, first, understanding that the peculiarities of a context 
characterised by conflict make it susceptible to the inevitable interactions between the 
stages of intervention and the elements of the context. This understanding and corol-
lary actions require conscientious and concerted efforts to develop specific compe-
tences in agency‘s staff and organisational structure and culture, and in its intervention 
policies. This constitutes the Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Capacity (PCSC) of the 
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organisation. PCSC is the ability of an agency intervening in conflict context to under-
stand the context for which intervention is planned, understand the intervention-
context interactions (ICI), and act upon this understanding to avoid/minimise negative 
impacts and maximise positive impacts (adapted from the Resource Pack, p. 9). PCSC 
is thus an agency‘s capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity (PCS), which will reflect 
in the organisational structure and culture and in its intervention programming. It in-
cludes staff capacity for and mainstreaming PCS in organisational culture and structure 
on one hand and integrating PCS in the whole intervention programming cycle —
planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation on the other hand. It in-
volves integrating peace and conflict analysis, peace indicators, and peace factors into 
the CSA as described in the Resource Pack.  
As earlier adumbrated, PCSA explicitly integrates peace concerns into the CSA 
to balance the explicit emphasis on conflict in the latter. Hence, while CSA talks of 
conflict analysis, PCSA talks of ‗‗peace and conflict analyses‘‘ (integrating Paffen-
holz‘s conflict and peace analysis in the Aid for Peace approach (Paffenholz, 2005, p. 
56)). Also, while CSA, at the planning stage develops indicators such as conflict indi-
cators, project indicators, and interaction indicators (with explicit recognition for con-
flict factors only), PCSA includes ‗‗peace indicators‘‘ and explicitly recognises ‗‗peace 
factors‘‘ as defined in the FEWER/WANEP‘s Conflict Analysis and Response Defini-
tion; and the FEWER/CIDA‘s Conflict Diagnostic Handbook (2004, p. 40; p. 57). 
Conflict indicators ‗‗specify what to measure in order to monitor and evaluate the evo-
lution of conflict factors and dynamics that impact a given context‘‘ (p. 4). They are 
used ‗‗…to monitor the progression of conflict factors against an appropriate baseline, 
and to provide targets against which to set contingency planning‘‘ (p. 26). They in-
clude root causes, proximate causes and conflict triggers in the areas of poli-
tics/security, economy and socio-culture. Peace indicators on the other hand specify 
what to measure in order to monitor and evaluate the evolution of peace factors and 
dynamics that impact a given context. Peace indicators are used to monitor the pro-
gression of peace factors. They include systems, processes and tools sustaining peace 
in a given society, in the areas of politics/security, economy and socio-culture (2004, p. 
40). 
Anderson‘s conceptualisations —transfer of aid‘s resource, dividers, and con-
nectors— are relevant to this study, hence they are integrated into the PCSA. For in-
stance, aid‘s resource may explain the reason for the interactions of intervention and 
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context. Also, its explanation that the ‗‗details of programme‘‘, captured by Bush as 
‗‗how things are being done‘‘, determines whether the impacts on the conflict situation 
will be negative or positive sheds some light on the nature and dynamics of interven-
tion-context interactions. It also points to possible places to expect and map impacts.  
In conclusion, the PCSA is designed to cater to the exigencies of this study. It 
integrates relevant concepts and assumptions of PCIA, DnH/LCPP, AfP and few other 
approaches into the CSA framework. It is a robust and flexible framework that under-
scores and integrates peace. However, a unique feature of the PCSA is its conceptuali-
sation of impacts as products of the interactions between intervention and context, that 
is, the Intervention-Context-Interaction (ICI) perspective. The PCSA uses the Peace 
and Conflict Sensitivity Framework (see section 2.5.1) to assess the capacity of an or-
ganisation for PCS and the extent to which PCS is integrated in its intervention pro-
gramming.  
2.4.1 Indicators for Assessing Peace and Conflict Impacts 
A key issue in any form of assessment is the issue of indicator. There must be 
indicators against which each aspect of the assessment is made. Many useful indicators 
have been developed in PCIAs to ensure the validity of the assessment. In fact, PCIA 
frameworks are replete with indicators. In assessing the impacts of the intervention on 
the context and vice versa, the study employs some indicators. Indicators to assess the 
negative impacts of the interventions include whether the intervention:  
 increases the vulnerability and insecurity of the target beneficiaries of the pro-
jects, other community members or other groups not being targeted by the pro-
ject, and project staff;  
 contributes to deepening the root causes of the conflict;  
 acts as an escalating factor in the conflict ; 
 pushes community members to join ethnic militia and take up arms;  
 creates or deepens divisions within the target community;  
 introduces new or other conflicts in the community;  
 reinforces inequity of class, gender and group; 
Similarly, relevant indicators are used to assess the positive impacts of the interven-
tions. These include whether the project: 
 builds community cohesion and resilience to resist the impact of conflict;  
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 opens spaces or opportunities for peace to be built;  
 improves relationships between antagonists;  
 contributes to resolving structural inequalities and the root causes of conflict;  
 is reaching the more marginalised and poorer communities with concrete bene-
fits;  
 reflects community ownership and community access to project resources and 
benefits;  
 includes target communities in decision-making. 
(Adapted from the Canadian International Development Agency —CIDA— Peace and Con-
flict Impact Assessment Summary by ChhayaJha and Tracy Vienings, 2004). 
 
The study, in the tradition of PCIA, also assessed the impacts of the intervention on 
gender dynamics, the indicators of which include whether the programmes: 
 entrench the traditional roles of women and men or it challenges it; 
 build the capacity of a gender at the expense of the other; 
 foster tension among the genders; 
 increase the vulnerability of women and girls both socially and economically. 
In light of the above, some specific questions asked concerning the interventions were: 
 What are the criteria for selecting the beneficiaries of the programme? 
 Did the selection process of programme beneficiaries reflect the diversity (of 
groups, interests, etc.) in the region? 
 Did the criteria reflect sensitivity to social, political and economic groups in the 
project environment? 
 What impacts did the dynamics of context have on the planning, implementa-
tion, monitoring and evaluation of the intervention? 
 Were the interventions gender-sensitive (by making special provision for 
women and girls, and men and boys)? 
 Did projects exacerbate any particular conflict? 
 Did projects intentionally/unintentionally build peace in any instance? 
 How sustainable are the interventions? 
 How did stakeholders (community and external stakeholders) perceive the 
Commission and its programmes? 
 Are there special provisions for women and girls, and men and boys who have 
been specially affected by the conflict in the community (For example those 
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who have lost parents, breadwinners, limbs, sight, properties, homes in the re-
gion)? 
2.5 Conceptual Frameworks 
Conceptual frameworks are narrative or graphical representations of the conceptual 
status of the main concepts, factors, variables or phenomena under study and their pre-
sumed relationships. Conceptual framework brings clarity, focus and explicitness to 
scientific investigation. It helps in delimiting research and communicating it better. 
Conceptual framework could be pre-specified (that is, developed a priori before em-
pirical work) or emerge at the latter stages during empirical work —of data collections 
and analyses. The stage at which it comes in research depends largely on the nature of 
the research. Researches employing the quantitative approach usually have pre-
specified conceptual framework. However, for qualitative research with less rigid 
structure, the timing of conceptual framework is more flexible (Punch 1999). For the 
purpose of this study, two relevant sets of indicators are integrated to assess the extent 
to which peace and conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed in the NDDC and in its pro-
gramming. The first set is developed by Maria Lange (2004) and the second set is de-
veloped in the Resource Pack (2004) by a consortium of Africa Peace Forum, Center 
for Conflict Resolution, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Forum on Early 
Warning and Early Response, International Alert and Saferworld. This integrated 
framework of indicators constitutes the Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework 
discussed below. 
2.5.1 Peace and Conflict-Sensitivity Framework (PCSF) 
Peace and Conflict Sensitivity (PCS) of an intervening agency will be evi-
denced in the extent to which it has mainstreamed peace and conflict sensitivity in its 
organisational culture and structure; and in the programming of its intervention. It in-
volves 
―... integrating the appropriate attitudes, approaches, tools and expertise 
into the organisation‘s culture, systems, processes and work, such that 
conflict sensitivity is applied not just to isolated projects but becomes 
an entire organisational ethos.‖ (Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & 
Sheriff, 2005, p. 6). 
The PCSF was developed in this study to evaluate the capacity of the NDDC 
for peace and conflict sensitivity. The framework assessed the peace and conflict sensi-
tivity capacity (PCSC) of the Commission. PCSC is demonstrated in two domains of 
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an agency intervening in conflict-prone region —in its culture and structure and in the 
programming of its intervention. The first part assessed the potential capacity and the 
second the demonstrated capacity. Hence the PCSF has two integrated parts —
framework to assess PCS in organisational culture and structure as well as framework 
to assess PCS in its intervention programming. Lange (2004) suggests a five-pillar 
framework for mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity in the culture and structure 
of agencies intervening in conflict areas. It includes institutional commitment; willing-
ness to make changes in organisational culture and institutional structure; support for 
capacity development; conducive external relationships; and accountability mecha-
nisms.  
Mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity in intervention programming, on 
the other hand, is integrating peace and conflict sensitivity into each stage of an inter-
vention. Its components are peace and conflict-sensitive planning; peace and conflict-
sensitive implementation; and peace and conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation. 
Together, mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity in the culture and structure of 
agencies and in intervention programming translate into peace and conflict sensitivity 
capacity (PCSC) of that agency. This capacity is demonstrated in peace and conflict 
sensitivity of institutional custom, policy and a framework for peace and conflict-
sensitive programming of its intervention. This is captured in Figure 2.1 below.  
In mainstreaming PCS in an organisation, mobilising ―…commitment based on 
strong motivation is an indispensable driving force‖ (Lange 2004, p.16). This com-
mitment and motivation is evidenced in organisational leadership support for PCS, the 
development of peace and conflict-sensitive policies, creating appropriate decision-
making systems/structures and committing staff time and financial resources to 
strengthening a peace and conflict-sensitive organisational culture. A peace and con-
flict-sensitive organisational culture is characterised by cross-organisational buy-in, 
participation and ownership, open communication channels on and between all levels 
of the organisation and facilitating the flow of knowledge and learning. Indeed, 
―[i]ndividual skills and knowledge are central to achieving positive impact‖ (Lange, 
2004, p. 9). 
Mainstreaming PCS in the culture and structure of an organisation involves 
consistently incorporating peace and conflict-sensitive skills in staff training and re-
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cruitment processes. Capacity building measures include development of 
tool/methodology for PCS, staff training, appraisal and rewards for PCS programming, 
adoption of peace and conflict-sensitive evaluation mechanisms and procedures. Req-
uisite peace and conflict-sensitive skills for staff include ―…understanding of the par-
ticular geographical area [and its conflict issues], knowledge of the relevant lan-
guage(s), relationship-building and analytical skills, and the ability to deal with high 
stress levels‖ (Lange, 2004, p. 9). 
In mainstreaming PCS in its culture and structure, an organisation has the op-
tions of establishing separate peacebuilding unit or integrating it on all levels. The first 
option provides a clear focal point and signals commitment and priority; however, it 
faces the risks of becoming marginalised. Hence, it needs to be well-connected to the 
rest of the organisation and combined with other mechanisms for exchange and learn-
ing. Strong systems of accountability are required for mainstreaming PCS. It includes 
―…appropriate appraisal and incentives systems that encourage peace and conflict sen-
sitive planning and programming and balance individual accountability with the need 
for learning. This includes documenting and disseminating better practice and reward-
ing progress to create a positive energy for moving forward‖ (Lange, 2004, p. 19) 
The fifth component refers to the external environment within which the 
agency implements its policies, that is, its relationships with communities, partners, 
consultants/contractors, government and donors. According to Lange, ―…successful 
mainstreaming of [peace and] conflict sensitivity demands conducive relationships 
with groups and actors that influence the conflict sensitivity of the wider response. 
This includes local partner organisations, donors, other INGOs, and national and inter-
national constituencies supporting the organisation.‖ (Lange, 2004, p. 9) An enabling 
environment, she argues, is of key importance to organisations. Factors such as domes-
tic and international policy environments, funding constraints and partnerships rela-
tions all  
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Source: Fieldwork, 2011 (Adapted from Lange (2004) and Resource Pack              
(2004)). 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework 
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have implications for mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity in an organisation. 
However, the most important thing in this process is how the different stages come to-
gether, and not a single stage. According to her, ―… putting in place a sophisticated 
planning system will not make an organisation [peace and] conflict-sensitive unless 
staff and partners applying the tool, feel ownership of it, know how to use it and are 
given support to do so‖ (Lange, 2004, p. 19). 
The Resource Pack (2004) provides a set of indicators for evaluating the extent 
which PCS is mainstreamed into each stage of an intervention; and thus for potentials 
for negative and positive impacts (Lange, 2004; Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & 
Sheriff, 2005). 
For a peace and conflict-sensitive planning, indicators include: 
 Incorporating peacebuilding and conflict-transformation principles into agen-
cies‘ strategic policies. 
 Linking conflict analysis with the objectives of the project in the project de-
sign. 
 Ensuring all planning processes themselves are conflict-sensitive. 
 Sacrificing some speed of delivery to ensure adequate conflict-sensitive plan-
ning. 
 
Peace and conflict-sensitive implementation involves: 
 Using conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies. 
 Investing in developing, disseminating and providing training in these. 
 Hiring specialist experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and 
headquarters staff. 
 Cooperating closely with local partners in identifying and addressing conflict 
dynamics. 
 Anticipating changing dynamics and developing contingency plans. 
 
Peace and conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation include: 
 Monitoring and evaluating programmes according to their impact on conflict 
and peace and vice versa. 
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 Setting flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the pro-
gramme as well as its outputs. 
 Conducting joint monitoring and evaluation with local partners and communi-
ties. 
(See section 2.3.3 for a more detailed discussion of peace and conflict-sensitive inter-
vention programming).  
2.5.2 Gender-Based Analysis of Intervention (GBAI) Framework 
The GBAI framework (Figure 2.2) evaluates the extent to which gender is main-
streamed in intervention programming. Hence, it involves gender-sensitive community 
participation, facilitation, logistics and gender equity at each stage of the programming 
including conception and planning, implementation as well as monitoring and evalua-
tion. Gender mainstreaming in community participation involves setting a representa-
tive quota for both sexes to participate as individuals and groups equally or equitably. 
This may necessitate employing innovative and non-traditional means to mobilise and 
enrol women and girls at each stage. Bunch (N.D) cites examples such as holding 
planning sessions where women traditionally gather, providing services to women so 
they can forgo their daily tasks in order to participate.  
At the stage of conception and planning, this may involve ensuring that women 
and girls, and community-based women and girls group have representative quota. It 
also includes ensuring that women and girls participate in setting goals and objectives 
for the intervention. At the stage of implementation, it involves employing representa-
tive quota (equality or equity) for both sexes to be selected as beneficiaries of the in-
tervention. This involves affirmative action. In case of physical project involving 
physically tasking unskilled labour, conscientious effort should be made to bring will-
ing women and girls on board or create alternative or compensatory benefits for them. 
Equitable participation may involve special empowerment programmes for women and 
girls where required. However, care must be taken to distinguish between those pro-
grammes that truly empower women and girls and those that reinforce their subordina-
tion to men. At the level of monitoring and evaluation, women and girls should be part 
of the monitoring and evaluation team and should be consulted as participants in the 
evaluation. An essential element is ensuring that both sexes understand the need for 
gender mainstreaming in the intervention programming. 
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  Source: Fieldwork, 2011 (Adapted Bunch, (n.d) and Resource Pack (2004)). 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Gender-Based Analysis of Intervention (GBAI) Framework 
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Facilitators or conveners must be trained on gender sensitivity. This is to en-
sure gender-sensitive language while addressing participants. This also ensures rein-
forcement of gender sensitivity at different stages of the intervention programming. 
Also, instructional materials must be gender-sensitive. Gender stereotypes in narra-
tions and illustrations should be avoided. Activities at every stage of intervention must 
address power imbalance between the sexes. Deliberate effort must be made to em-
power women and girls in role playing, task assignments, sharing of responsibilities, 
group leadership, selection of beneficiaries, leading group discussions and other inno-
vative ways. In selecting time, venue, and other logistics, convenience and safety of 
women and girls should be put into consideration. Special considerations should be 
provided for women on childcare and conveniences and other things (e.g. transporta-
tion) that will ensure their full participation at each stage of the programming. 
2.6 Theory Development in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment 
 
…the area of [peace and conflict] impact assessment is least theorised and 
tends to be left to the so called practitioners who often do not do much be-
yond ―ticking the boxes‖…The fact that this area of study is left mainly for 
the so called practitioners…has often ended in production of rather too 
much untheorised literature on impact assessment—Anonymous commen-
tator, 2014 
Theory is a tool for constructing and explaining reality. It is essentially an attempt 
to explain the phenomenon being studied using terms more abstract than the terms 
used to describe the phenomena. Theory may be about what the phenomenon is, its 
form of existence, and its relationships with other phenomena.  Theory serves a num-
ber of purposes in scientific works. First, it links the philosophical foundations (ontol-
ogy and epistemology) to empirical data. It is used to explain empirical data. More-
over, it helps researchers summarise and comprehend the facts (empirical evidences) 
gathered about phenomena. It also helps to fit facts into meaningful explanatory 
framework because facts are dumb without theory. In addition, theories highlight 
which elements of a phenomenon are relevant for study. A scientific research must 
necessarily have theory in addition to methodological issues. Alemika (2002, p. 9) 
summarises the role of theory in research as including defining appropriate methods 
for a research problem; specifying the nature (type, scope, and level) of data required 
by a research problem; offering conceptual framework or scheme for collecting, organ-
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ising, analysing and interpreting data; and predicting facts or outcomes (deterministic, 
causal or probabilistic). 
Theory and empirical data play central roles in scientific research. Scientific stud-
ies verify/test or generate/build theory. Theory-testing or theory-verification research 
tests the scientific propositions of a particular theory (Punch, 1998). Traditionally, 
positivist (quantitative) research is theory-testing research with clearly-defined theory 
pre-specified before the empirical work of data collection. Theory building or theory 
generation research, on the other hand, seeks to end with theory, ―…developed sys-
tematically from the data we have collected‖ (Punch, 1998, p. 16). Qualitative research 
has typically been involved in theory generation. As Punch points out, while both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches can be used for both verification and genera-
tion, theory generation research is more likely to use the unstructured fieldwork tech-
niques of qualitative approach. Theory verification research is useful in areas or fields 
where there are many unverified theories. Theory generation on the other hand is more 
suitable in areas or fields with scanty theories. 
With few theories developed in the discipline, peace and conflict studies has by 
far fewer discipline-developed theories compared to older disciplines such as Political 
Science, Sociology, and Psychology. Though as a multidisciplinary and transdiscipli-
nary field, many theories in other fields are useful in explaining the core field defini-
tion and distinctive issues of the field. Nevertheless, there have been repeated calls for 
the need to build more theories to understand and explain contemporary social issues 
(Punch, 1998). The need for theory building is pressing in the field of peace and con-
flict studies, most especially in Africa. The relatively young status of the field, the 
complexity and dynamism of its phenomena of interest require new theories to under-
stand, explain, and predict its realities. In Introduction: Research and Education Fun-
damental to Peace and Security, King and Sall contend that the field of peace and con-
flict studies is ―…open to a spectrum of conceptions, hypotheses, and theories‖ (King 
& Sall, 2007, p. 8). They argue further the need for African peace scholars to develop 
―…endogenous and alternative theories, methodologies, and analyses forged in the 
crucible of the epistemological, social-political, cultural, and economic conditions of 
African realities‖ (University for Peace Africa Programme, 2007, p. 75). 
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The area of peace and conflict impact assessment is a relatively young area 
where there is conspicuous need for theory development. The flurry of activities in-
volving practitioners, policy-makers, researchers, and scholars in PCIAs for about two 
decades has led to appreciable volume of scientific knowledge on the nature, dynamics 
and the implications of the interactions of intervention and its context. However, while 
there is relatively high level of development in the practice of PCIAs, the level of de-
velopment of the theory of PCIAs is significantly low. The epigraph above (at the be-
ginning of this section) reflects the state of affairs in theorising in peace and conflict 
impact assessment. Almost from inception, there has been debate on the usefulness or 
uselessness of theory in peace and conflict impact assessment. Although all peace and 
conflict impact-assessment approaches have implicit theory of change, Ross (2003) 
and Schmelzle (2005), and (Hoffman, 2007) among others have argued for the need to 
make these theories, their assumptions and propositions explicit.  
The need or role of theory in peace and conflict impact assessment was one of 
the recurrent issues in Berghof‘s dialogue series on PCIA in 2003 and 2005. In New 
Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), Bush argues that ‗‗…in war 
zones, theory is either useful or useless…there is rarely the luxury of time or space to 
mull over and contemplate abstractions, however, erudite, parsimonious or elegant‘‘. 
Barbolet et al. (2005) contends that ‗‗no one theory would be able to explain all rele-
vant aspects of a peace process in its complexity.‘‘ Paffenholz asserts that there are 
enough theories in related fields to make theory-building in impact assessment a non-
priority at the time (2005). These views support the arguments for giving inadequate 
attention to theory-building in PCIAs. Interestingly, in the same publication, Bush 
made a remarkable statement:  
Perhaps sometime in the distant future – when whatever will work, has 
worked –university-based academics will wade in to excavate theories. 
But for now, the distance between the academy and the field suggests 
that it may be a long while before we see useful theory     
 
 
A decade after Bush made this submission, the distance between the academia 
and the field have gotten closer and some things have worked to somehow indicate an 
imminent possibility of evolving theory of peace and conflict impact or a form of 
peace and conflict impact theory (PCIT). Also arguing in favour of theory develop-
ment, Schmelzle in the same publication, points out that the findings from Utstein 
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study and INCORE reports support the need for theory development in PCIA. She ar-
gues for the role of theory and the need for explicitness of hypotheses and assumptions 
underlying various methodologies in peace and conflict impact assessment. She identi-
fies ―…a lack of theoretical coherence and a lack of explicitness of hypotheses and as-
sumptions, in particular with respect to theories of change, yet a disagreement over 
whether more theory-building was to be the top priority of the field at present‖ (2005) 
as one of the clusters of issues and themes that authors, scholars and practitioners in 
peace and conflict impact assessment grapple with.  
Ross has earlier advocated the need for ―…explicit concern with theory in the 
planning, organisation and evaluation of interventions…‖ (Ross, 2003, p. 78). Theory 
in this sense, he claims, refers to local (folk theories) and academic knowledge about 
the world. He contends that most academic theories of social actions are simple and 
can be articulated in local terms and then ―…can be compared with local theories to 
clarify similarities and differences to bridge gaps between them‖ (p. 78). Barbolet, 
Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff also recognise that ―The development of impact-
monitoring and evaluation remains an area of huge interest, but one in which there is 
the least guidance in terms of theory or practice‖ (Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & 
Sheriff, 2005, p. 24).  
In spite of the need for theory-building supported by empirical evidences, very 
little has changed in the theory development in peace and conflict impact assessment 
since Schmelzle‘s observation in 2005. Hence as Punch (1998) suggests, theory devel-
opment research should be pursued in PCIA. The usefulness or otherwise of theories of 
peace and conflict impact assessment will be best adjudged by the affected communi-
ties. According to Bush, ―…communities on the ground …[should feel] that such the-
ory construction was more useful compared with the bare foot inductivism that enables 
survival —even peacebuilding— in violence-prone realities‖ (2005, p. 34). Useful 
theories in this regard border on the nature of interventions, context, the triggers and 
drivers of the interactions of interventions and context, how it happens, why it hap-
pens, and its implications, amongst others. It will be based on clear assumptions, em-
ploy useful concepts and make testable propositions germane to peace and conflict or 
positive and negative impacts of interventions in conflict-prone contexts.  
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2.6.1 Why Build Theories of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment? 
Nothing is quite so practical as a good theory...Good theory is practical 
precisely because it advances knowledge in a scientific discipline, guides 
research toward crucial questions, and enlightens the profession... 
(Lewin‘s, 1951:486 cit. in Corley & Gioia, 2011) 
PCIA methodologies, frameworks, or approaches have a shared purpose —to en-
sure that intervention in conflict-prone regions build peace rather than exacerbate con-
flict. To this end, they seek to maximise the positive and minimise the negative im-
pacts of the intervention. The core assumption of these frameworks is that, in spite of 
good intentions, intervention in conflict-prone regions can contribute both negatively 
(by exacerbating conflict) and positively (by building peace) to the conflict situation. 
Hence there is need to programme intervention with sensitivity or consciousness of 
this potential in order to do less harm and more good through the intervention.  
Apart from these assumptions, there are also shared concepts across PCIAs. They 
include those from the broader field of peace and conflict studies such as peace, peace-
building, conflict, conflict setting, and conflict exacerbation. Also, there are those 
germane to the area of peace and conflict impact assessment such as impact assess-
ment, impacts, outcomes, effects, evaluation, intervention, positive impacts, negative 
impacts, interactions, peace and conflict sensitivity, among others.  
Moreover, a number of testable propositions have emerged from these assumptions 
and the relationships with and among the concepts. Some of the most obvious ones are 
that intervention in conflict settings is never neutral; intervention in conflict settings 
has measurable impacts on the (structures and dynamics of peace and conflict) context; 
and the structures and dynamics of peace and conflict of the context also have measur-
able impacts on the intervention. Therefore, intervention and its context interact; these 
impacts can either be negative, conflict-exacerbating impacts or positive, peacebuild-
ing impacts; regular conflict analysis is central to assessing these impacts. Also, there 
are capacities and infrastructure for peace in various contexts. These might be consid-
ered as constituting the core propositions of PCIA. Others are that there is need for 
sensitivity to peace and conflict issues —structures, dynamics, and processes to 
achieve positive impacts; as well, the capacity of the intervening agency to peace and 
conflict-sensitise its programmes has implications for the overall impacts of the inter-
actions of intervention and context for the conflict situation (Abitbol, 2013).  
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From the foregoing, the building blocks of theory —theoretical assumptions, social 
concepts and scientific propositions— are all available in PCIA. Hence, the first reason 
we should build theory in peace and conflict impact assessment is because we have 
enough building blocks for its development. Doing so is both relevant and timely. Not 
doing so will be an unexploited opportunity to improve scholarship and practice of 
PCIA. PCIA is an uncompromisingly practice-oriented area. Since the 1990s when it 
emerged, PCIA practice has provided huge information from which academics can 
theorise. The theory-building activities focus on any of the four domains of PCIAs —
ethics, politics, logistics and methodologies— identified by Bush (Abitbol, 2013). In 
addition, theories should be prescient by focusing on the possible future domains of 
PCIAs. A theory in PCIA should first and foremost be a theory of practice. Theories of 
PCIA should be informed by practice and inform practice in a constant back-and-forth 
interaction between the two. 
The four building blocks of theory building —‗‗what‘‘, ‗‗how‘‘, ‗‗why‘‘, ‗‗who‖, 
―where‖ and ―when‘‘ (Whetton, 2001) are currently available in the various ap-
proaches and frameworks to PCIAs. Whetton (2001) citing Dubin (1978) submits that 
a good theory must have four essential elements —―what‖, ―how‖, ―why‖, alongside 
the trio of ―who‖, ―where‖, and ―when‖. These elements essentially describe the three 
components of social theory discussed in the previous paragraph. Whetton‘s model 
presents a good starting point for engaging theory development in PCIA.  
In the context of PCIAs, the what elements refer to factors, that is, variables, con-
structs, and concepts that are logically considered as part of explanation of PCIAs. 
Numerous factors such as conflict, peace, peacebuilding, impacts, negative impacts, 
positive impacts, interactions, intervention, conflict sensitivity, effect, and others have 
been employed in mapping the conceptual landscape of PCIAs. The proliferation of 
PCIA methodologies has led to multiplicity of factors in explaining the realities of the 
PCIA domains. While some have condemned this proliferation for various reasons, 
maybe it is a positive indication for theory development. Because as advised by Whet-
ton, having ‗‗too many factors‘‘ is in tandem with good practices in theory develop-
ment. This is because ‗‗…recognizing that over time their ideas will be refined. It is 
generally easier to delete unnecessary or invalid factors than it is to justify additions‘‘ 
(2001, p. 490). Moreover, Whetton advises the balancing of the virtues of parsimony 
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and comprehensiveness in selecting those factors (from a long list) that will make the 
final list in theory building efforts.  
Beyond mere listing factors, there is need to show how these factors relate to one 
another. This is the how element and it involves showing linkages among the factors in 
form of conceptual frameworks. This brings conceptual clarification by delineating 
patterns and it introduces causality. Apparently, all our PCIAs approaches have been 
able to show linkages between most of the what elements. For instance how interven-
tion impacts its context and vice versa, how it leads to negative or positive impacts, 
and so on. This incidentally constitutes strength for theory building. Since most PCIAs 
were developed as frameworks, hence conceptual frameworks, constituting the how 
element of theory building are abundant in PCIAs. The what and how elements, Whet-
ton says, constitute the domain of a theory. This is most insightful as it generates and 
clarifies an important aspect for consideration in theorising PCIA. And this is ―what 
are the domains of PCIAs?‖ Fortunately, Bush recently answered this question in the 
conference on PCIAs at York University that led to a JPD special edition on PCIAs 
(Abitbol, 2013). Bush identified four domains of PCIAs as ethics, politics, logistics 
and methodologies. At the moment, these seem comprehensive enough, and more do-
mains may be identified later as scientific knowledge in this area progresses. However, 
the concern for now is what does this imply for theory building, especially, as regards 
what and how elements? The implication is that we can identify the factors and de-
scribe their relationships in each of these four domains as we theorise or build theory 
of PCIAs. 
Why element constitutes the underlying dynamics —psychological, social, eco-
nomic, political— that justify the selection of the factors and their proposed causal re-
lationships. They are the theory‘s assumptions. They constitute the credentials provid-
ing the reasoning or the basis for trusting or believing in this particular representation 
of this domain of the PCIA being theorised. How sound is the logic of the fundamental 
views of the nature, dynamics and implications of intervention, context, impacts, and 
other things that provide the basis for judging the reasonableness of the proposed con-
ceptualisation. This is probably where most PCIA frameworks fall short. They fail to 
make explicit the logic underlying their models (Schmelzle, 2005). And this is proba-
bly because of their normative orientation for practice with little or no consideration 
for the academy. Logic, rather than data, is the basis for evaluation (Whetton, 2001) in 
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the theory building process. Hence building PCIA theory will involve extending the 
whats and hows in PCIA frameworks to include the logic behind the whats and hows. 
This logic must be sound. That is, it must account for the inclusion of the whats and 
the decisions about their causal relationships. Such explanations include relationships 
that are yet to be tested if they must be useful for research. There is need to explain the 
whys underlying the whats and hows. Our propositions should therefore be grounded in 
the what, how and why. According to Whetton, the Who, Where, and When are tempo-
ral and contextual factors that delimit the generalizability of propositions, thus consti-
tuting the range of a theory. They situate a theory within a specific time and space. 
They force theorists to be sensitive to the context of their theories and be context-
specific in discussing the generalizability of their theories. Generally, PCIA frame-
works have been classified as applicable to different generic contexts such as micro, 
meso, macro. Some will even lay a strong claim on moving beyond the generic con-
texts to documenting specific geographical locations (the Niger Delta, Mindanao, etc.) 
where they have been applied. So, to a large extent, contextualisation is already a hard-
wired feature of PCIAs, in a sense.  
Also, we need to build theories in PCIAs because theory development is an in-
dication of maturation of a field/discipline or an area within the field/discipline. Hence, 
by building theories of PCIAs, we demonstrate its maturation as an academic area, 
build on it, learn from it and benefit from it, theoretically and practically. In addition, 
building theory will help us bridge the gap between theory and practice in the area. As 
earlier adumbrated, practice-oriented development has overtaken theory development 
in the area. Building theories will ensure that the science of PCIAs influences its prac-
tice.  
Every scientific inquiry starts with or ends with theory. In other words, the sci-
entific process of knowledge accumulation, construction, situation, location, decon-
struction, either tests or builds theory. This is the basic format of academic enterprise 
of scientific knowledge production. This issue is central to social science research and 
cannot be wished away in PCIAs. Hence, for academic researchers, theory is non-
negotiable in scholarly/research activities. It is either theory begins research or theory 
emerges from research. Theory ‗‗at the beginning‘‘ of research is to test theory, while 
theory ‗‗at the end‘‘ of research is to build theory. No social science area is complete 
without these two activities going hand in hand. It goes without saying that to test the-
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ory, we must first build it and, once built, we keep testing it to see its fit with new data. 
This is the scientific enterprise.  
Therefore, no matter how much we try, we cannot wish this reality away in our 
claim of PCIAs as a scientific research area. This is not to depreciate the inestimable 
value of previous brilliant practice-oriented works (of practitioners, researchers, poli-
cymakers and scholars) at describing and generating context-specific explanations of 
realities of aid impacts in conflict context. However, it is to call scholars to arms to 
wake up to the responsibility and challenge them to build useful scientific theory in 
impact assessment. Practitioners and practice-oriented scholars have done their fair 
share of documenting the realities of the interactions of aid and contexts. Theory being 
a critical tool in the academic enterprises, it is apposite for university-based academics 
and other interested stakeholders waded in and ‗‗excavate theories‘‘ to capture, ex-
plain, predict and account for the patterns and causal relationships in the interactions of 
intervention and conflict contexts. 
Recently, the tension in the role or need for theory in peace and conflict impact 
assessment seems to be between building organic or emergent, context-specific theo-
ries and building generalizable theories (Abitbol, 2013). However, this tension may be 
unnecessary because existing PCIA methodologies have abundant building blocks of 
theory, namely, assumptions, concepts and propositions. Therefore, using appropriate 
approach, both context-specific and generalizable theories might be possible in peace 
and conflict impact assessment. Nevertheless, while the building blocks for developing 
theories of PCIAs abound, however, disincentives also abound in the conditions that 
informed the emergence of the field, the inherited orientation and normative commit-
ment (from Peace Studies) of PCIAs, stakeholders‘ justifiable preference for practice, 
and the epistemological contention in social science methodologies. Despite these en-
cumbrances, there is need to bridge the gap between theory and practice by making 
concerted effort for building theories in the different domains of PCIA. This need in-
formed the study‘s objective of understanding and explaining the nature, dynamics, 
and implications of the interactions of the NDDC interventions and Odi community 
context. 
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2.6.2 Inhibitions to theory building in peace and conflict impact assessment 
Few suggestions as to the paucity of theory in PCIAs lend themselves to reason. In the 
first category are those factors that are due to the nature of orientation of the parent 
(and/or the grandparent) fields and/or disciplines as well as those factors that led to the 
emergence of the area itself. In another category are those factors that have to do with 
the epistemological contentions in the social sciences. Yet in another category are 
those that border on the subtle tension between theory and practice that seems to im-
perceptibly carry the suggestion that to do one is to ignore the other. However, what-
ever reasons we concoct as scholars (most especially), researchers and practitioners 
(forgivably) of PCIA to excuse or justify our not tinkering with theory building, giving 
the current state of knowledge in the field, is at best lame, also detrimental to praxis, 
self-limiting and counter-intuitive.  
 The first inhibition to theory development in PCIAs is probably because it is 
the nexus of two applied (that is, practice-oriented) fields/disciplines —Peace and 
Conflict Studies and Development Studies— with normative commitment towards pol-
icy and practice. From its parent fields, therefore, PCIA could be presumed to have 
inherited its normative preference for practice from conception. The field of Peace and 
Conflict Studies is particularly notorious for suffering from a dearth of theory. It ap-
pears that this theory-dearth gene inherited from the grandparent field of Peace and 
Conflict Studies is dominant in PCIAs. So, PCIAs ordinarily tilt towards practice and 
suffer from dearth of theory. (Although the field of Peace and Conflict Studies appears 
to have awoken from its slumber and has started paying attention to theory develop-
ment with the excavation of theories such as democratic and liberal peace theories and 
other critical peace theories). 
Another issue that might have affected the dearth of theory in PCIAs is the con-
cerns that led to and surrounded its emergence as an area of practice and theory. Two 
factors readily come to mind. First is the nature of the exigencies that led to the emer-
gence of PCIAs, that is, the realisation that aids intended for good could do harm in 
conflict settings, which compelled practitioners to seize the rein of its development. 
Interest in impact assessment for peace and conflict sensitivity predates the christening 
of its foremost approaches —PCIA, Do no Harm, Conflict Sensitivity and Aid for 
Peace. PCIAs were more or less conceived, midwifed and christened by the exigencies 
of practice and hence by practitioners. Although in real sense, many of them, through 
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various theoretical contributions to the development of PCIA, would pass as theorist-
practitioners rather than solely as practitioners. Practitioners (at the individual and or-
ganisational levels) rather than scholars/researchers have been most active in its forma-
tive years. They therefore developed it in a way that it is most useful for them —
practice-oriented.  
Consequently, various organisations and individuals came up with different ver-
sions or derivatives of PCIAs to cater to the exigencies of their works. Hence in addi-
tion to, and probably as a consequence of, its genetic composition, the midwives of 
PCIAs showed preference for practice of PCIA at the expense of theory building. 
Foremost individuals at the inception of PCIA such as Kenneth Bush, Mary Anderson, 
Thania Paffenholz, Barbolet et al., demonstrated a greater motivation and commitment 
for practice. Midwifing an innovative approach to aid in the midst of conflict, they did 
not have the luxury to give attention to theory development. Rather, the exigencies of 
their works demanded concentration on practice —on what works in the midst of life 
and death situations.  
The third factor that probably discouraged theory development was the competition 
or in-fighting amongst proponents of various versions of PCIA that heralded its devel-
opment in its early days. The attempts by organisations such as Berghof Center of 
Constructive Conflict Resolution to bring together various scholars and practitioners 
working on PCIAs to chart the waters of the emergent area resulted in in-fighting or 
competition among them. Reading through Berghof resources on PCIA, one gets the 
idea that proponents are more desirous to present and defend their own versions of 
PCIA jealously than focus on theory building. Consequently, much effort was devoted 
to defending derivatives to the detriment of theory building in spite of frequent refer-
ence to the need for theory building in their discussions.  
The exigencies that led to, and surrounded the emergence of, PCIA, therefore, fa-
voured practice rather than theory building. The implication is that not much work was 
done to make PCIAs very useful for academic concern of scientific knowledge genera-
tion and the central role of theory in this exercise. Thus PCIA, while inherently making 
adequate provisions for frameworks for data collection, makes grossly inadequate pro-
vision for academic theory-building and theory-testing exercises. What this means is 
that while these numerous frameworks do explicitly direct scientists to what and where 
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to look for appropriate data on impact assessment (through indicators), they do not 
provide explicit theories against which those data could be explained; and theories 
which could be refined in light of new data collected through their frameworks. Hence, 
considering the centrality of theory and data in the scientific enterprise, the scientific 
process of knowledge generation looks somehow partially short-circuited in PCIA. 
In a community of practice conference ‗‗Assessing the impact of Peace and Con-
flict Impact Assessment: A North-South Participatory Research Project‖ (2013), the 
tension in the role or need for theory in peace and conflict impact assessment seems to 
be between building organic or emergent, context-specific theories and building gener-
alizable theories. The contention is whether we are to build context-specific, emergent, 
organic theories grounded in the realities of each context, following the naturalistic 
tradition of qualitative methodologists or seek generalizable theory following the rigid 
hypothetico-deductive tradition of quantitative methodologists. Many individuals in 
PCIA seem to favour the qualitative methodology, with its explicit and strong bias for 
accounting for observed realities as understood and interpreted by subjects, that is, in-
dividuals living in the realities. The preference of the qualitative methodology for the-
ory building exercise in PCIA is almost natural, given that PCIA champions participa-
tory, people-centred, intervention programming. Both the qualitative methodology, 
rooted in subjectivism and PCIAs, therefore, share the core belief of mapping, under-
standing and accounting for realities from the perspectives of the subjects living in 
such realities.  
Moreover, the qualitative approach is closer to the natural way human beings in-
vestigate the world through inductive reasoning. This makes it less threatening and 
more acceptable to non-academics. As such, practitioners, in making sense of, and ac-
counting for, realities of aid and conflict contexts, will almost naturally adopt the natu-
ralistic way of qualitative methodology. However, it is generally beyond the intent, 
interest and competence of practitioners to develop their accounts into scientific theo-
ries. Building scientific theory is a rigorous exercise requiring special competences and 
it falls squarely within the purview of academics. It is their responsibility as social sci-
entists to take the various accounts by practitioners, identify factors, the relationships 
between them, patterns of these relationships, and make testable propositions about 
realities in these accounts. Hence from context-specific accounts of realities, similari-
ties, categories, and trends could be identified from which generalizable theories can 
 93 
 
be developed. Punch (1998) has earlier made a case for the possibility of generalising 
case studies through conceptualisations and development of propositions.  
Therefore, from qualitatively-generated, organic, context-specific, people-centred 
theories, we can build more generalizable theories that account for core/essential reali-
ties in each context. These theories could then be tested following the hypothetico-
deductive tradition of the quantitative methodologists. Obviously then, there is no 
logical reason for the tension between the qualitative and quantitative approaches (or 
to take sides with one against another) in PCIAs theory development. In fact, the two 
methodologies will be complementary and mutually-reinforcing in our theory devel-
opment effort. This has become the preferred approach among methodologists in the 
social sciences. However, it is noteworthy here that although the subjectivists or hu-
manistic qualitative methodologies tend to favour theory building and positivistic 
quantitative methodologies, theory testing, nevertheless, both can be used to either 
build or test theory in the scientific enterprise. 
One of the strongest arguments against theory building in impact assessment 
hurled by majority of practice-oriented scholar-practitioners is the need to make PCIAs 
context-specific and make it people-centred and the need to protect the integrity of 
each context in accounting for its realities. A closely-related argument vigorously 
trumped is that no single theory can explain the diversity of realities across myriads of 
contexts of conflict. Yet another subtle argument is that the ever-changing nature and 
dynamics of conflict environment are not susceptible to theorising. However, scientists 
have appropriate tools for context-specific, people-centred research and theorising (es-
pecially those in qualitative methodology). Also, scientists are quite aware that no sin-
gle theory can explain all the aspects or dimensions of a single reality, needless to say 
explaining realities in different contexts. Hence, scientists only try to theorise portions 
of realities. In fact, one of the descriptions of theory is as a representation, interpreta-
tion or construction of an aspect of reality. In addition, while appreciating diversity and 
fluidity of some realities, scientists, because of the basic assumption of science that the 
universe is ordered, believe in identifying similarities in diversity and discovering pat-
terns in chaos. Science, in fact, recognises the fluidity of certain realities and the limi-
tation this imposes on theorising about them. This led to such scientific ideas as prin-
ciple of uncertainty in quantum theory (Heisenberg, 1927) and the principle of irra-
tionality in rational, strategic thinking (Schelling, 1960). 
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2.6.3 A Case in Point in Theory Development 
A commendable attempt at taking practitioners‘ accounts and churning out useful 
theory from them is exemplified in an article co-authored by Emiko Noma, Dee Aker, 
and Jennifer Freeman of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice in Heeding 
Women‘s Voice: Breaking Cycles of Conflict and Deepening the Concept of Peace-
building (Noma, Aker, & Freeman, 2012). The authors drew from accounts of 35 
women peacemakers from around the world and focus on three —Mary Ann Arnado of 
the Philippines, Luz Méndez of Guatemala and Zandile Nhlengetwa of South Africa. 
From these, they developed concepts and propositions that describe how women 
peacemakers emerge and engage in peacebuilding in conflict contexts. Such concepts 
as crossing lines of division, building parallel structures, creating and reclaiming 
space, listening, speaking, and seeing the big picture emerged from the narratives of 
women peacemakers. The authors were able to identify the overarching theme or the 
core category in the data (p. 15). Through these conceptualisations and their proposi-
tions, the authors described and explained how and why women become peacemakers 
in conflict situations. This is a good case of generalising from multiple case studies 
from diverse contexts. They have provided a good starting point, as a theoretical 
framework for scholars wishing to study women peacemakers or peacebuilders in other 
contexts. Such studies could be qualitative or quantitative in nature, depending on the 
focus of the inquiry. Thus their emergent, organic theory from qualitative research 
could inform hypothetico-deductive theory testing research in the quantitative tradi-
tion.     
An important lesson here is that while appreciating the uniqueness of each context 
and trying to preserve the integrity of each case, stakeholders in PCIAs should also 
appreciate the similarities of experiences and dynamics, across different cases. That is, 
although cases of interventions in the Niger Delta and Mindanao may be different in 
their specifics, there might, be similarities in their essentials. These similarities are the 
basis for building the second category of theories in PCIAs. In a more academic sense, 
insights/findings from each case could be generalised or transferred to account for 
similar experiences in similar contexts. This will be done through conceptualisations 
and development of propositions. These are academic processes involving levels of 
abstraction of concepts to formulate first-order, second-order constructs to account for 
the phenomena investigated.  
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2.6.4 Theorising in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment 
Ross (2003) in ‗‗PCIA as a Peacebuilding Tool‘‘ makes strong argument for the need 
for explicit theory in PCIAs. He submits that theory is crucial to practice first because 
people generally have some theories of how the world works. Understanding these 
theories may determine the success or failure of intervention. Also, theories make ex-
plicit how an intervention is expected to impact on its context and vice versa. In his 
words, ―theory can play a crucial role in priority setting and resource allocation when it 
identifies sequences, points of maximum impact, and connections among domains‘‘ 
(Ross 2000b cited in 2003).  
The caption ‗‗theorising in peace and conflict impact assessment‘‘ throws up some 
critical questions. These include what is theorising in PCIAs? What should constitute a 
theory in impact assessment? How should we go about theorising? What should we 
theorise about? What should be the criteria for assessing theories of impact assess-
ment? Theorising in PCIAs could be considered as a continuum having the strict aca-
demic and layman‘s theories as the two ends of the continuum. At the left end of the 
continuum of theories in PCIAs are the non-academic theories that anthropologists 
capture as folk theories. That is, people‘s explanation of how their world works —an 
explanation of events or phenomena using local, context-specific terms to describe 
their experiences/realities. People‘s explanation of how their world works will influ-
ence the success or failure of interventions. Hence these theories are crucial to PCIA. 
But beyond the specific contexts, how do we make these relevant to the general theory 
and practice of PCIA. Probably, first by being sensitive to the existence of these theo-
ries and to the implications they have for our interventions. That is, how they 
might/have interacted with our interventions and vice versa. 
On the right end of the continuum is theorising in its strictest academic sense. In 
the strict academic sense, theorising involves using factors (variables, constructs and 
concepts) to explain phenomena of interest by showing how the factors are related and 
the underlying, psychological, social, economic, and political dynamics that justify the 
selection of factors and the proposed relationships among them (Whetton, 2001). The-
ory in this sense is academic knowledge of the world. Theorising in PCIA would basi-
cally mean making theoretical contributions and building theories. It will involve de-
scribing, explaining or accounting for observed regularities about the phenomena ger-
mane to PCIA and summarising existing knowledge in the area. It would also neces-
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sarily involve prescience in the sense of anticipating, conceptualising and influencing 
future problem domains in the area.  
Theorising in PCIA involves making incremental theoretical contributions to cer-
tain of its aspects. Theoretical contributions in PCIA would involve advancing our un-
derstanding of the nature and implications of intervention-context interactions by chal-
lenging and extending existing knowledge in the area. To begin with, much is required 
in the area of conceptual clarification in PCIA. Across approaches, there exists (some-
times, unnecessary) multiplicity of concepts to explain similar ideas. Works that bring 
together such concepts, clarifies them, and provide us with a set of concepts to de-
scribe and explain PCIA realities, offering sound logic why some concepts will be jet-
tisoned in favour of others will qualify as theoretical contributions. Also, more works 
is still required to explain some of the claims of PCIA. Efforts in this direction will 
constitute theoretical contributions to PCIA.  
Academics could theorise in PCIA by building theory from examining existing 
PCIA approaches/frameworks and/or from (meta-) analysis of data of documented 
cases of intervention in conflict-prone contexts. This involves critiquing the various 
PCIA approaches/methodologies to identify, (cross-cutting) assumptions, concepts and 
propositions in them in order to describe and explain aspects of phenomena in PCIA 
they are interested in. In addition, academics could build theories by taking docu-
mented cases of PCIA or interventions in conflict contexts; identifying and accounting 
for patterns as well as trends in the nature and implications of intervention alongside 
context interactions using emergent themes in conceptualisations and developing 
propositions to describe and explain observed regularities as done in the case of the 
three scholars earlier presented.  
Moreover, academics could embark on theory building researches, using appropri-
ate methodologies. In this sense, they select a particular case or multiple cases of inter-
vention(s) in conflict context(s) as well as investigate and account for the data using 
context-specific conceptualisations grounded in the data. In this sense, the researchers 
build a theory to explain the what, how, why alongside the trio of when, where, and 
who in that particular context, using appropriate methodology —qualitative, quantita-
tive or mixed method. This is building context-specific emergent theories to account 
for the experiences of stakeholders as regards a particular case of the interactions of 
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intervention and context. Such activity will most likely be in the traditions of qualita-
tive research, especially grounded theory research strategy, which has explicit orienta-
tion towards developing theory grounded in the data collected from the field —
people‘s experience/interpretation of their realities. Theorising in this sense will in-
volve an in-depth understanding of the case(s), context-specific theorising or theory 
grounded in data (that is, in realities of peoples‘ experiences). Hence, building 
grounded theory in PCIAs may simultaneously be case-study design. For instance, a 
case of intervention in Mindanao will be studied to understand, explain and document 
how and why intervention and its context interacted and the implications of these in-
teractions for peace and conflict dynamics in the community. By developing conceptu-
alisations and propositions from the analysis of data, academics could generalise 
(transfer) their findings to other similar settings, where these propositions are further 
tested. This back-and-forth process of theory building-theory testing could continue 
until they are able to describe and explain the nature and implications of the interac-
tions of interventions and contexts.  
In addition, theorising includes the realm of prescience, which involves anticipat-
ing, conceptualising and influencing future problem domains in PCIA. Corley and 
Gioia (2011, p. 13) define prescience as ‗‗…as the process of discerning or anticipating 
what we need to know and, equally important, of influencing the intellectual framing 
and dialogue about what we need to know.‘‘ They further posit that ‗‗an orientation 
toward prescience holds some promise for advancing our craft of theory development, 
as well as enhancing the receptivity of the audiences for our developing theories be-
yond the academy and, therefore, conferring a greater potential for influencing the or-
ganizations and societies we study.‘‘ Prescience is therefore essentially futuristic, pro-
active PCIA in theory and practice.   
In conclusion, PCIAs as a specialised area of Peace and Development Studies has 
the basic building blocks of theory building —factors, that is, variables, constructs, and 
concepts that are logically considered as part of explanation of PCIA; linkages show-
ing the relationships of these factors; and the underlying dynamics —psychological, 
social, economic, political— that justify the selection of the factors and their proposed 
causal relationships. Indeed, most notable works on impact assessment, though done 
by practitioners and scholar-practitioners, are scientific in approach. However, disin-
centives to theory building also abound in the conditions that informed the emergence 
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of the field, the inherited orientation and normative commitment of PCIAs, stake-
holders‘ justifiable preference for practice, and the epistemological contention in social 
science methodologies. In spite of these encumbrances, there are enough incentives for 
theory building in PCIAs. There is need to bridge the gap between theory and practice 
by making concerted effort for building both context-specific and generalizable theo-
ries in the different domains of PCIA. Such theory will necessarily draw upon previous 
works in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIAs); and identifying cross-
cutting assumptions, concepts, and propositions implicit or explicit in them. PCIAs 
theories are necessarily of practice focusing on any of the four domains of PCIAs —
ethics, politics, logistics, and methodologies. It also involves prescience. While practi-
tioners have provided and could provide useful inputs, the responsibilities of excavat-
ing scientific theory are essentially academic, and meant for academics. 
2.7Grounded Theory 
‗‗Grounded theory is the systematic generation of a theory from data acquired by a rig-
orous research method. Grounded theory is not findings, but rather an integrated set of 
conceptual hypotheses. It is just probability statements about relationship between con-
cepts‘‘ (Glaser, 1998, p. 3). The first thing to know about the grounded theory is that it 
is not a theory. It is a systematic research method, a strategy (Punch, 1998). It is a re-
search method aimed at ending with theory grounded in the data. Its purpose is to gen-
erate theory grounded in (the analyses of) its data. Hence, its objective for collecting 
and analysing data is to generate theory. Though simply and beautifully described, it 
has its peculiar rationale, philosophy, strategy, and techniques to data collection, sam-
pling, literature and analysis of its data. Espousing these is what this section is all 
about. Once understood, it is soon realised that grounded theory, like most qualitative 
research methods, is similar to the natural way we gather knowledge and build explana-
tions (that is, theories) about our world on day-to-day basis. In a sense, we have all 
been grounded theorists or qualitative researchers one way or the other without recog-
nising it. The section shows how to consciously practice grounded theory (GT), espe-
cially in building scientific knowledge about the phenomena of interests.  
2.7.1 Brief History of Grounded Theory 
GT was discovered in the 1960s through a collaborative work in medical sociology by 
two sociologists —Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss. They studied dying in 
Californian hospitals and developed and used the constant comparative method (later 
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known as grounded theory). They published their first book, Awareness of Dying 
(1965), which was a great success. The second book, The Discovery of Grounded The-
ory (1967), was published in response to many methodological questions that followed 
the Awareness of Dying. After this publication, Glaser and Strauss seem to disagree on 
how to conduct GT. Eleven years later, Glaser published Theoretical Sensitivity 
(1978). Nine years after, Strauss published Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists 
(1987), followed by a joint publication of Strauss and Corbin Basics of Qualitative Re-
search: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques (1990).  
In a bid to correct what he saw as misconceptions of GT presented in Strauss and Cor-
bin‘s book, Glaser published Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergence vs. Forcing in 
1992. The 1967 to 1992 publications give the basic history of the development of GT 
and are also the main publications on methodological statements on GT (Punch, 1998). 
Glaser has published two more publications —Examples of Grounded: A Reader and 
More Grounded Theory Methodology: A Reader critiquing Strauss and Corbin‘s book. 
Strauss and Corbin wrote a chapter in Denzin and Lincoln Handbook (1994) in which 
they gave an overview of GT methodology and commented on its emerging nature. 
Strauss died in 1994 and, in 1998, Glaser published another book Doing Grounded 
Theory: Issues and Discussions and dedicated it to Strauss ‗‗in remembrance of the 
journey we started in 1967‘‘ and to the ‗‗the minus-mentorees throughout the world 
who are doing‘‘. In 1999 Glaser founded a non-profit web-based organisation —the 
Grounded Theory Institute (GTI)— dedicated to his own GT methodology. GTI is an 
online forum for discussion of GT and publishes a journal —The Grounded Theory 
Review. 
GT was developed as a method for the study of complex social behaviour and 
was initially presented as a method of analysing qualitative data. It thus became asso-
ciated with qualitative research. Although it arose of the quantitative methods in the 
sense that it was discovered in a bid to bring the statistical analytic methods (e.g. mul-
tivariate analysis) into qualitative data analysis. Therefore, Glaser, especially, argues 
that it is applicable to quantitative data as well. However, GT is essentially different 
from positivist theory-testing methodologies in its view of theory. In positivistic re-
search, existing theory is tested for robustness using empirical data. GT, however, does 
not force data into pre-existing theory or test theory, rather it provides researchers with 
tools to build and generate theory from data. GT has become a general strategy for re-
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search found useful in a variety of research contexts including health research, educa-
tion, and business, which entails studying high impact dependent variables.    
2.7.2 Developing Grounded Theory: Key Concepts in Theory and Practice 
The crucial idea in developing a grounded theory (from data collected about a 
phenomenon being investigated) is finding a core category, at a high level of abstrac-
tion but grounded in the data, which accounts for what is central in the data (Punch, 
1998). This is a three-step process, with the first being finding conceptual categories in 
the data, which is the first level of abstraction. The second is finding relationships be-
tween these conceptual categories, which is the second and higher level of abstraction. 
And the third is conceptualising and accounting for these relationships at a higher level 
of abstraction (Punch, 1998). Its goals, therefore, include formulating concepts, devel-
oping hypotheses (from these conceptual ideas) and verifying these hypotheses 
through constantly comparing concepts developed from data. Hence, it involves both 
inductive and deductive thinking processes. Induction and deduction in grounded the-
ory are done through the twin, essentially simultaneous, activities of abstracting and 
constant comparison. So, abstracting and constant comparing are essential parts of the 
core activities in GT. Other core activities and tools of GT include theoretical sam-
pling, theoretical sensitivity, theoretical relevance, and theoretical saturation, coding, 
identifying core variables and saturation.  
There is need to point out at this juncture that the peculiar relationship of data 
collection and analysis in GT makes it necessary to discuss data collection and data 
analysis pari passu when presenting this research method. Hence many of the proc-
esses or steps of GT discussed below are executed concurrently with some others in 
real life GT research activities. 
2.7.2.1 Theoretical Sampling 
One of the unique features of GT is the relationship between data collection and data 
analyses. In most research methods, qualitative and quantitative alike, data collection 
is a distinctive stage from data analyses. That is, all relevant data are usually collected 
before analysis commences. But in GT, data collection and analyses are iterative and 
continues throughout the lifespan of the research. This means there is a back-and-forth 
movement between data collection and data analyses. This is the concept of theoretical 
sampling, in which subsequent data collection is guided by theoretical developments 
that emerge in the data analysis (Punch, 1998). In GT, a researcher, guided by some 
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initial research questions, collects a sample (usually small) of data, codes and analyses 
them.  
The next set of data collected (what, whom and where) is guided by the analysis of the 
previous data collected. This iterative, back-and-forth movement continues until the 
researcher has sufficient data to describe what is going on in the context and until the 
point when theoretical saturation is reached, which is a point when new data collected 
are no longer adding new information to what is already known. However, there is the 
argument that one can never be certain that the categories are saturated since induction 
has its limits. For instance, fresh data may come along that refute the existing theory. 
This brings in the concept of theoretical completeness as a twin concept to theoretical 
saturation. In other words, data collection and analysis continues until the researcher 
has theoretical explanation for what is happening and its key features. That is, when 
the theory is able to explain the data fully and satisfactorily.  
Hence, the key issue in sampling here is not representativeness; rather, it is of 
allowing the theory to emerge (Collin, Manion and Morrison, 2011). Theoretical rele-
vance, that is, ‗‗…how the data contribute to the emerging theory and its catego-
ries…‘‘ is a critical criterion in the data collection and sampling process. Theoretical 
relevance requires a skill —theoretical sensitivity. That is, being sensitive to the theo-
retical possibilities that all data carry. Theoretical sensitivity is a major emphasis in 
GT. It requires the analyst opening her thinking about the phenomena being studied. 
Theoretical sampling is getting more popular in other qualitative methods today. And 
as Punch (1998) points out, it resembles the normal way human beings act every day 
when we encounter a puzzling situation. Hence it models the way we have always 
learned. Theoretical sampling may necessitate reviews or total change of the initial re-
search questions. The essential thing is that data drive the direction of the research. 
2.7.2.2 Coding 
Having collected sample data as guided by initial research questions, a re-
searcher analyses the data. This informs the next phase of data collection. This brings 
us to the next activity in GT research —coding. One needs to know what the generic 
terms code and coding mean. Codes are names, tags, or labels. Coding is therefore the 
process of putting names, tags or labels against pieces of data (Punch, 1998). The data 
may be individual words, phrases, a whole sentence or more, a part of a picture, and so 
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on. Most people have coded text without knowing. Highlighting part of a text and tag-
ging it with a label to represent what we consider the central idea is a form of coding. 
Coding serves as index for the data. The first labels also permit a more advanced cod-
ing at the latter stage of the analyses. Hence coding is both the first part of the analysis 
and part of getting the data ready for subsequent analysis. Coding in qualitative re-
search is different from coding as used in quantitative analysis. In quantitative analy-
sis, data analysts code data from questionnaire into symbols amenable to statistical op-
erations.  
Following the three-stage process of developing grounded theory identified 
above, there are three general types of codes in GT. These are substantive, theoretical 
and core codes. Substantive codes are the initial conceptual categories generated from 
the empirical data. However, they are at a higher abstract level than the data. Theoreti-
cal codes connect or show the relationship among the categories identified. They bring 
the substantive codes together and interconnect them using propositions or hypotheses 
about the data, which will be integrated in the third stage. The core code is the higher-
order conceptualisation of theoretical codes which account for these relationships and 
thus form the basis for theory building. (Punch, 1998). From these three codes come 
the three coding activities in GT. They are open coding which finds the substantive 
codes; axial coding or theoretical coding, which uses theoretical codes to connect the 
main substantive codes; and selective coding which isolates and elaborates the higher-
order core category (Punch, 1998). Consequently, in coding in GT, the first, second 
and their objectives are to identify the substantive codes in the data, the theoretical and 
the core codes respectively. This corresponds with the first, second and third levels of 
analysis respectively with increasing levels of abstraction. Coding is thus a central is-
sue in GT. However, these coding are likely to overlap and done simultaneously, rather 
than as separate sequential activities.   
Open coding involves breaking open or deconstructing the data into manage-
able chunks (This is why it is called open coding). The point is to understand the phe-
nomenon by opening the theoretical possibilities in the data. It aims at generating ab-
stract conceptual categories more abstract than the data they describe. These can then 
be used later as building blocks for the theory. It involves exploring the data and 
breaking it into units to code for meanings, feelings, actions, events and so on (Cohen, 
Manion, & Morrison, 2011). This leads to creation of new codes and categories and 
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subcategories where necessary. It is not about bringing concepts to the data and no a 
priori coding scheme is used in open coding. Axial coding (or Glaser‘s theoretical cod-
ing) attempts to link together the categories and codes created during open coding. In 
other words, the theoretical possibilities and categories broken apart by open coding 
are put together again or interrelated by putting axis (that is, link) through the data, 
howbeit in conceptually different ways. Axial coding involves exploring codes and ex-
amining their interrelationships. Selective coding involves deliberately selecting a core 
code and making explicit its relationship with other codes in those parts of data. Once 
selected, the core category becomes the centrepiece of the grounded theory. Selective 
coding includes writing a story that builds on the propositions or integrates categories 
produced by axial coding. The aim of selective coding is integrating and pulling to-
gether the developing analyses. The core category being the central focus around 
which all other concepts, ideas and categories are integrated. 
2.7.2.3 Abstracting 
The inductive process of GT is seen in the way its theory emerges from its data 
through moving from one level of abstraction to the other. Abstracting (as in most 
other qualitative analysis) essentially means that some concepts are at higher level of 
abstraction than other. Punch (1998) gives a useful conceptual framework to depict 
levels of abstraction in data analysis. This is adapted in Figure 1 below. At the lowest 
level of abstraction are the indicators, which are at the most concrete, descriptive level. 
As the label goes, indicators indicate, that is, they show the presence of something. For 
instance, hostile remarks made by someone can be considered indicators of the concept 
of aggression in a particular research on aggression. A researcher working on such 
study may include other indicators of aggression in order to understand aggression in 
the given context. Hence, indicators are what qualitative researchers collect in the field 
in form of data. In abstracting, we infer a concept from an indicator in the data. That is, 
we are going upwards from a piece of empirical data to a more abstract concept 
(Punch, 1998). A concept has many indicators and the indicators are interchangeable 
with each other for the purpose of inferring the concept.  However, rather than have 
pre-specified concepts and indicators, emerging indicators from the data lead to the 
development of concept in GT.    
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       Figure 2.3. Qualitative Data Analysis Process        
       Source: Fieldwork, 2013 Adapted from Punch, 1998. 
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2.7.2.4 Constant Comparison  
Comparison is a central intellectual activity in qualittive analysis. It is at the heart of 
GT analysis as it assissts in theory generation. In fact the co-founders of GT described 
grounded theory analysis as the constant comparative method. Comapring is essential 
in abstracting and coding. At the first level of coding, through comparing different 
indicators in the data, the analyst comes up with more abstract concepts behind the 
data. Similarly, at the second stage, it is by comparing categories that we are able to 
link them. Thus comparison helps in raising the level of abstraction.  According to 
Glaser, constant comparison is the process  ‗by which the properties and categories 
across the data are compared continuously until no more variation occurs (1996 cited 
in Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 600), that is, until saturation is reached. 
Theoretical saturation is the aim of constant comparison. It involves using negative, 
discrepant and disconfirming cases to assist the categories and emergent theory to fit 
all data by comparing new data with existing data and categories in order for the cate-
gories to achieve a perfect fit with the data. 
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 105-13 cit. in Cohen, Manion, and 
Morrison, 2011, p. 600), constant comparison involves four stages. These are compar-
ing incidents and data that are applicable to each category; integrating these categories 
and their properties; bounding the theory; and setting out the theory.  At the first stage, 
incidents are coded and compared with former incidents in the same and different 
groups and with other data in the same category. This involves two processes —
unitising and categorising. Unitising involves breaking the narratives into the smallest 
pieces of information or meaningful text, for example, words, phrases, paragraphs. 
Categorising involves bringing together related the unitised text into the same cate-
gory, devising rules to describe the properties of the categories, and checking for inter-
nal consistency within the unitised text within the categories. The second stage is a 
stage of memoing and further coding, where units being compared change from inci-
dents with incidents to incidents with properties of the category that emerged from 
previous comparison of incidents. The third stage is a stage of delimitation. The de-
limitation occurs at the levels of theory and the categories. Major modifications reduce 
because underlying uniformities and properties are discovered. Theoretical saturation 
takes place at this stage. The final stage is the stage of writing theory. It occurs when 
 106 
 
the researcher, having gathered and generated coded data, memos, and a theory, write 
the theory in full.   
To aid reflexivity and accompany constant comparison, the co-founders of GT 
recommend that memoing should be done simultaneously with constant comparison. 
2.7.2.5 Memoing 
‗‗Memos are the theorising write-up of ideas about substantive codes and their theo-
retically coded relationships as they emerge during coding, collecting and analysing 
data and during memoing.‘‘ (Glaser, 1998, p. 177). Memoing is the writing down of 
ideas that occur to the researcher during the process of constant comparison and data 
analysis. A memo is the write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they 
occur to the analyst while coding (and memoing). It involves writing ‗‗…ideas, notes, 
comments, notes on surprising matters, themes or metaphors, reminders, hunches, draft 
hypotheses, references to literature, diagrams, questions, draft theories, methodological 
points, personal points, suggestions for further enquiry, etc…‘‘ (Lempert, 2007, p. 
245.; Flick, 2009, p. 434 cited in Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 2011, p. 600) Memo 
can be a sentence, a paragraph or a few pages. It expresses the analyst momentary 
ideas elaborated using certain concepts. Memos could be as varied as the analyst 
imagination permits. They may be about any part of the data. According to Punch 
(1998), memos may be ‗‗…substantive, theoretical, methodological, or even per-
sonal.‘‘ The first two suggest deeper concepts than coding. Memos are useful through-
out the stages of the analysis and even may constitute useful part of the report writing 
later. Coding and memoing are essential parts of the style of all qualitative data analy-
sis. 
2.7.2.6 Elaborating 
As a concept has many indicators, so also, a category has many properties. Elaborating 
a category is to specify and compare its additional properties by finding additional in-
dicators of the concept until we reach saturation. Elaborating also means developing 
and examining its variation systematically by specifying, comparing and developing its 
properties (Punch, 1998).   
2.7.3 Grounded Theory (GT) Researchers 
GT is unique in the sense that it sets aside all preconceived ideas and allows the data 
themselves to give rise to the theory. This demands certain abilities from the GT re-
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searchers. Glaser (1996) suggests ability to tolerate uncertainty (no preconceived the-
ory), confusion, setbacks (when new data disconfirm emergent theory), to avoid pre-
mature formulation of the theory, but through patiently doing constant comparison al-
low the emergence of the final theory. There is need for openness to the emergent the-
ory and not forcing data to fit theory by all means. A researcher forces when he lacks 
the ability to handle confusion and feeling stupid in his study, he argues. GT demands 
hard work and faithfulness to the rigour of the process. These are summarised as fol-
lows: 
 tolerance and openness to data and what is emerging; 
 tolerance of confusion and regression (feeling stupid when the theory does not 
become immediately obvious); 
 resistance to premature formulation of theory; 
 ability to pay close attention to data; 
 willingness to engage in the process of theory generation rather than theory 
testing; it is an experiential methodology; 
 ability to work with emergent categories rather than preconceived or received 
categories. 
(Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 599). 
2.7.4 Evaluating a Grounded Theory 
The grounded theory of whatever is being theorised must emerge from the data in an 
unforced manner and explain the data fully and satisfactorily, that is, account for all 
the data. There are several criteria against which we can evaluate the adequacy or oth-
erwise of the grounded theory. Those suggested in GT literature include originality, 
resonance (the data, the phenomenon, the participants‘ experiences and views), useful-
ness (for different people and groups, for identifying generic processes, for further re-
search, for advancing the field), workability (practicality and explanatory power), fit 
with the data, relevance (to the situation, to groups, to researchers, to the field) and 
modifiability (in light of additional data) (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011). Glaser 
and Strauss (1967, p. 237) suggest four key ones. These are: 
 The closeness of the fit between the theory and the data. 
 How readily understandable the theory is by the lay persons working in the 
field, that is, that it makes sense to them. 
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 The ability of the theory to be general to a ‗‗multitude of diverse daily situa-
tions within the substantive area, not just to a specific types of situation‘‘. 
 The theory must enable partial control to be exercised over the process and the 
structures of day-to-day situations that evolve over time, such that the re-
searcher who is using the theory can have sufficient control of such situations 
to render it worthwhile to apply the theory to these. 
(Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 601) 
2.7.5 Conclusion 
With explicit orientation and procedure for theory generation, GT is a viable tool for 
filling the need for theory-building in Peace and Conflict Research, especially in Af-
rica. It is a complete and rigorous research strategy to develop explanatory theory 
grounded in the data. It was discovered by Glaser and Strauss in the 1960s. Developing 
grounded theory about phenomena under investigation involves some tools, activities 
and guiding processes. Central activities in GT are abstracting and constant compari-
son. Others include theoretical sampling, theoretical sensitivity, theoretical relevance, 
theoretical saturation, theoretical completeness, coding, memoing, and elaborating. 
There are criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a GT in theorising about its phenom-
ena. These are originality, resonance, usefulness, workability, fit with the data, rele-
vance and modifiability. These and similar ones show GT as a rigorous research strat-
egy. GT has been criticised for presuming that it is not informed by other theories 
whereas data are laden with theories. 
2.8 Gaps in the Literature 
Much scholarly works have been done on the Niger Delta Region (NDR), its history, 
people and culture, its conflicts and interventions in the conflicts (Dike, 1956; Ikime, 
1969; Alagoa E. J., 1999; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Albert, 2001a; IPCR, 2002; 
Isumonah, 2003; Ogbogbo, 2004; Internaitonal Crisis Group, 2006a; Ibaba, 2007). 
Also, various types of impact assessments in the NDR are covered in the extant litera-
ture —social, economic, political, environmental impact assessment (Omotola, 2007; 
Ojukwu-Ogba, 2009; Aaron & George, 2010). However, the literature has not paid 
adequate attention to assessing the peace and conflict impacts of the interventions on 
the context of the NDR and vice versa, using the PCIA framework.  
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While assessing impacts in social, economic, political, health or environmental 
terms are useful, in a conflict area, such as the NDR, there has been a growing interest 
to measure impacts either solely in terms of peace and conflict or in combination with 
other impacts (Bush K. , 1998; Anderson M. B., 1999; Austin, Fischer, & Wils, 2003; 
Schmelzle, 2005; Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff, 2005).  
Conversely, in the NDR, adequate attention has not been paid to assessing the 
peace and conflict impacts of, particularly, the FGN socio-economic interventions. The 
NDDC is the Federal Government of Nigeria‘s most comprehensive and most capital-
intensive socio-economic intervention in the NDR to date, hence there is need to inves-
tigate the contributions it has made and/or which it is making to its contexts. In an un-
published Master‘s dissertation titled ―Towards A Conflict Sensitive Development: 
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of the Niger Delta Development Commission‘s 
Development Interventions in Ilaje Local Government Area‖ (2004), Akinyoade 
attempted a PCIA of the NDDC. However, since then, the PCIA literature has grown 
larger and its methodologies have been rigorously revised. For instance, in 2008, Cole, 
Mitchell, Ohlsen, Rinaldi, and Unumeri, in Exploring Conflict Sensitive Programming 
in the Niger Delta: A Rough Guide for the Practitioner presents a framework for 
conducting peace and conflict-sensitive intervention in the NDR. Hence, there is need 
to undertake a more rigorous PCIA of the Commission. 
From the foregoing, gaps exist in literature on the Niger Delta, the NDDC, and 
PCIA. Firstly, much has been written on the Niger Delta, its history, people and cul-
ture, conflicts, intervention in its conflicts (Dike, 1956; Ikime, 1969; Alagoa E. J., 
1999; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Albert, 2001a;IPCR, 2002; Isumonah, 2003; 
Ogbogbo, 2004; Internaitonal Crisis Group, 2006a; Ibaba, 2007).  However, there is no 
known ex post facto peace and conflict impact assessment of the NDDC intervention 
and its implications on the Niger Delta conflict situation.  
Secondly, while literature exists on the NDDC, empirical work on its capacity 
for peace and conflict-sensitive intervention is not available. Empirical work on its ca-
pacity will tell us the extent to which the Commission is capable to deliver on its man-
date. Thirdly, while empirical works on gender issues in the Niger Delta exist (Aina, 
Adeyemi, Waziri, & Samuel, 2009), a gender-based assessment of the interventions of 
the NDDC and its implications for the context of the interventions is an unexplored 
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area in literature. Finally, a major gap also exists in theorising on the interactions be-
tween intervention and context alongside the implications for the conflict situation, 
especially in the African context. These are the gaps this study seeks to fill by under-
taking an empirical investigation into the interventions of the Niger Delta Develop-
ment Commission as well as developing an explanatory theory to understand and ex-
plain the nature, dynamics and implications of intervention-context interactions and its 
implication for the Niger Delta conflict situation.
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methods employed in this study. It covers research 
design or strategy, sampling and sampling techniques, data collection and data analy-
sis. It also discusses the procedure by which validity and reliability in method and data 
analysis was achieved in the study. The researcher personally carried out all fieldwork 
and post-field data handling activities. This ensured the quality of the research work as 
necessary precautions were taken to produce quality data, analysis and findings. 
3.1 Research design 
This is an ex post facto peace and conflict impact assessment research. It combines the 
case study and the grounded theory designs in the qualitative research tradition. A 
peace and conflict-sensitive assessment mainstreams peace and conflict sensitivity into 
traditional assessment. In other words, it assesses a given programme or intervention 
with explicit bias for peace and conflict issues. A case study examines cases. In social 
science research, a case is ―…a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded con-
text.‖ (Punch, 1998, p. 152). Brewer and Hunter (1989 cited in Punch, 1998) list six 
types of units, any of which can be the focus of case study, which can be studied in 
social science research. They are individuals; attributes of individuals; actions and in-
teractions; residues and artefacts of behaviour; settings, incidents and events; and col-
lectivities. The general idea of a case study is to develop fullest understanding of the 
case. Case study aims at understanding the situation in depth, in its natural setting in 
order to recognise its complexity and context. It has a holistic focus, with the aim to 
understand the wholeness and unity of a case (Punch, 1998). Going by Stake‘s classifi-
cation, therefore, this study is an instrumental case study, which examines a particular 
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case to give insight into a phenomenon, or to refine a theory (1994 cited in Punch, 
1998, p. 152). 
Nevertheless, ―any particular qualitative research will not necessarily be one 
thing or the other.‘‘ (Punch, 1998, p. 150). Hence, the grounded theory design was 
combined with case study in order to improve the quality of the study. Grounded the-
ory is a research strategy that aims at generating theory from data. That is, theory that 
is grounded in the data. Its sole aim is to end up with a theory or theories derived from 
the analysis of data. Grounded theory is therefore a research strategy and a method of 
data analysis. Though it uses deduction as well, grounded theory is essentially an in-
ductive technique. It emphasises induction as the main tool for theory development 
(Glaser, 1998; Punch, 1998). A key issue in grounded theory is theoretical sampling, 
which describes the relationship between data collection and data analysis (see Data 
Collection below). Another key issue is the use of literature. Based on its orientation 
—theory generation— literature reviewing is deliberately delayed until conceptual and 
theoretical directions within the data are clear. Hence, literature is treated as further 
data for the analysis (Glaser, 1998; Punch, 1998). The grounded theory strategy is con-
sidered appropriate for this study because there has been repeated call for building ex-
planatory theory in Peace and Conflict Studies and especially about the phenomenon 
under investigation. Also, it is a coordinated, systematic but flexible approach, thus it 
brings a disciplined and organised approach to analysing qualitative data. Finally, the 
nature of this study —being an applied research investigating relatively new prob-
lems— makes the traditional hypothetico-deductive theory testing/verification ap-
proach less appropriate. 
3.2 Sampling 
No research can study everything about a case, hence the need for sampling within the 
case. Being qualitative, this study employed a combination of purposive sampling 
methods for its various desired purposes as required. Sampling decisions for the pur-
pose of this study were made about people to interview, settings or sites and processes 
to evaluate. Five categories of interviewees —programme beneficiaries, community 
stakeholders, external stakeholders, the NDDC officials, and the NDDC Consultants— 
were sampled, using maximum variation sampling. Maximum variation sampling aims 
at obtaining ―…maximum differences of perceptions about a topic among information-
rich informants or group‖ (McMillan and Schumacher, 1997, cited in Introduction to 
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Designing Qualitative Research). Programme beneficiaries were selected using snow-
balling (also known as network or chain referral) technique. In snowballing sampling, 
participants already sampled referred the researcher to other potential participants. In-
formant sampling was employed in sampling community and external stakeholders 
while concept/theory sampling was employed in sampling NDDC staff and consultant. 
Concept/theory sampling selects ―…by information-rich persons or situations known 
to experience the concept or to be attempting to implement the concept/theory‖ (Tro-
chim, 2006). 
Odi community in Kolokuma-Opokuma Local Government Area of Bayelsa 
State was selected, using site selection and comprehensive sampling strategies. Site-
selection strategy decides on site where specific events occurred while comprehensive 
sampling chooses entire group by criteria. Odi community was selected for a number 
of reasons. One, the community has attracted much intervention after the 1999 massa-
cre. Also, it is an Ijaw community, which is the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta 
region and fourth largest in Nigeria. Moreover, at the time of the fieldwork, the com-
munity was not involved in any violent conflict, which makes it safe for the researcher 
and participants. Furthermore, preliminary investigation revealed that the community 
had enjoyed relatively high number of NDDC interventions. Finally, it is home to one 
of the major NDDC consultants on its agricultural support programme —the Biotech-
nology Resources Development Centre (BIODEC)—one of which the Commission 
proudly broadcasts its achievements since 2006. Evaluation included the overall proc-
ess of the NDDC intervention in the region and particularly in the community. The 
NDDC intervention evaluated in the community included all available NDDC projects 
and programmes from 2006 to 2011.  
3.2.1 Description of participants 
Seventy-eight interviews were conducted on resident community members in Odi. In-
terviewees included traditional ruler, secretary, and members of the traditional ruling 
council, chairman, secretary and members of the Community Development Commit-
tee, the oldest man in the community, religious leaders, women leader, female and 
male executives and members of the Odi Youth Council, NDDC project beneficiaries 
(females and males), school teachers in the community, I/NGOs/ CBOs staff, politi-
cians, and law-enforcement agents. Most of the participants are literate with their level 
of education ranging from modern school certificate to university education. They 
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were military officer (retired, now farmer), politicians, university graduates, teachers, 
Biotechnology Resource Development Centre staff, farmers, fishers and traders. Their 
ages ranged from late twenties to seventy above.  
Twenty-three external stakeholders (non-resident of Odi community) were also 
interviewed. This included NDDC staff, NDDC consultants, experts on Niger Delta, 
I/NGOs staff, activists, academics, religious leaders, and professionals. These catego-
ries were selected to reflect different aspects and make an objective account of the 
phenomenon under investigation. Non-resident community stakeholder interviewed 
were academics, social critics/activists, staff/consultants for NGOs and politicians. 
NDDC staff interviewed comprised assistant directors and desk officers in Agriculture 
and Fisheries Directorate, Commercial and Industrial Directorate, Community and Ru-
ral Development Directorate, and Youth, Women Culture and Sports Directorate at the 
headquarters in Port Harcourt, Rivers State Directorate and Bayelsa State Directorate. 
All NDDC staff and consultants interviewed had a minimum qualification of univer-
sity education and their ages ranged from mid-thirties to early fifties. 
3.3 Data Collection 
Data collection covers types of data, methods and instruments for, and ethics 
in, data collection. Since both case study and grounded theory designs use multiple 
sources of data and multiple data collection methods, primary and secondary data were 
collected for the study. Consequently, this study employed key informant and in-depth 
interviews, official documents, and non-participant observation as methods of data col-
lection. Primary data were collected through key informant interviews (KII), in-depth 
Interviews (IDIs), and non-participant observation. The researcher took field notes on 
participant‘s reactions throughout the duration of the interview. These notes were built 
into the transcript of the interview and were also used in data analyses. At the end of 
the interview, participants were informed that they would be furnished with transcript 
of the interviews if they gave the researcher their individual e-mail address. All NDDC 
staff and consultants, experts and other external stakeholders provided the required e-
mail addresses and the transcript was sent to them for validation. Surprisingly, most of 
the programme beneficiaries and community stakeholders also provided e-mails con-
tact. The transcripts were sent to them for validation as promised. All these transcripts 
were validated before commencement of data analysis. At the end of each day, audio 
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of the interviews were transferred into the researchers laptop with backup copies saved 
in a flash drive and a memory card. 
Table 3.1.  Categories of Interviewees 
S/N Category of Participants Number 
of interviews 
A Resident Community People (RCP) 78 
1 Traditional Ruler/Secretary to the Traditional Ruling Coun-
cil 
4 
2 Community Development Committee Leaders—
Chairman/Secretary  
2 
3 The oldest man in the community  1 
4 Men  8 
5 Religious Leaders 3 
6 Women Leader  1 
7 Women 5 
8 Community Youth Leaders (females and males) 4 
9 Community Youths (females and males) 12 
10 Project beneficiaries (females: males) 20 
11 School Principal/Teacher in the community 4 
12 I/NGOs/ CBOs staff 5 
13 Politicians 6 
14 Law-enforcement agents  3 
B          NDDC Staff and Consultants    16 
1 NDDC Staff 10 
2 NDDC Consultants 6 
C         Other Stakeholders in the Niger Delta 7 
1 Neutral experts on Niger Delta, academics, activists, etc. 7 
                                                                                         Total 101 
Source: Author‘s Compilation, 2011 
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3.3.1 Development and Validation of Research Instruments 
The instruments for data collection included semi-structured interview guides, digital 
voice recorder (Olympus WS-510), and digital camera (Nikon Coolpix S570 for pic-
ture and video). Five semi-structured interview guides were developed for the five 
groups of interviewees sampled. These were: 
1. IDI Guide for programme beneficiaries. 
2. IDI Guide for community stakeholders (excluding project beneficiaries). 
3. IDI Guide for the NDDC staff. 
4. IDI Guide for the NDDC consultants. 
5. IDI Guide for experts and other agencies working in the Niger Delta (and Odi 
community). 
The interview guides address questions covering the mandate of the NDDC and 
its fulfilment; identification of NDDC intervention in the community; and stage and 
level of community involvement. NDDC official documents such as the Niger Delta 
Regional Development Master Plan, NDDC Act, official brochures, Chairman and 
Managing Director/CEO‘s speeches at various NDDC events, and NDDC website con-
tents were analysed. Unstructured non-participant observations were carried out at 
NDDC Offices and its intervention sites in Odi. The drafts of the interview guides 
were sent to a consultant, Mr Godwin Unumeri, who is a Shell-trained Peace and Con-
flict Impact Assessment expert and a consultant to Peacebuild, an organisation in Can-
ada that published Exploring Conflict Sensitive Programming in the Niger Delta: A 
Rough Guide for the Practitioner (2008). He validated the interview guides. Each in-
terview guide contained between nine and 12 questions drawn to elicit information 
necessary to answer the research questions. The duration of the interviews ranged from 
less than 10 minutes to over 100 minutes. The recorded interviews were later tran-
scribed for closer study. In Bailey (2008, p. 1), transcription is ―…representing audible 
talk as written words requires reduction, interpretation and representation to make the 
written text readable and meaningful‖ (The audio recording was transcribed by the re-
searcher personally at an average of four hours transcription time for every 30 minute 
of recording. This is consistent with general observations about transcribing time 
(Lacey and Luff 2007; Bailey 2008,). Transcription, normally time-consuming, was 
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handled over a period of three months. The transcripts contained about 200, 000 words 
in Microsoft Word Processor. 
Secondary data were collected from NDDC website, NDDC official documents 
(the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan, speeches of key NDDC officials, 
and NDDC skills acquisition graduation ceremony brochure and community partici-
pants‘ personal file records.  
In consonance with most qualitative designs, especially, grounded theory, the 
process of data collection and data analyses for this study was iterative, that is, there 
was a back-and-forth movement between the two stages throughout the research pro-
ject. Also, the principle of theoretical sampling (see Section 2.6.2) guided the process. 
This continued until the stage of theoretical saturation (see Section 2.6.2) was 
achieved. This is a stage when new data was not adding new theoretical elements but 
rather confirming what has already been found. 
3.3.2 Ethics in Data Collection 
Some ethical issues were observed in data collection. On the appointed date 
and time, letters of institutional affiliation or introduction (from the Institute of African 
Studies, University of Ibadan) and letter of introduction of the research (written by the 
researcher and containing information about the research and rights of the participants) 
were given to each respondent. In cases of NDDC officials and consultants, it took 
weeks and sometimes months before official approval for the interview was secured. 
Before commencing the interview, the researcher went over the letter of information 
about the research with each participant and clarified issues raised by the participant. 
The ethical issues of voluntary participation, withdrawal of consent, confidentiality 
and anonymity were stressed to every participant. Also, the researcher asked for the 
permission to record the interview. The permission was granted in most cases. The re-
searcher then administered consent form to the participant. The interview commenced 
after the consent form is signed and handed over to the researcher. The interviews were 
recorded using Olympus WS-510M digital voice recorder. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
Analysing qualitative data involves coding, memoing, categorisation, identifying pat-
terns and building explanatory theories. It involves two fundamental activities —
abstracting and comparing. The essential idea of abstracting ‗‗…is that some concepts 
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are at a higher level of abstraction than others‘‘ (Punch, 1998, p. 208). Abstracting in-
volves raising the levels of abstraction from more concrete indicators through first-
order concept to second-order concept, and possibly to more abstract and general con-
cepts. Hence, it moves through a continuum from concrete to abstract and from spe-
cific to general. Comparison is essential throughout the stages of qualitative data 
analysis. At the level of coding, comparing different indicators in the data helps to 
identify more abstract concepts behind the empirical data. Comparison, therefore, leads 
to raising the level of abstraction, which is essential to conceptual development. Cod-
ing at higher level also involves comparing concepts and their properties, thereby help-
ing us to identify more abstract concept (Punch, 1998). Through abstracting and com-
parison, categories emerge from the data, leading to the emergence of concepts and 
propositions from the data (Glaser, 1998). Concepts and propositions thus developed 
may be useful in understanding similar phenomena in contexts similar to the one in-
vestigated. Conception and development of propositions are two ways by which case 
study can be generalised (Punch, 1998). This will help the generalizability or transfer-
ability of the findings.  
3.4.1 ATLAS.ti 7.0: Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analyses Software 
(CAQDAS) Package 
There are diverse techniques of analysing qualitative data. These techniques are often 
interconnected, overlapping and complementary, seldom mutually exclusive. The 
manual approach to qualitative data analysis, with its many variants, was predominant 
until the mid-1990s when computer application packages for the analysis of qualitative 
data became available. Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analyses Software 
(CAQDAS) help qualitative data analyst to do all activities —coding, quoting, 
memoing, and others that are traditionally done in manual qualitative data analyses. 
Computer technology saves a great deal of what Lacey and Stuff (2007) call ‗‗paper 
chase‘‘ that normally accompany manual qualitative data analysis. ATLAS.ti 7.0, one 
of the popular computer packages for analysing qualitative data, was used in analysing 
data collected in this study. The researcher was first introduced to ATLAS.ti in 2008 at 
the CODESRIA Regional Methodology Workshop, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. 
Competence in using the software was achieved through practice with demo version, 
video tutorials and manuals for 12 months. The analysis of the data for this study was 
done with ATLAS.ti version 7.0 released in June 2012. It is a well-stocked workbench 
for the qualitative analysis of large bodies of textual, graphical, audio, and video data. 
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It provides the necessary instruments to accomplish the tasks associated with any sys-
tematic approach to unstructured data, that is, data that cannot be meaningfully ana-
lysed by formal, statistical approaches.  
It helps to thoroughly analyse and evaluate, search and query data, to capture, 
visualise and share findings (Friese, 2011). ATLAS.ti helps user explore the complex 
phenomenon hidden in the data by letting him manage, extract, categorise, compare, 
explore, interlink data segments and reassemble meaningful pieces from large amounts 
of data from a large variety and volume of source documents. Thus the software sup-
ports user in discovering patterns and testing hypotheses in creative, flexible yet sys-
tematic ways.  
With numerous output options and collaboration tools, the analysis is easily ac-
cessible to the user and others (Friese, 2011). Qualitative analysis with ATLAS.ti in-
volves two principal levels —the data level and the conceptual level. The data level 
includes segmentation of data files; coding text, image, audio, and video passages; and 
writing comments and memos. The conceptual level focuses on linking codes to net-
works and writing some more comments and memos, which are activities involved in 
querying data and model-building. Data-level activities include segmenting the data 
assigned to a project into quotations, adding comments to respective passages (note-
making/annotating), and coding selected text passages or data segments, secondary 
materials, annotations, and memos to facilitate their later retrieval. Initial ideas often 
find expression through their assignment to a code or memo, to which similar ideas or 
text selections also become assigned. The latter act of comparing noteworthy segments 
leads to a creative conception phase that involves higher-level interpretive work and 
theory-building (Friese, 2011). Conceptual-level work involves querying data in vari-
ety of ways, combining complex code queries with variables, exploring relationships 
between codes and visualising findings using the network tool. ATLAS.ti allows user 
to visually connect selected passages, memos, and codes into diagrams that graphically 
outline complex relations. This feature virtually transforms text-based workspace into 
a graphical playground for constructing concepts and theories based on relationships 
between codes, data segments, or memos. This process sometimes uncovers other rela-
tions in the data that were not obvious before and still allows user the ability to in-
stantly revert to his notes or primary data selection. 
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The following sequence of steps describes a common script when working with 
ATLAS.ti:  
1. Create a project, an "idea container," meant to enclose data, all findings, codes, 
memos, and structures under a single name. This is called a Hermeneutic Unit 
(HU). This is the main workspace —the HU Editor. 
2. Next, assign documents, text, graphic, audio and video files, and Google Earth, 
called Primary Documents (PDs), to the HU. The data files become the source 
material for the project‘s primary data and can be located anywhere on the 
computer or a network. For ease of data management, all data and the AT-
LAS.ti project file, the HU, should be saved within one folder.  
3. Read and select text passages or identify areas in an image or select segments 
on the timeline of an audio or video file that are of further interest, assign key 
words (codes), and write comments and memos that contain your thinking 
about the data. This is the Data-Level working phase. 
4. Compare data segments based on the codes you have assigned; possibly assign 
more data files to the project. 
5. Organise PDs, codes, and memos into families.  
6. Query the data based on the research questions utilising the different tools AT-
LAS.ti provides. The key words to look for are: simple retrieval, complex code 
retrievals using the query tool, simple or complex retrievals in combination 
with variables via the scope button, the co-occurrence explorer (tree and table 
explorer), the codes -primary document table, Excel and SPSS export of fre-
quency counts for further statistical analysis.  
7. Build semantic, prepositional or terminological networks from the codes you 
have created. These networks, together with the codes and memos, form the 
framework for emerging theory.  
8. Finally, compile a written report based on the memos written throughout the 
various phases of the project and the networks created and even publish the 
project as a World Wide Web document or an individual presentation using 
XML.  
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Source: (ATLAS.ti 6 User Guide and Reference, 2011). 
3.5 Ensuring Rigour: Validity and Reliability in Method and Data 
Analysis 
The onus to demonstrate that qualitative research adheres to a systematic and rigorous 
method rests on the researcher. This is especially important, given the criticism from 
those less favourable to the method of qualitative research. This section, therefore, fo-
cuses on the issue of rigour in research method and data analyses, especially on the 
issues of validity and reliability. Validity, meaning the correspondence between the 
reality studied and the reality reported, or the best available approximation to the truth 
of propositions, is an important issue in scientific research. It is a contested issue in 
qualitative research. Some qualitative researchers argue that the validity framework 
commonly accepted in quantitative research is not acceptable in qualitative research. 
―They reject the basic realist assumption that there is a reality external to our percep-
tion of it. Consequently, it doesn't make sense to be concerned with the ―truth‖ or ―fal-
sity‖ of an observation with respect to an external reality…‖ (Trochim, 2006). This 
school argues for different standards for judging qualitative research. Guba and Lin-
coln (1994, cited in Punch, 1998) suggest four criteria for judging qualitative research. 
They are credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. They correspond 
to quantitative criteria of internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity. 
Methodologists argue about the value and legitimacy of these criteria. Some 
argue that a correct understanding of the corresponding quantitative criteria will show 
that those quantitative criteria are applicable to qualitative research as well. However, 
the purpose of featuring it here is not to support the argument for or against a set of 
criteria but to show that this study was conducted with full consciousness of certain 
criteria to ensure quality scientific research. Of the technical meanings of validity —
validity of data; overall validity of research, internal validity and external validity— 
the last two were emphasised throughout the course of the investigation. Internal and 
external validity have their origin in quantitative research and have found inroads into 
qualitative research as well. However, they have different meanings in different con-
texts. In quantitative research, internal validity is concerned with whether a finding 
that incorporates a causal relationship between two or more variables is sound. Exter-
nal validity refers to the generalizability of the study‘s findings. That is, the extent to  
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Table 3.2. Criteria for Judging Qualitative Research 
S/N Criteria Description 
1 Credibility Establishing that the results of qualitative research are 
credible or believable from the perspective of the partici-
pant in the research. Since the purpose of qualitative re-
search is to describe or understand the phenomenon of 
interest from the participant's eyes, the participants are the 
only ones who can legitimately judge the credibility of the 
results. 
2 Transferability The degree to which the results of qualitative research can 
be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings. 
Qualitative researcher enhances transferability by doing a 
thorough job of describing the research context and the 
assumptions that were central to the research. 
3 Dependability Emphasises the need for the researcher to account for the 
ever-changing context within which research occurs. It is 
the researcher‘s responsibility to describe the changes that 
occur in the setting and how these changes affected the 
way the research approached the study. 
4 Confirmability The degree to which the results could be confirmed or 
corroborated by others. 
Source: Trochim, 2006. 
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which the findings can be generalised, or transferred to other settings. In qualitative 
research, internal validity refers to the ―…degree to which the interpretations and con-
cepts have mutual meanings between the participants and the researcher‖ (Trochim, 
2006). External validity in qualitative research refers to ―…the extension of findings, 
as grounded theory or as an analytical synthesis that enables others to understand simi-
lar situations and apply these findings in subsequent research‖ (Trochim, 2006). 
McMillan and Schumacher (1997) suggest some strategies for ensuring internal and 
external validity in qualitative research. These are presented in tables 3.2 and 3.3 be-
low. 
In qualitative research, ―validation does not belong in some separate stage of 
the investigation, but instead as an on-going principle throughout the entire research 
process.‖ (O' Connor & Gibson, n.d). In order to ensure rigour in the study, the re-
searcher employed five of the nine strategies enumerated above throughout the entire 
research process. These were: 
1. Prolonged and persistent field work: The first and second phases of the field-
work spanned 15 months, from June 2010 to September 2011. It covered 
Bayelsa (Odi, Egboghene, Yenagoa), Edo (Benin, Auchi), and Rivers States 
(Port Harcourt). Between three and five visits (spanning four to 10 days) were 
made to each state. 
2. Verbatim Account of participants‘ language: As will be shown later in the find-
ings, participants were quoted verbatim to support findings. This is usual for 
qualitative research. 
3. Mechanically-recorded data: Electronic gadgets —digital voice recorder and 
digital camera were used for audio recording, video footage and photographs 
during the fieldwork. 
4. Member checking: Meanings of words and symbols were clarified with partici-
pants. Also transcribed interviews were sent to participants for validation be-
fore inclusion in the data analysis. 
5. Participants review: The researcher asked the participants to validate the 
study‘s findings. Part of this was done through phone interview. Inputs from 
participants were worked into the final report. This constituted the third phase 
of fieldwork. 
 
 124 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3. Strategies to Enhance Internal Validity in Qualitative Research 
 Strategies to Enhance Design Validity 
 Strategy Description 
1 Prolonged and persis-
tent field work 
Allows interim data analysis and corroboration to 
ensure the match between findings and participant 
reality. 
2 Participant language; 
verbatim accounts 
Obtain literal statements of participants and quota-
tions from documents. 
3 Low-inference de-
scriptors 
Record precise, almost literal, and detailed descrip-
tions of people and situations. 
4 Multiple researchers Agreement on descriptive data collected by a re-
search team 
5 Mechanically re-
corded data 
Use of tape recorders, photographs and videotapes. 
6 Participant researcher Use of participant recorded perceptions in diaries or 
anecdotal records for corroboration. 
7 Member checking  Check informally with participants for accuracy dur-
ing data collection; frequently done in participant 
observation studies 
8 Participant review Ask each participant to review researcher's synthesis 
of all interviews with the person for accuracy of rep-
resentation; frequently done in interview studies. 
9 Negative cases or 
discrepant data 
Actively search for, record, analyse, and report nega-
tive cases of discrepant data that are an exception to 
patterns or that modify patterns found in the data. 
Source: McMillan and Schumacher, 1997. 
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Table 3.4. Strategies to Enhance External Validity in Qualitative Research 
Components that Enable Others to Discover Similar Phenomena or Apply the 
Findings 
Strategy Adequate Description in the Study 
Research Role The social relationship of the researcher with the par-
ticipants. 
Informant selection Criteria, rationale, and decision process used in pur-
poseful sampling. 
Social context The physical, social, interpersonal, and functional 
social scenes of data collection. 
Data collection strategies The multi-methods employed, including ethno-
graphic observation, ethnographic interview, and 
documents. 
Data analysis strategies Data analysis process described. 
Authentic narrative Thick description presented as an analytical narra-
tive. 
Typicality Distinct characteristics of groups and/or sites pre-
sented. 
Analytical premises The initial theoretical framework or concept that in-
forms the study and others added as the study pro-
gresses. 
Alternative explanations Retrospective delineation of all plausible or rival ex-
planations for interpretations. 
Other criteria by purpose 
(after study completed) 
 
Phenomenology Understand the complexity of the situation; generates 
additional case studies. 
Grounded theory Concepts or mini-theory relate to social science; gen-
erates verification research with more structured de-
signs. 
Critical traditions Historical revisionism and situatedness to erode ig-
norance; empowers participants; generates further 
research; action stimulus. 
Source: McMillan and Schumacher, 1997. 
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There are strategies to enhance external validity of qualitative research. In the table 
3.4, McMillan and Schumacher highlighted some of these strategies. Some of these 
were employed to improve the external validity of the findings of this study. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the research method for this investigation. The study is an 
instrumental case study (in the qualitative tradition), which seeks to understand a par-
ticular case —the NDDC intervention in Odi community —to give insight into the na-
ture, dynamics and implications of the interactions of intervention and context on 
peace, conflict and gender dynamics. The study employed multiple sources of data and 
methods including primary and secondary sources; and interviews and documents as 
methods of data collection. Forty-five participants were interviewed in 78 interview 
sessions until theoretical sampling was attained. Ethical issues, including informed 
consent, anonymity, confidentiality and voluntary participation observed during data 
collection, transcription of interviews and data analysis were also presented. The data 
were analysed with ATLAS.ti. Finally, procedures for ensuring validity and reliability 
of this study were also discussed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION: 
MANDATE, INTERVENTIONS AND SENSITIVITY TO 
PEACE AND CONFLICT  
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), its vision, 
mission, mandate and statutory and administrative structure in the first section. The 
second section presents the Commission‘s strategies, goals and policies for change and 
a strategic framework for implementing the NDDC‘s interventions. In the third sec-
tion, the relationship of the Commission‘s mandate, interventions, and the needs of the 
Niger Delta region (NDR) people is presented. The fourth section discusses the institu-
tional capacity of the NDDC, that is, the extent to which peace and conflict sensitivity 
is mainstreamed in its institutional context and in its intervention programming.  
4.1 The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC): Vi-
sion, Mission, Mandate, and Institutional Framework 
The need to give special attention to the development of the NDR has been recognised 
before oil exploration began in the area and before Nigeria‘s independence. It informed 
the colonial government‘s commission of enquiry —Willink Commission of 
1957/58— set up to investigate the fears of the minorities and how to allay them. The 
commission recognised the peculiar developmental needs of the region and recom-
mended a developmental board for the region. To this end, the Nigerian central gov-
ernment, at different times, established specialised agencies to cater to the need of the 
region. The Balewa administration set up the Niger Delta Development Board 
(NDDB) by an act of parliament, and it operated from 1960 to 1966. The failure of 
NDDB and the increasing political mobilisation of the various ethnic groups in the re-
gion informed the setting up of the Presidential Task Force by the 1979/1983 admini-
stration. The Task Force was set up in 1980 and 1.5% of the Federation Account was 
allocated to it to tackle the developmental problems of the region (Master Plan, 2006). 
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It operated from 1980 to 1985. In 1992, the Babangida administration established the 
Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) for provision of 
infrastructure in the area. OMPADEC lasted from 1992-1999. Through these estab-
lishments, the people of the NDR have suffered from rising expectation, relative depri-
vation, and frustration. The result has engendered aggression and violent conflict 
among the people.  
By the late 1990s, the Niger Delta Region had become a zone where youths 
disrupted oil production at will and communities frequently engaged in destructive in-
ter- and intra-community strife at the slightest provocation. This was the situation of 
things when a presidential aspirant, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, visited the region dur-
ing his election campaign and promised to establish a programme that would proffer 
urgent and fundamental solution to the developmental needs of the Niger Delta and 
usher in sustainable prosperity and peace to the area. In fulfilment of his promise, 
within two weeks of his inauguration, he sent a bill to the National Assembly to estab-
lish the Niger Delta Development Commission as an agency to implement a pro-
gramme for the sustainable development of the NDR. The National Assembly enacted 
the NDDC Act 2000 on the 12
th
 of July 2000 (The NDDC Act, 2000). The NDDC was 
officially inaugurated on 21
st
 December 2000, and established in 2001 (NDDC, 2011). 
This is deemed the Obasanjo administration‘s greatest and most significant attempt to 
grapple with the grievances of the minorities in the oil-producing areas (Isumonah A. 
V., 2003). The Commission was established with the aim of deliberately influencing 
the conflict situation in the NDR positively with mandate covering development, hu-
manitarian aid, and peacebuilding interventions. 
Hence, the NDDC was birthed into a volatile situation that heralded Nigeria‘s 
return to civilian rule in 1999. Threats from various quarters greeted the NDDC from 
its inception. One threat related to inclusion of other oil-producing areas in the NDDC 
bill, another to the location of its headquarters. Yet another contested issue was the po-
sition of the Executive Chairman of the Commission. In other words, conflicts among 
the target beneficiaries heralded the establishment of the Commission. This, in a sense, 
attests to the conflict exacerbating potential of interventions in contexts. Nonetheless, 
in the words of ex-President Obasanjo, ―the Niger Delta Development Commission 
has the potential to offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic problems of the Ni-
ger Delta people‖ (Master Plan, 2006). Its vision is to ―offer a lasting solution to the 
socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta Region‖. It has the mission ―...to facili-
 129 
 
tate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is 
economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically 
peaceful.‖ (Master Plan, 2006). These clearly describe the Commission as a develop-
ment (intervention) agency. Since it was established in response to the ND socio-
economic problems, which has made the region conflict-prone, the NDDC‘s inherent 
overarching goal is to facilitate the socio-economic development and peacebuilding in 
the Niger Delta.  
The mandate, that is, functions and powers of the Commission are established 
in Part II of the Act and they include: 
1. Formulation of policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger Delta 
area. 
2. Conception, planning and implementation, in accordance with set rules and 
regulations, of projects and programs for sustainable development of the Niger 
Delta area in the field of transportation (including roads, jetties and water-
ways), health, employment, industrialisation, agriculture and fisheries, housing 
and urban development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications. 
3. Surveying the Niger Delta in order to ascertain measures necessary to promote 
its physical and socio-economic development. 
4. Preparing Master Plans and schemes designed to promote the physical devel-
opment of the Niger Delta region and the estimation of the member states of 
the Commission. 
5. Implementation of all the measures approved for the development of the Niger 
Delta region by the Federal Government and the states of the Commission. 
6. Identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger Delta region and assist-
ing the member states in the formulation and implementation of policies to en-
sure sound and efficient management of the resources of the Niger Delta re-
gion. 
7. Assessing and reporting on any project being funded or carried out in the re-
gion by oil and gas companies and any other company, including non-
governmental organisations, as well as ensuring that funds released for such 
projects are properly utilised. 
8. Tackling ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploration 
of oil mineral in the Niger Delta region and advising the Federal Government 
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and the member states on the prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring 
and environmental pollution. 
9. Liaising with the various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing com-
panies on all matters of pollution, prevention and control. 
10. Executing such other works and performing such other functions, which in the 
opinion of the Commission are required for the sustainable development of the 
Niger Delta region and its people. 
(Source: www.nddc.gov.ng; NDDC, 2011). 
The Commission‘s headquarters is located in Port Harcourt with state director-
ates in each of the nine oil-producing states. The NDDC administrative framework as 
contained in the NDDC Act includes a 19-member governing council comprising a 
chairman; one indigene each to represent the nine states; three representatives of non-
oil mineral producing states drawn from geopolitical zones not represented in the 
Commission; one representative of oil-producing companies in the Niger Delta nomi-
nated by the oil-producing companies; one person to represent the Federal Ministry of 
Finance; one person to represent Federal Ministry of Environment; the Managing Di-
rector of the Commission; and two executive directors. The chairmanship of the board 
is rotated amongst the member states in alphabetic order. Part III of the Act establishes 
the structure of the Commission. The following directorates are established for the 
Commission:  
(a) the Directorate of Administration and Human Resources;  
(b)  the Directorate of Community and Rural Development;  
(c)  the Directorate of Utilities Infrastructural Development and Waterways;  
(d)  the Directorate of Environmental Protection and Control;  
(e)  the Directorate of Finance and Supply;  
(f)  the Directorate of Agriculture and Fisheries;  
(g)  the Directorate of Planning, Research, Statistics and Management Information 
System;  
(h)  the Directorate of Legal Services;  
(i)  the Directorate of Education, Health and Social Services;  
(j)  the Directorate of Commercial and Industrial Development; and  
(k)    the Directorate of Projects Monitoring and Supervision. 
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However, the Act gives the board, with the approval of the president, the power 
to create additional directorates as the need arises. A management committee, compris-
ing the Managing Director as the chairman, two executive directors, and the directors 
of the directorates established above. The management committee is saddled with the 
responsibility of general administration of the Commission. The NDDC management 
currently has 23 members —made up of 19 males and four females. Part III also estab-
lished the Niger Delta Advisory Committee comprising the governors of the member 
states and two other individuals appointed by the President of Nigeria. The advisory 
committee advises the Commission with a view to achieving its objectives. An NDDC 
State Directorate is established for each state. An administrative structure, similar to 
the headquarters‘ (with particular reference to the directorates) exists in the state direc-
torates. However, in place of directorates at the headquarters, we have desks in the 
state directorates. Hence, we have a desk on community and rural development among 
others. A clear distinction need be made between the headquarters and the state direc-
torates in the area of intervention. And this is that all interventions are initiated by the 
headquarters, while the state directorates implement and monitor. According to an 
NDDC state directorate staff: 
…most of the planning is done from the headquarters…So, most of the 
planning is done over there. What we do is to implement, to moni-
tor…(Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011). 
This may have implications for intervention programming. It gives room for 
disconnect between planning and implementation. This has also led to different status 
enjoyed by the staff in the headquarters and the state directorates. The former are re-
ported to feel superior and overbearing in their relationship with the latter. The con-
cepts of ―oppressiveness of intervention‖ and ―divisiveness of intervention‖ (to be ex-
plained in chapter five) seem to play out among the staff of the intervening agency as 
well.  
4.2 The NDDC Intervention Strategies: Master Plan and Strategy for 
Change 
Strategy refers to a carefully-designed method or plan of action to achieve a goal. It 
also refers to the art or act of developing and carrying out such plans. Since its early 
days, the Commission recognised the need for strategic approach to fulfilling its man-
date. The approach employed a two-phased strategy for the development of the Niger 
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Delta Region. The strategy includes the immediate and the far-reaching phases. The 
first phase includes the completion of OMPADEC projects, the new strategic projects, 
and human development. This was to prevent a vacuum of inactivity while preparing 
the second phase, which is the development and implementation of the Niger Delta 
Regional Development Master Plan. For the first phase, the Commission drew up an 
action plan for immediate take-off projects. This focused on the completion and com-
missioning of viable projects inherited from OMPADEC. The rationale for these pro-
jects is essentially because they were on ground. Projects in this category include water 
supply; rural electrification; roads maintenance and construction; jetties and shore pro-
tection; school building; health centres; land reclamation and dredging.  
The phase also included the execution of new strategic projects. These strategic 
projects are those that make immediate impact on the community and impact on con-
flict resolution and risk management. According to Chief Onyema Ugochukwu, the 
first Chairman of the NDDC,  the projects were to be equitably distributed to ensure 
that no community was left out and they must eventually fit into the Master Plan, when 
completed (cit. in Akinyoade, 2004). The last part of the first phase, based on the prin-
ciple that any development must start with human beings, focused on human capacity 
development programmes. Programmes in this category include education support, 
skill acquisition and computer training, vocational training, community-based surveil-
lance schemes, commercial bus scheme, agriculture support projects, and road, public 
buildings and utilities maintenance schemes. 
The far-reaching strategies developed were to cover a phased development of 
the entire region. This constitutes the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan. 
The Master Plan is a 260-page document published in 2006 to serve as guide for the 
NDDC in fulfilling its mandate in the NDR. The Commission adopted the bottom-up 
approach in developing the Master Plan. The whole idea is to make the ND people the 
drivers of their own development by involving them in the conception, planning, and 
implementation of the NDDC‘s programmes to be executed in their areas 
(Ugochukwu, 2002 cit. in Akinyoade, 2004). To this end, the Commission held stake-
holders‘ consultative forums in all the nine-member states and some local government 
areas of the Niger Delta soon after its inauguration. The forums provided opportunity 
for the people, particularly those at the grassroots, to tell the NDDC what they wanted 
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and the order of priority in which they wanted it. In addition, communities were en-
couraged to write the vision of their development to the Commission.  
Since its publication, the Master Plan serves as the road map for the social, 
economic, and physical development of the NDR. Expectedly, it articulates the strate-
gies of the Commission. The strategy, titled ―The Master Plan Strategy‖ is summarised 
in pages 18 through 26 in the executive summary and fully discussed in pages 161 
through 164 of the Master Plan, where it was titled ―The Strategy for Change in the 
Niger Delta Region‖. The strategy is rooted in the vision to improve the quality of life 
of the Niger Delta people (with particular attention to those with the greatest need) by 
making good use of the region‘s rich natural resources for the prosperity of the region 
(Master Plan, 2006). To achieve this, strategies and specific policies and interventions 
were adopted. The overarching direction of the development strategy is ―…to raise the 
standards of living above the poverty line, achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
and progress beyond these to enhance the technological and industrial capacity of the 
region‖ (2006, p. 18). The strategy attempts ―…to create favourable conditions for 
greater productivity and economic enterprise in rural and urban areas…‖ (p. 19). 
Furthermore, it specifically addresses how to create enabling conditions for enterprise, 
efficient agriculture and industrialisation in order to utilise the rich natural resources to 
achieve its vision and mission. The strategy is rooted in an integrated consideration of 
the dynamic relationship between all aspects of life in the NDR. Hence, it adopts an 
integrated approach.  
The essential elements of the strategy include pursuing poverty reduction, 
largely through improved agricultural productivity, and development of micro and 
small-scale enterprises while also pursuing improved infrastructure and industrialisa-
tion as engines of accelerated economic growth; institutional development, capacity 
building and environmental protection as general foundations and enablers. These es-
sential elements of the integrated strategy and their relationships are captured in the 
Integrated Strategy for the NDR Pyramid (Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1. The Integrated Development Strategy (IDS) Pyramid  
Source: The Master Plan, 2006 p 21. 
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According to the Master Plan, the pyramid depicts:  
―…the concept of parallel interventions in rural and urban areas, and 
how the ultimate achievement of the poverty alleviation is based on 
wealth creation through economic development and fundamental 
changes, with an underlying emphasis on capacity building for good 
governance, planning, management, and enterprise.‖ (p 21) 
In the IDS Pyramid, all issues below the apex of the pyramid underpin two key 
components of the Master Plan strategy —poverty reduction through industrialisation 
and economic growth. Other issues including human resource development, infrastruc-
ture and natural environment conservations are present as necessary conditions to 
achieve the desired result —development that is sustainable in social, economic and 
environmental terms (Master Plan, 2006). The integrated approach addresses five criti-
cal questions in confronting the causes of poverty and poor living standards in the 
NDR. The questions are:  
1. What are the problems experienced by the people and who experience 
them? 
2. What are the chains of causes leading to a problem and who are the ac-
tive stakeholders causing them? 
3. Which interventions are needed to address the causes and change the fu-
ture outcomes? 
4. Are these interventions feasible, taking account of the necessary re-
sources (financial, human and material) and the capacity of active 
stakeholders to change? 
5. What would be the downstream side effects of these interventions and 
how to prepare for them? (2006, p. 19). 
The strategy identified the causes of poverty and poor living conditions in the NDR as 
including:  
1. poor economic growth; 
2. lack of enterprise; 
3. poor physical infrastructure; 
4. poor governance and management of resources and corruption; 
5. unsuitable institutions and regulations; 
6. unsuitable political system and economy; 
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7. poor security of life and property; and 
8. inadequate labour force and skills base.  
To tackle these, the Master Plan proposes a gradual intervention process including: 
1. understand the constraints on the rate of development (not so much financial as 
human resources, institutions, infrastructure, the construction industry, etc.); 
2. start with demonstration projects in rural areas and with pilot projects in urban 
areas, selecting projects that are likely to succeed and concentrating the profes-
sional effort in an integrated set of interventions in each project. Publicity of 
successful projects in order to spread good practice across the region; 
3. build up in parallel a widely-spread human capacity for good integrated plan-
ning and for management of change. This entails the discipline of integrative 
thinking, the relationships with active and passive stakeholders, transparency 
and accountability, legislative changes and law enforcement, and the role of 
universities in research and development, adult learning and primary education 
(Master Plan, 2006). 
The integrated approach to promoting economic growth and facilitating poverty reduc-
tion involves interventions in many activity sectors but grouped into five thematic ar-
eas. The Master Plan‘s five thematic areas of intervention are economic development, 
community needs, the natural environment, physical infrastructure, and human and in-
stitutional resources. These constitute the strategic goals, policies and proposals and 
are briefly discussed below. 
1. Economic development aims at reducing poverty and creating jobs, diversify-
ing the economy, supporting better living standards for a growing population, 
diffusing social tensions and regenerating the urban space. It includes growth in 
agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture, micro and small enterprises (MSEs), me-
dium and large industries, tourism, solid minerals, financial services and in-
vestment promotion.  
2. Community needs concern the welfare of individuals within their social and 
physical environment. It covers health care, housing, water and sanitation, edu-
cation, vocational training, security/conflict management, social welfare, com-
munity development, arts, sports and culture, and women and youth leisure. 
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3. The natural environment includes the protection of bio-diversity and the quality 
of air and water. It covers impact of oil and gas operations, waste management, 
intensive agriculture, and fishing, emissions and waste from industry, emis-
sions from vehicles and planes. 
4. Physical infrastructure, which is necessary to accelerate economic growth and 
human and community welfare, includes energy, telecommunication, transpor-
tation, utilities, and community buildings (schools, clinics, etc.). 
5. Human and institutional resources including capacity building for good gov-
ernance and prosperous enterprise. It is deemed necessary for the actualisation 
of the activities proposed above. It involves good planning and management 
skills at all levels of government, and a culture of respect for the public, trans-
parency and accountability. In addition, it includes continued professional de-
velopment requirements for all public officers. Furthermore, it includes labour 
force skills in all types of economic and social employment; skills and culture 
of community workers and facilitators; and recognition and respect for human 
rights amongst community members (Master Plan, 2006). 
The strategy for change in the NDR in the Master Plan involves both strategic goals 
and policies for change.  
4.2.1 Strategic goals for change 
Under its strategic goals for change, the NDDC enumerates seven strategic economic 
and social goals. They include: 
1. To increase economic growth in the rural areas by improving the productivity 
of agriculture and fishing and facilitating micro and small enterprises;  
2. To increase economic growth in urban areas by removing obstacles and creat-
ing conditions that will encourage private enterprise; 
3. To substantially reduce the percentage of people below poverty line;  
4. To substantially improve the health of the population including substantial re-
duction in the incidence of malaria, HIV/AIDS, infant mortality and maternal 
mortality; 
5. To reduce conflict and achieve substantial improvement in social stability and 
security of lives and property; 
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6. To halt environmental degradation with the attendant loss of biodiversity and 
ensure sustainability for future generations; 
7. To provide adequate housing for existing and future households. 
In order to create enabling conditions for achievement of the economic and social 
goals, the Master Plan adopts additional six goals, namely: 
1. To remove unnecessary regulation and to fully enforce necessary regulation; 
2. To improve the accountability and standards of governance and enforcement of 
law and order; 
3. To improve the standards of essential physical infrastructure; 
4. To improve supporting services and financing of enterprise; 
5. To improve the standards of education and of research and development of use-
ful products; and  
6. To protect the natural environment. 
4.2.2 Strategic policies for change 
Policy G1-Strategic Planning Principles 
The Commission adopts five key principles to guide its strategic policies to achieve the 
strategic goals enumerated above. The principles are: 
1. Economic growth and surplus income are necessary to pay for the cost of better 
health protection, living conditions and education; 
2. Economic growth can be best achieved by the enterprise of people who find 
opportunities to supply goods or services for which there is demand in the re-
gion and beyond. The great diversity of interests and people who know their 
environment can produce a wide range of enterprise, if obstacles to their initia-
tives are removed and necessary conditions exist. 
(The first two principles approve the NEEDS strategy, which places emphasis on eco-
nomic growth and the role of the private sector in it).  
3. Good governance at the federal and state levels is a pre-requisite to progress on 
all other fronts. It must introduce transparent and publicly-accountable prac-
tices, remove unnecessary regulation while fully enforcing the necessary regu-
lation; and must develop a greater understanding with passive and active stake-
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holders including entrepreneurs. These measures will reduce corruption and in-
crease effectiveness. 
(This third principle endorses the general observation that reforms are necessary in the 
style and quality of governance for any plan to succeed). 
4. Strategic and detailed planning must be integrative and process-oriented; must 
create the necessary enabling conditions for the planned activities to take off 
and continue operating; must take account of the downstream effects of change 
and provide for them; and must ensure consistency between social, economic 
and physical interventions. These measures will reduce waste and increase effi-
ciency and, ultimately, enhance economic growth and social welfare. Pilot pro-
jects that employ this approach will be started early on within programmes of 
growth centres, growth poles and growth communities. 
(This fourth principle is adopted specifically by the Master Plan. It comes as a result of 
findings about resources that are underutilised or wasted due to lack of consideration 
for the necessary enabling conditions or lack of regard for subsequent impacts of ap-
parently-good projects. It requires focus on the process of change. A focus on the 
causes of current problems will give a clue as to the most effective remedies. A focus 
on the process of improvement in any sector will indicate what other sectors have to be 
involved in creating enabling conditions for change. A focus on the outcomes of pro-
posed change will warn of possible side effects and how to cope with them). 
5. A sound planning process has to be based on participatory decision-making. 
This entails the meaningful involvement of the active and passive stakeholders 
—public sector, private sector, community and NGOs— and ensuring that their 
respective needs and constraints are taken into consideration when policies and 
proposals are formulated, including attention to issues such as gender and 
youth. 
(This principle underscores the fact that the participatory processes adopted for the 
preparation will be taken forward to implementation phases of the Master Plan when 
stakeholders will have a continuing role in reviewing the effectiveness of the plan and 
directly influencing the direction in which it is moving) (Master Plan, 2006). 
Policy G2-Sustainable Development 
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The Master Plan proposes to adopt the principle of sustainable development, defined 
by the United Nations as ―…development which meets the needs of the present with-
out compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs‖ 
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Hence the Master Plan 
aims to sustain the positive attributes of the NDR (cultural and ecological diversity, 
natural resources, etc.) while allowing change and progress to improve on the undesir-
able attributes (poverty, underdevelopment, insecurity, violence, militancy, etc.). This 
is applicable to the natural environment, the economic, the social and the institutional 
environment. This implies that in all cases of proposing and implementing develop-
ment options, balance must be struck between sustaining existing conditions and ena-
bling change with regard to both short and long term impacts of the intervention. With 
the aid of an analytical framework —community impact evaluation— proposed inter-
ventions must be assessed and must strike positive balance between anticipated bene-
fits to the natural environment as well as people of current and future generations, and 
the anticipated damage to the natural environment alongside people of current and fu-
ture generations.  
Policy G3: A shared Approach with NEEDS and SEEDS 
The Master Plan endorses the aims of and proposes to collaborate with NEEDS and 
SEEDS at the federal and state levels. In collaboration with the federal and state gov-
ernments and specialised university departments in 2005/2006, it proposes to identify 
main legislative and regulatory changes, institutional changes, and capacity-building 
requirements for successful development in the rural and urban areas. Necessary 
changes and training courses were to be set in motion immediately to prepare the ca-
pabilities of rural and urban areas of implementation of the Master Plan (Master Plan, 
2006). 
4.2.3 The NDDC intervention policies 
For the five thematic areas (covering the seven economic and social goals and the six 
goals to create the conditions for achieving the economic and social goals) identified 
above, the NDDC has specific policies for its interventions. These policies address 
each thematic area. They are presented as follows: 
1. Economic Development Policies     (30 Poli-
cies) 
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a. Policies for Economic Development in Rural Areas (Rural Areas, Agri-
culture and Fisheries)      
 (four policies) 
i. Policy E1—Demonstration projects in rural areas 
ii. Policy E2—Rural Development Service (RDS) 
iii. Policy E3—Diversification of rural economy 
iv. Policy E4—Selection of projects 
 
b. Policies for Economic Development in Urban Areas  (six poli-
cies) 
i. Policy E5—Pilot programmes in urban areas 
ii. Policy E6—Planning and delivery authorities 
1. State Development Services (SDS) 
2. Review Forum 
3. Urban Development Authority (UDA) 
4. The role of the NDDC 
iii. Policy E7—Business development 
iv. Policy E8—Improved Urban Environment for business, residen-
tial communities and housing 
v. Policy E9—Business parks and town centre development 
vi. Policy E10—The Urban residential environment 
c. General Economic Development Policies for the Region (four poli-
cies) 
i. Policy E11—The education system and economic development  
ii. Policy E12—Development of a knowledge based economy 
iii. Policy E13—Promotion of an investor friendly environment 
iv. Policy E14—Access to finance 
d. Policies and Interventions in Oil and Gas    (seven poli-
cies) 
i. Policy OG1—using oil and gas to the benefit of the Niger Delta 
people 
ii. Policy OG2—review of existing policies, programmes and ac-
tions 
iii. Policy OG3—Conflict mitigation initiatives 
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iv. Policy OG4—Credible and transparent procedures for compen-
sation 
v. Policy OG5—Community participation in decisions on oil and 
gas issues 
vi. Policy OG6—Liaison between government and oil and gas 
companies 
vii. Policy OG7—Review of planning and environmental policies 
e. Policies for Tourism       (nine poli-
cies) 
i. Policy TM1 —Promotion of tourism. 
ii. Policy TM2 —Comprehensive survey of tourist attractions. 
iii. Policy TM3 —Cooperation with state, LGAs and other stake-
holders. 
iv. Policy TM4 —Support for sustainable tourism. 
v. Policy TM5 —Limitation of damage to ecosystems. 
vi. Policy TM6 —Environmental impact analysis (EIA). 
vii. Policy TM7 —Environmental quality standards. 
viii. Policy TM8 —Capacity development in the tourism sector 
(community organisation, current visitor economic profiles, 
resident attitude survey, visioning and goal setting, tourism 
marketing basics, attraction and facility inventory, potential pro-
ject identification, initial project scoping, impact analysis). 
ix. Policy TM9 —Development of Oloibiri national oil museum. 
2. Policy for Human and Community Needs 
The policy on human and community needs has four main categories of goals, includ-
ing housing goals (two); health care goals (17); education goals which is divided into 
two categories: improve educational operating standards (7) and to develop links be-
tween educational curricula at all levels and the needs of the region‘s population to 
support increased economic activity, personal wealth, health, and cohesive communi-
ties); and social welfare and community goals. The following are the policies for hu-
man and community needs. 
a. Policies for Community Needs   (nine policies) 
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i. Policy HC1—Integrated planning for human and community 
needs 
ii. Policy HC2—Building on safe ground 
iii. Policy HC3—Housing 
iv. Policy HC4—Health care 
v. Policy HC5—Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, yellow fever and ty-
phoid 
vi. Policy HC6—Education strategy (regulatory issues) 
vii. Policy HC7—Education issues 
viii. Policy HC8—Community development and social welfare 
ix. Policy HC 9—A network of effective law enforcement agencies 
b. Policies for Arts, Culture and Sports    (seven poli-
cies) 
i. Policy CAS1—Promotion of arts, culture and sports 
ii. Policy CAS2—Improving existing and promoting new facilities 
iii. Policy CAS3—Revitalisation of museums and cultural centres 
iv. Policy CAS4—Protection of heritage and historical sites 
v. Policy CAS5—Annual cultural event 
vi. Policy CAS6—Galleries and music studios 
vii. Policy CAS7—A database on facilities 
The natural environment 
The Master Plan set out 12 goals on the natural environment. A total of 16 policies 
were set to achieve these. They are enumerated below. 
3. Policies for environmental intervention 
i. Policy EN1—Comprehensive review 
ii. Policy EN2—Sustainable appraisal 
iii. Policy EN3—A sustainable development forum 
iv. Policy EN4—Indigenous species 
v. Policy EN5—Management of biological resources 
vi. Policy EN6—Enhanced non-timber forestry products 
(NTFPs) management 
vii. Policy EN7—Air quality 
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viii. Policy EN8—Water quality 
ix. Policy EN9—Environmental education programme 
x. Policy EN10—Waste disposal 
xi. Policy EN11—Floods and erosion management 
xii. Policy EN12—Clearance of invasive species 
xiii. Policy EN13—Enforcement of laws   
xiv. Policy EN14—Demonstration projects 
xv. Policy En15—Stakeholders participation 
xvi. Policy EN16—Oil impacted areas 
Physical infrastructure 
There are 19 goals under physical infrastructure. These are grouped under four catego-
ries, namely telecommunication goals (two), energy goals (four), transportation goals 
(six), and water and sanitation goals (seven). There are 10 policies on physical infra-
structure. 
4. Policies for intervention in physical infrastructure 
 
i. Policy PI1—Essential physical infrastructure 
ii. Policy PI2—Prioritising infrastructure projects 
iii. Policy PI3—Telecommunications 
iv. Policy PI—Energy supply and conservation 
v. Policy PI5—Transportation—general 
vi. Policy PI6—The delivery of good transportation 
vii. Policy PI7—Road planning (roads in rural areas, regional roads, roads in urban 
areas) 
viii. Policy PI8—Waterways 
ix. Policy PI9—Rail and air transportation 
x. Policy PI10—Water and sanitation 
 
5. Human and institutional resources 
There are seven goals for human and institutional resources. There are 14 policies in-
cluding six policies on a special category —interventions for conflict resolution. 
a. Policies for Human Resources 
i. Policy HR1—Developing skills and expanding knowledge 
ii. Policy HR2—Endorsing the ‗NEEDS‘ strategy 
iii. Policy HR3—Civil society and the eradication of corruption 
iv. Policy HR4—Re-professionalising the civil service 
v. Policy HR5—Encouraging private sector initiative 
vi. Policy HR6—Peer review mechanism for the NDRMP 
vii. Policy HR7—Promotion of meritocracy 
viii. Policy HR8—Promoting integrated government 
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b. Policies (and Interventions) for Conflict Resolution 
i. Policy HR9—Reducing conflict 
ii. Policy HR10—Promotion of core principles 
iii. Policy HR11—Baseline review of conflict programmes 
iv. Policy HR12—Establish a committee for peace and security 
v. Policy HR13—Involvement of partners for sustainable development (PSD) 
networks 
vi. Policy HR14—Capacity building conflict resolution skills  
(2006, pp. 27-46;165-217) 
The Commission adopts a two-pronged approach in implementing the thematic 
areas of its intervention. They are the Infrastructure Development Projects (IDPs) and 
Human Capacity Development Programmes (HCDPs). The IDPs include Roads, Wa-
ter, Electrification, Schools, Hospitals, Jetties and Canalisation Projects, and free 
Health Care Programmes. The HCDPs include Computer Training, Skills Acquisition, 
Mass Transit, Small/Medium Enterprises, Waste Disposal, Agricultural Support, and 
Globacom Call Centre programmes (NDDC, 2007). The Commission has well-
articulated strategies for its interventions. However, as discussed earlier in section 1.1, 
good intention and articulation are not enough for an agency intervening in conflict 
zone to avoid negative and make positive contributions to a conflict situation. 
4.2.4 The framework for the NDDC intervention strategies 
From the foregoing, the framework for the NDDC intervention strategies refers to the 
practical implementation of the Commission‘s strategies. The framework, inferred 
from the Commission‘s strategic goals and policies highlighted above, is laid out in 
this section. From the strategic policies for change, it is evident that the Commission‘s 
intervention is aimed at economic prosperity, through income generation and creation 
and/or expansion of markets. The planning and implementation of the interventions 
must, nonetheless, be guided by certain principles. The planning must promote good 
governance, through ‗‗…transparent and publicly accountable practices…‘‘ and 
‗‗…develop a greater understanding with passive and active stakeholders…‘‘ in order 
to reduce corruption and increase effectiveness. Furthermore, it must be guided by 
strategic and detailed planning, which must be integrative and process-oriented. It must 
create enabling conditions, and be sensitive to the downstream (impact) of the inter-
vention and provide for them in order to reduce waste and increase efficiency, enhance 
economic growth and social welfare. Finally, to be sound, the planning of the NDDC 
intervention ‗‗…must be based on participatory decision making, involving the mean-
 146 
 
ingful involvement of the ‗active‘ and ‗passive‘ stakeholders‘‘. In implementation, the 
overarching principle is sustainability. Essentially, this means sustaining ―…the posi-
tive attributes of the Niger Delta Region, while allowing change and progress to im-
prove on the undesirable attributes‘ at the natural, economic, social and institutional 
environments. And finally, the interventions must collaborate with or complement 
other interventions in the region, especially, NEEDS, SEEDS and CEEDS.  
Other critical features of this framework (especially within the context of inter-
vention in human and community needs) are selection criteria, women and youths, and 
peace and conflict sensitivity. The Commission‘s interventions are required to be 
guided by five criteria discussed on page 217 to 218 of the Master Plan. The first crite-
rion is complementarity between the proposed intervention and other existing pro-
grammes or community facilities. Feasibility, for instance, availability of markets, hu-
man resources and skills to implement and sustain the intervention, constitute the sec-
ond criterion. The third criterion is the cost-benefits analysis. The benefits must out-
weigh the cost. The cost-benefit analysis covers social, natural, economic, and human 
resources. The fourth criterion is comparative advantage over alternative intervention, 
that is, opportunity cost of the proposed intervention. The final consideration is human 
resource development import of the intervention. This includes IT, technological, and 
managerial skills building potential of the proposed intervention. This is considered as 
a key criterion because of the need to build world-class human resources in the Niger 
Delta Region. A key overriding principle for the selection is transparency. According 
to the Master Plan, ‗‗Transparency of the decision criteria used for particular projects 
and the public scrutiny of the material will reduce the scope for unprofessional or cor-
rupt decisions‘‘ (p 218). 
The interventions are to be designed to ‗‗…create a more harmonious climate 
within which structural causes of tensions and conflict be addressed‘‘. The Master Plan 
notes that the long history of violent conflict in the Niger Delta Region (NDR) has 
perpetuated a culture of violence. It shows an understanding of the conflict situation 
when it submits that the Niger Delta conflict is a consequence of  
…complex set of factors ranging from ambiguous land ownership, a 
very weak educational system…unequal access to resources and eco-
nomic opportunities through to poor governance. Lack of transparent 
decision-making and allocation of funds, procedures that are considered 
to be unfair and unjust and institutionalised corruption contribute to the 
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feeling of political exclusion that is widespread throughout the Niger 
Delta. (p 215) 
It also recognises the potentials of the Commission to mitigate the consequences of 
conflicts and fight their root causes. Moreover, it recognises local infrastructure for 
peace in social cohesion and traditional authorities providing positive counterweights 
in violence prevention. In addition, the Master Plan also emphasised the need to pro-
mote the role of women and youth in political decision-making process through its in-
terventions. This is in recognition of the fact that, about half of the NDR population 
are women and more than 60% are youths. Therefore, integrating women and youth 
into levels of social and political aspects of the community will reduce the likelihood 
of violence. All the principles identified above constitute the features of the framework 
of the strategy for implementing the interventions of the NDDC, as contained in the 
Master Plan. Hence, this will serve as the framework for assessing the Commission‘s 
interventions in Odi community. The principles are:  
1. Economic prosperity. 
2. Market creation and expansion. 
3. Promotion of good governance. 
4. Integrative and process-oriented planning: 
a. Enabling conditions and continuity; 
b. Impacts assessments 
ii. Increase positive impacts 
iii. Reduce waste 
iv. Income efficiency 
    5.  Participatory decision-making 
a. Gender-sensitive 
b. Youth involvement  
6. Sustainability. 
7. Partnership with other agencies. 
8. Transparent selection, decision and public scrutiny of materials. 
9. Peace and conflict sensitive. 
10. Involvement of women and youths. 
4.3 The relationship of NDDC intervention strategies, mandate and 
the needs of the people 
This section discusses the consonance between the NDDC mandate and the interven-
tion strategies and the extent to which the interventions are in line with the expressed 
needs of the Niger Delta people. First, the study determined the extent to which the 
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intervention strategies are informed by the mandate of the Commission. Then, it de-
termined the correspondence between the intervention strategies and the needs of the 
community people. Findings show that the NDDC interventions were clearly informed 
by its mandate. Obviously, the NDDC interventions correspond with mandates one to 
four as shown in the Table 4.1 below. The strategic goals and policies of the Commis-
sion as discussed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 relate with the very first mandate of the 
NDDC. Moreover, its IDPs and HCDPs correlate with the second mandate. However, 
the conception, planning and implementation of the projects and programmes are not 
in accordance with set rules and regulations as required by this mandate. This is the 
locus of the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies, which became characteristic of the 
Commission during the period under study. In other words, the discrepancy in the in-
tervention strategies and the mandate of the Commission is in how things are being 
done rather than what is being done. Some critical policies and principles that the 
Commission contravened in conception and planning and implementation included 
promotion of good governance, enabling conditions and continuity, impact assess-
ments, participatory decision-making (gender sensitivity and youth involvement), 
transparent selection, decision and public scrutiny of materials, and peace and conflict 
sensitivity (see chapter 5 for full discussion). Table 4.1 below shows the relationship 
between the NDDC mandate and intervention strategies. 
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Table 4.1. Relationship of the NDDC mandate and intervention strategies 
S/N Mandate Intervention Strategies 
1 Formulation of policies and guidelines 
for the development of the Niger Delta 
area. 
The strategic goals and policies; the 
NDDC intervention policies. 
2 Conception, planning and implementa-
tion, in accordance with set rules and 
regulations, of projects and programs 
for sustainable development of the Ni-
ger Delta area in the field of transpor-
tation including roads, jetties and wa-
terways, health, employment, industri-
alization, agriculture and fisheries, 
housing and urban development, water 
supply, electricity and telecommunica-
tions. 
Infrastructural development projects 
and the human capacity development 
programmes. However, the conception, 
planning, and implementation of the 
interventions are not done in accor-
dance with the set rules and regulations 
of the projects and programmes. Main 
rules and regulations —principles and 
policies— contradicted include promo-
tion of good governance, participatory 
planning, transparency, sensitivity to 
impacts, sustainability, gender sensitiv-
ity and youth participation. 
3 Surveying the Niger Delta in order to 
ascertain measures necessary to pro-
mote its physical and socio-economic 
development. 
Pre-Master Plan geophysical survey of 
the NDR. 
 
4 Preparing Master Plans and schemes 
designed to promote the physical de-
velopment of the Niger Delta region 
and the estimation of the member 
states of the Commission. 
The development of the Niger Delta 
Regional Development Master Plan 
Source: Fieldwork, 2011. 
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The Master Plan was developed after extensive consultation with the Niger 
Delta people. Findings show that the Commission held stakeholders‘ consultative fo-
rums in all the nine-member states and some local government areas of the Niger Delta 
soon after its inauguration and prior to the development of the Master Plan. This in-
cludes seven briefings at state capital level, 27 needs assessment workshops in the 
senatorial districts and participatory rural assessments involving 54 communities. 
Also, it held 10 capacity-building workshops in major towns, including state capitals, 
and 27 integration workshops at senatorial district level. A final round of stakeholders‘ 
workshops was also held in each of the nine states to publicise and discuss the draft 
Master Plan before presenting it to the Federal Government committees (Niger Delta 
Development Commission, 2006, p. 118). These allowed the NDDC to listen to the 
grassroots people and reflect their desires in drawing (its intervention strategies as con-
tained in) the Master Plan. In a general sense, therefore, there is congruence between 
NDDC intervention strategies and the needs of Niger Delta people.  
Most of the community people interviewed agreed that the NDDC interven-
tions in Odi met the critical and felt needs of the community. However, this should be 
understood within appropriate context of neglect and marginalisation in the region. 
The long-time neglect and marginalisation made the community to be receptive to any 
NDDC intervention project or programmes. This is because the interventions necessar-
ily address certain aspects of people‘s long-felt needs. Hence there is hardly an inter-
vention that does not meet some needs in some ways. The main issue here is prioritisa-
tion of these needs. For instance, secretary of the Traditional Council comments:  
En, as far as NDDC is concerned…they need to, at least, consult the 
communities on what are their [communities‘] priorities. What do you 
need? Like Odi now, our biggest problem now is our shore protec-
tion…So what I will advise is NDDC should come to the communities, 
sit with the communities or the leaders of the communities or opinion 
leaders, on their priority projects, then carry out those project.   
Therefore identification and prioritisation of interventions with the beneficiary 
community is necessary for certain reasons. First, there is a time gap between the de-
velopment of the Master Plan and the implementation of the interventions studied. 
Also, the stakeholders‘ consultations did not include every community. Therefore the 
socio-economic, ecological and physical challenges peculiar to the communities might 
not be adequately catered for. Moreover, the changing socio-political conditions in the 
NDR may bring some discrepancies between the identified intervention strategies and 
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the contemporary needs of people in the community. Prioritisation of community 
needs could only be done with the concerned community. For instance, when asked to 
suggest how the Commission‘s interventions could be more effective, the community 
people agreed that participation of the community people right from conception and 
planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation is the most critical precondi-
tion. 
4.4 Institutional capacity of the NDDC for Peace and Conflict Sen-
sitivity 
As earlier discussed (see sections2.3 and 2.4), peace and conflict sensitivity (PCS) in 
intervention programming is to understand the context for which intervention is 
planned; understand the interactions between intervention processes and the context; 
and act upon this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive im-
pacts through peace and conflict-sensitive planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. It is described in the Resource Pack as: 
―… an awareness of the causes of historical, actual or potential conflict, 
and of the likelihood of further conflict and its likely severity; and the 
capacity to work with all parties to reduce conflict and/or minimize the 
risk of further conflict. It involves understanding the operational con-
text; understanding the interaction between an intervention and that 
context; the capacity to act upon this understanding to avoid negative 
impacts and maximize positive ones‖ (2004, p. 61). 
PCS is thus a means to mainstream peace and conflict-sensitivity in all stages 
of intervention programming. It has three core components —understanding opera-
tional context; understanding the interaction between intervention and operational con-
text; and the capacity of the intervening agency to act upon its understanding of the 
two earlier components- in order to minimise the negative and maximise the positive 
impacts of its interventions. The third component encapsulates the first two; in the 
sense that the ability of an intervening agency to act upon this understanding presup-
poses that it has the understanding in the first place. Hence to assess the agency‘s ca-
pacity to act is to assess its understanding of the context and the interactions of inter-
vention as well as the operational context. The institutional capacity to act is termed 
peace and conflict-sensitivity capacity (PCSC) in this study. The NDDC institutional 
capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity was assessed using the Peace and Conflict 
Sensitivity Framework (see section 2.4). The framework has two integrated parts —
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PCS of the intervention agency and the PCS of its intervention programming. The first 
part has five components and the second part, four. 
4.4.1 Peace and conflict sensitivity in the NDDC institutional context 
The study used Lange‘s (2004) five-pillar framework for mainstreaming peace and 
conflict sensitivity in an organisation (see section 2.4) to assess the PCS of the Com-
mission. Components of this framework are commitment and motivation to peace and 
conflict sensitivity, readiness to make changes in organisational culture, building staff 
capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity, and accountability mechanisms and condu-
cive external relations. Corresponding questions asked to determine the presence of 
each component included these: Is the NDDC committed and motivated for PCS main-
streaming? Is its organisational culture reflective of PCS? Does it build staff capacity 
for PCS? Does it have accountability mechanisms? And finally, does it enjoy condu-
cive external relations? Answering these questions shows the extent to which the PCS 
is mainstreamed in the Commission. These are discussed below. 
Commitment and motivation could be inferred from the activities and docu-
ments of the Commission, especially those that have to do with the board and man-
agement. The nature and dynamics of activities characteristic of the NDDC interven-
tion programming makes it difficult for the board and management of the NDDC to 
have commitment and motivation for peace and conflict sensitivity. Expectedly, the 
selfish interests and greed that drive the barefaced corruption (see sections 5.1 and 5.2) 
that characterise these activities are antithetical to factors and processes that drive 
commitment and motivation for PCS. Although the mission of the Commission has 
expressed bias for peace and stability, nevertheless, findings show that peace and con-
flict sensitivity is not explicitly linked with the mandate and values of the NDDC. The 
analysis of NDDC documents such as MD/CEO speeches, report, and magazines 
clearly support this claim. In the documents, NDDC reports its achievements in devel-
opment terms only. Indeed, the Commission reports success in terms of the number of 
projects, or participants in capacity-building training. The implications these have on 
peace and conflict dynamics of the context are rarely considered in the reports. Sam-
ples of the Commission‘s reports are presented as follows:  
A survey conducted by the Commission showed that most of the bene-
ficiaries are either self-employed or gainfully employed in private insti-
tutions. The programme has indeed reduced the high index of unem-
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ployment in the Region and inculcated the spirit of self-reliance among 
youths. 
(Computer education unit/Skills Acquisition Pro-
gramme)  
Under the scheme, more 1,000 buses and 136 boats have been given to 
cooperative societies across the nine states that make up the region. 
Through this means, "by modest estimation, about 11,360 families 
across the region have been empowered".   (Mass Transit Scheme) 
Three hundred youths of Bayelsa State have been trained in an NDDC 
agriculture empowerment programme in various income-yielding en-
terprises at the Biotechnology Development Agency, Odi, Bayelsa 
State, while another 1,700 youths in Delta, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom and 
Bayelsa states have been trained at the Songhai Farms, Delta State on 
fish farming and so on. Now, they are self-employed and doing well.    
(Agricultural Support Programme). 
(www.nddc.gov.ng. accessed 21
st
 November 2008). 
Finally, the responses of the NDDC staff interviewed imply an assumption that, 
by meeting its target output (what is being done and quantity) in intervention irrespec-
tive of the process (how it is being done), the Commission automatically builds peace 
in the NDR. However, empirical evidence supports claims that quantitative accom-
plishments in intervention programming may not necessarily translate into peacebuild-
ing in the operational context (Bush K. , 1998; Bush & Opp, 1999; Bush K. , 2003c; 
Bush K. , 2009; Anderson, 1999; Anderson, 2004; Paffenholz, 2005).            
Empirical evidence also shows that peace and conflict sensitivity is not inte-
grated into the Commission‘s organisational culture, that is, its existing procedures and 
structures. The procedures of intervention programming, particularly conception and 
planning are driven by budget and other interests as discussed earlier. Hence, there is 
hardly any consideration for peace and conflict sensitivity. NDDC personnel inter-
viewed (including those of the Community and Rural Development [CRD]) were 
completely ignorant of issues relating to peace and conflict sensitivity in the Commis-
sion‘s activities. The CRD has the duty of informing community about NDDC‘s in-
tended intervention and intervene in conflict arising as a result of the intervention in 
the community. This suggests that PCS is not mainstreamed in the Commission‘s or-
ganisational structure.  
 154 
 
Furthermore, findings show that peace and conflict-sensitivity skills are not in-
tegrated into staff training or incorporated into staff recruitment. Staff interviewed 
were not familiar with terminologies and issues germane to peace and conflict sensitiv-
ity. However, since most staff are indigenes of the NDR, they have the advantage of 
contextual knowledge of the NDR such as knowledge of the geographical area, history 
of the NDR conflict, and knowledge of one or more NDR indigenous languages. The 
Directorate of Community and Rural Development is charged with the responsibilities 
of managing intervention-related conflicts in communities. Personnel of CRD are 
trained in conflict resolution. But ―…it‘s [the training] so very peripheral. The training 
is so peripheral. It‘s not sufficient, ok.‖ These are the words, representative of other 
participants‘ responses, of a staff that had participated in the training. He had also at-
tended more intensive training and higher courses in Peace and Conflict Studies, so he 
was qualified to evaluate the CRD training. This suggests that the training did not 
build the capacity of the CRD personnel in any appreciable manner commensurable 
with the responsibilities of their field operations. Also, the CRD‘s field responsibilities 
are restricted to introducing the contractor/consultant to the community and mediating 
in conflict triggered by the NDDC intervention in the community. They are not in-
volved in the conception and planning, as required by the NDDC guiding policy. 
Hence, even their weak capacity is only restricted to conflict resolution and not full 
mainstreaming of PCS into staff training and recruitment.   
Accountability mechanisms here refer to appraisal and incentives systems en-
couraging peace and conflict sensitivity in intervention programming. It ―…includes 
documenting and disseminating better practice and rewarding progress to create posi-
tive energy for moving forward‖ (Lange, 2004, p. 19). Nothing of this nature exists in 
the NDDC. In fact, findings reveal that report of evaluation of past effort do not inform 
planning of new intervention. This is consistent with the findings discussed under con-
ception and planning. According to an NDDC desk officer, 
But, you know, some of the project, I can tell you have not been suc-
cessful at all. So…assuming that the planning process is democra-
tized…we should have been able to make input, based on our field ex-
perience. 
Conducive external environment was evaluated in three domains —conducive 
relationships with other actors (other government agencies, NGOs, INGOs, oil compa-
nies‘ intervention) working in the NDR; buy-in, participation and capacity of commu-
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nities; and broader policy environment. Findings show that gap exist for a better coor-
dination of intervention with other organisations pursuing similar goals in the region. 
For instance, there were organizations such as BIODEC, FADAMA, CDB, and NGOs 
in Odi doing some things that the NDDC has been trying to do through its agricultural 
support programmes. The NDDC did not partner with organisations like FADAMA, 
having very similar agricultural programmes, in its agricultural support programmes. 
However, some participants reported that the FADAMA initiative succeeded whereas 
the NDDC failed. A partnership with FADAMA would have made the NDDC more 
successful with its agricultural intervention. For instance, the NDDC could have part-
nered with FADAMA, in which the NDDC provides the training and get its successful 
trainees organised into cooperative groups while FADAMA provides the fund and the 
two organisations jointly monitor the beneficiaries. The partnership that existed be-
tween NDDC and BIODEC was at the latter's instance. In the second domain, findings 
revealed that the Commission does not ensure community buy-in or ownership of its 
intervention. The programming of its intervention are not participatory, hence they do 
not directly build community‘s capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity. Rather, Odi 
community itself has developed its own infrastructure and custom to manage conflicts 
related to intervention, which oftentimes are not acknowledged in the NDDC interven-
tion programming.  
The third domain of the external environment has to do with the socio-political 
terrain of the NDDC operations. The Nigerian political environment described as char-
acterised by prebendalism (Joseph, 1996) seems hostile to values such as altruism, im-
partiality or multi-partiality, equality, equity, justice, emancipation, peacebuilding, 
which are necessary for peace and conflict-sensitive programming. In prebendal poli-
tics, state offices become prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use 
them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups. 
The Nigerian socio-political environment, which is the context of the NDDC interven-
tions, supports systemic corruption. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND), referring to government intervention in the NDR, once warned, ―the 
people of the region should receive this latest dish with apprehension. It will be yet 
another avenue for corruption and political favouritism‖ (International Crisis Group, 
25 October 2006c). Public perception about the NDDC intervention as a means of cor-
ruption and political favouritism has serious negative implications for the NDDC. 
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Table 4.2 summarises the results of the assessment of peace and conflict sensi-
tivity in the NDDC institutional context, using Lange‘s framework. Table 4.3 summa-
rises the answers to pertinent questions in determining the mainstreaming of PCS in 
the Commission‘s institutional context.  
 
4.4.2 Peace and Conflict Sensitivity of the NDDC Intervention Program-
ming 
Peace and conflict sensitivity of intervention programming entails sensitising each 
stage —conception and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation— of the 
intervention for peace and conflict. The generic question to ask at each stage is 
whether the programming reflects concern for peace and conflict issues in the context. 
Each stage is assessed using indicators earlier identified in chapter two. Findings show 
that the NDDC intervention programming has a low sensitivity to peace and conflict. 
The Commission, nevertheless, has a policy on conflict resolution, which is presumed 
to have some remote influence on the general intervention programming.   
4.4.2.1 Conception and Planning 
The assessment used the four indicators for peace and conflict sensitive conception and 
planning presented in section 2.10.2. The first indicator is incorporating principles of 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation in intervention policies. The NDDC Strate-
gic Policies for Change is documented in page 22 to 46 of the Master Plan. The last 
section of the policies, Policies and Interventions for Conflict Resolution —Policy 
HR9 to Policy HR14— contains six explicit policy statements on peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation. They are: Policy HR9: reducing conflict; Policy HR10: Pro-
motion of core principles; Policy HR11: Baseline review of conflict resolution pro-
grammes; Policy HR12: Establish a committee for peace and security; Policy HR13: 
Involvement of Partners for Sustainable Development (PSD) Network; and Policy HR 
14: Capacity -building in conflict resolution skills. In addition, Policy OG3 —Conflict 
Mitigation Initiatives— under Section D on Oil and Gas, is a policy establishing a 
mechanism on early warning and conflict resolution. Hence, principles of peacebuild-
ing and conflict transformation are incorporated into the Commission‘s intervention 
policies. 
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Table 4.2. Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in NDDC Institutional Context 
S/N Concepts Indicators Results 
1 Institutional  
commitment  
Organisational leadership support for PCS No 
Development of peace and conflict-sensitive policies Yes 
Creating appropriate decision-making sys-
tems/structures 
Fair 
Committing staff time and financial resources to 
strengthening a peace and conflict-sensitive organisa-
tional culture 
No 
 
2 Willingness to 
make changes in 
organisational cul-
ture and institu-
tional structure 
Cross-organisational buy-in No 
Participation and ownership No 
Open communication channels on and between all 
levels of the organisation 
No 
Facilitating the flow of knowledge and learning No 
Consistently incorporating peace and conflict-
sensitive skills in staff training and recruitment proc-
esses.  
No 
 
3 Support for staff 
capacity develop-
ment 
Development of tool/methodology for PCS  No 
Staff training, appraisal and rewards for PCS pro-
gramming  
Weak 
training 
only for 
CRD 
Adoption of peace and conflict-sensitive evaluation 
mechanisms and procedures.  
No 
Requisite peace and conflict-sensitive skills for staff: 
 understanding of the particular geographical 
area [and its conflict issues] 
 knowledge of the relevant language(s) 
 relationship-building and analytical skills; 
and 
 ability to deal with high stress levels 
No 
Good 
NE* 
NE 
NE 
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S/N Concepts Indicators Results 
Separate peacebuilding units or integrating it on all 
levels. 
Separate 
Unit 
 
4 Accountability 
mechanisms 
Appropriate appraisal and incentives systems that 
encourage peace and conflict-sensitive programming 
and balance individual accountability with the need 
for learning.  
None 
documenting and disseminating better practice None 
rewarding progress to create a positive energy for 
moving forward 
None 
 
5 Conducive exter-
nal  
Relationships 
Conducive relationships with groups and actors that 
influence the conflict sensitivity of the wider re-
sponse: 
 local partner organisations 
 donors  
 INGOs, and national and international con-
stituencies supporting the organisation 
 domestic and international policy environ-
ments 
 funding constraints 
 partnerships relations 
 
Fair 
NE 
Fair 
Unfair 
Partial 
N/E 
  Community buy-in or ownership of its intervention; 
and 
building community‘s capacity for peace and conflict 
sensitivity 
No 
No 
 
 Coherence and 
seamless fit 
among the differ-
ent stages  
 Sophisticated PCS planning system  
 
No 
 Staff and partners ownership of the PCS tool No 
 Capacity to use it  No 
 Support to use it No 
*Not Evaluated. 
Source: Author‘s Assessment, 2013 
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Table 4.3. Answers to Pertinent Questions on PCS in the NDDC Institutional 
Context 
 
Source: Author‘s assessment, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S/N Questions Answers 
1 Is the NDDC committed and motivated for PCS main-
streaming? 
No 
2 Is its organisational culture reflective of PCS? No 
3 Does is build staff capacity for PCS? Very weakly and lim-
ited to CRD personnel 
4 Does it have accountability mechanisms for PCS?  No 
5 Does it enjoy conducive external relations? Not really 
 160 
 
Table 4.4. Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in the NDDC Intervention Programming  
S/
N 
Stages of interven-
tion 
Indicators Results 
1 Peace and conflict 
sensitive conception 
and planning 
Incorporating peacebuilding and conflict-
transformation principles into agencies‘ stra-
tegic policies. 
Yes 
Linking conflict analysis with the objectives 
of the project in the project design. 
No 
Ensuring all planning processes themselves 
are conflict-sensitive. 
No 
Sacrificing some speed of delivery to ensure 
adequate conflict-sensitive planning. 
Not ap-
plicable 
 
2 Peace and conflict 
sensitive implementa-
tion 
Using conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies. No 
Investing in developing, disseminating and pro-
viding training in these. 
No  
Hiring specialist, experienced and trained conflict 
advisors to support field and HQ staff. 
No 
Cooperating closely with local partners in identi-
fying and addressing conflict dynamics. 
No 
Anticipating changing dynamics and developing 
contingency plans. 
No 
 
3 Peace and conflict 
sensitive monitoring 
and evaluation 
Monitoring and evaluating programmes according 
to their impact on conflict and peace and vice 
versa. 
No  
Setting flexible indicators that cover the process 
and outcomes of the programme as well as its 
outputs. 
No  
Conducting joint monitoring and evaluation with 
local partners and communities. 
No  
 
Source: Author‘s Assessment, 2013 
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The second indicator is linking conflict analysis with the objectives of the in-
tervention during conception and planning stage. Inasmuch as the Master Plan was de-
veloped as a response to, and based on, the analysis of the NDR conflict, in a sense, 
the Commission linked the analysis of the conflict with the objectives of its generic 
region-level intervention. However, this is not always the case in designing specific 
interventions at the community level. This is because, although the Commission de-
pends largely on the Master Plan in conceiving and planning its programmes, the con-
flict analysis of Odi community context was not done. The NDDC‘s practice was to 
intervene through ad-hoc peacebuilding interventions in response to open conflicts. A 
case in point is the supply of flying boats to certain people in Odi community in re-
sponse to Odi youths‘ agitations when they obstructed the former NDDC chairman, 
Larry Koiyan, on Odi-Trofani Road (see section 5.1.3.2).  
It appears that the interests of the NDDC board and management, politicians 
and contractors are paramount in the process of conceiving and planning the interven-
tions. Community‘s interests have a narrow chance of consideration through the activi-
ties of Ward 12 (See Sub-section 5.2.2). And finally, available data support the fact 
that the Commission does not do a peace and conflict-sensitive planning. So the ques-
tion of sacrificing speed of delivery to ensure adequate peace and conflict-sensitive 
planning (as also required) does not arise. Hence, characteristic corruption and corpo-
rate bad governance appear to be the major reason for the insensitivity of the concep-
tion and planning processes to peace and conflict dynamics of the context. 
In conclusion, the assessment of the peace and conflict-sensitivity of the con-
ception and planning stage of the NDDC interventions was done using four indicators 
of peace and conflict-sensitive conception and planning (see section 2.4.1). They are 
incorporating peacebuilding and conflict-transformation principles into agencies‘ stra-
tegic policies; linking conflict analysis with the objectives of the project in the project 
design; ensuring all planning processes themselves are conflict-sensitive; and sacrific-
ing some speed of delivery to ensure adequate conflict-sensitive planning. Empirical 
evidence shows that only the first indicator is present in the Commission‘s conception 
and planning stage of intervention. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 summarise the results of the as-
sessment of the conception and planning.  
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Table 4.5. Answers to Pertinent Questions about Mainstreaming PCS in the 
NDDC Intervention Programming 
S/N Questions Answers 
1 Is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in conception and 
planning? 
No 
2 Is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in implementation? No 
3 Is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in monitoring and 
evaluation? 
No  
 
Source: Author‘s Assessment, 2013  
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4.4.2. 2 Implementation  
The five indicators of peace and conflict-sensitive implementation as presented in sec-
tion 2.4.1 include using conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies; investing in devel-
oping, disseminating and providing training in these; hiring specialist, experienced and 
trained conflict advisors to support field and headquarters‘ staff; cooperating closely 
with local partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics; and anticipating 
changing dynamics and developing contingency plans. The corresponding questions to 
the five indicators include: does the Commission use peace and conflict-sensitive tools 
and methodologies (e.g. PCIA, CSA, SCA, or any of the frameworks or similar ones to 
those presented and/or discussed in chapter 2)? Does it invest in developing, dissemi-
nating and providing training on these tools and methodologies? Does the NDDC hire 
specialist, experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and headquarters 
staff? Does it cooperate closely with local partners in identifying and addressing con-
flict dynamics? And finally, does the Commission anticipate changing dynamics and 
develop contingency plans?  
Generally speaking, the answer to these questions is ―no‖. Only one NDDC 
staff interviewed has heard of peace and conflict impact assessment, conflict-
sensitivity or any similar terms. However, he confirmed that the Commission does not 
use it or any similar methodology in programming its intervention. Analysis of the re-
sponses of other staff indicates that they had no knowledge of any of such frameworks 
or terminologies. The same goes for the NDDC consultants and community people. 
Community people confirmed that the NDDC interventions do not have elements of 
peace and conflict sensitivity incorporated into them. No community member remem-
bered the usage of terms germane to peace and conflict sensitivity during the imple-
mentation of any of the Commission‘s intervention. Mr Godwin Unumeri, an expert on 
PCIA and the Niger Delta describes NDDC implementation in the following terms: 
They look at the communities and say, ‗Ok this community needs, 
maybe a school or a road or any other development project.‘ They just 
go there and they site the project without looking at the effect of this 
project on the enforcement or weakening of the peace structures. They 
don‘t look at that 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 06/03/2011). 
 
The participant quoted above is a Shell-trained expert on PCIA and a consultant for 
Peacebuild Canada on conflict-sensitivity programming in the Niger Delta. He is a Ni-
ger Deltan and independent researcher with almost a decade experience in PCIA in the 
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Niger Delta. He co-authored a resource material on conflict sensitivity in the Niger 
Delta. Confirming this view, an NDDC desk officer, a former NDDC Community and 
Rural Development personnel, said 
… and that‘s why we have conflict otherwise there shouldn‘t be con-
flict for the CRD [Directorate of Community and Rural Development] 
to go and resolve. Because if a community is not aware of a project un-
til a contractor arrives, they are bound to say ‗contractor come and give 
us marching ground‘ [money demanded by the locals to permit the con-
tractors to work in their community] ok, so there is a gap between how 
it should be done and how it is being done presently.  (Fieldwork: In-
terview, 06/07/2011) 
Deutsche Gesellschaftfür Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) International, a 
Germany-based organisation in conflict transformation was a lead consultant for the 
NDDC in drawing the Master Plan. This portrays conflict sensitivity in drawing the 
Master Plan. However, findings show that the NDDC does not hire specialist, experi-
enced and/or trained conflict advisors to support field and headquarters staff for im-
plementation of its intervention at the community level. Rather, personnel of the CRD 
intervene whenever conflicts arise as a result of an intervention. Findings show that the 
Commission does not work with potential local partners such as the Traditional Coun-
cil, the Youth Council, the women‘s group and the community development council in 
identifying and addressing conflict dynamics. It only informs the Traditional Council 
at the point of implementing its interventions. Expectedly, this has negative impacts on 
the implementation of the interventions. A case in point is the conflict triggered be-
tween Asanga and Tamanga by the concrete pavement of internal link roads in Odi 
(see section 5.4.1). Finally, whether the Commission anticipates changing dynamics 
and develops contingency plans could not be directly ascertained. One could only infer 
that using the Master Plan and other strategic documents as the main basis for concep-
tion and planning intervention to the exclusion of the community people implies that 
the NDDC may not factor in the changing dynamics of peace and conflict in the NDR. 
At the level of the community, the Commission intervenes when its intervention 
causes conflict with the hope of resolving it. Empirical data available is not sufficient 
to confirm or confute any other contingency plan for changing dynamics of peace and 
conflict.  
In conclusion, using Maria Lange‘s five indicators of peace and conflict sensi-
tive implementation, findings suggests that the implementation stage of the Commis-
sion‘s intervention is not well-sensitised for peace and conflict dynamics. In other 
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words, the NDDC does not use peace and conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies or 
invest in developing, disseminating and providing training in them. Also, it does not 
hire specialist, experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and HQ staff. 
Although as described earlier, it provides some training for CRD personnel, the train-
ing is grossly inadequate. Furthermore, the Commission does not cooperate with local 
partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics or developing contingency 
plans on anticipated change in the dynamics of peace and conflict in the context of the 
intervention.  
4.4.2.3 Monitoring and evaluation 
Indices of peace and conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation include monitoring 
and evaluating programmes according to their impact on conflict and peace and vice 
versa; setting flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the programme 
as well as its outputs; alongside conducting joint monitoring and evaluation with local 
partners and communities. The corresponding guiding questions here include, first, 
does the NDDC monitor and evaluate its interventions according to their impact on 
peace and conflict and vice versa?  Second, does it set flexible indicators that cover the 
process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs? And third, does it con-
duct joint monitoring and evaluation with local partners and communities?  
Firstly, the Commission would be able to monitor and evaluate the impact of its 
interventions on peace and conflict and vice versa if it incorporated peace and conflict 
concerns in the earlier stages of the intervention programming. Incorporating peace 
and conflict concerns include setting indicators that cover the process and outcomes as 
well as outputs of intervention. However, as earlier discussed, the NDDC does not do 
this. In addition, monitoring and evaluation are not rigorous exercises. Monitoring is 
done by the NDDC state directorates and it is strictly to ensure that programmes and 
projects are executed in line with specifications other than peace and conflict concerns. 
Evaluation is done by NDDC consultants. The NDDC only evaluates the evaluations 
of those consultants. The NDDC monitoring and evaluation, therefore, leaves out local 
partners and communities.  
In conclusion, the monitoring and evaluation stage of the NDDC intervention is 
totally insensitive to peace and conflict concerns. This is partially as fallout of the in-
sensitivity of the conception and planning, which fails to take into account peace and 
conflict indicators against which to monitor and evaluate the impact of the interven-
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tion. Hence, projects and programmes are not monitored and evaluated according to 
their impact on conflict and peace and vice versa. Also, flexible indicators that cover 
the process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs are not set. Finally, 
monitoring and evaluation are not conducted with local partners and communities. 
Table 4.4 summarises the assessment of the NDDC intervention programming for PCS 
and 4.5 summarises answers to pertinent questions regarding PCS in the Commission‘s 
intervention programming. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The assessment of the institutional capacity of the NDDC for peace and con-
flict sensitivity shows that the Commission has abysmally-low capacity. The assess-
ment was done using the Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework, which integrated 
Lange‘s five pillar framework for mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity into 
intervention agency, and the conflict-sensitivity of development, humanitarian aid and 
peacebuilding interventions as proposed by Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, and 
Sheriff (2005). Empirical evidence shows that PCS is not mainstreamed in the organ-
isational culture and structure and intervention programming of the Commission. 
Hence, the NDDC‘s has low Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Capacity (PCSC). The 
Commission scored very low in PCS in its commitment and motivation, organisational 
culture, capacity building, accountability and conducive external relations. Findings 
show that the peace and conflict sensitivity is not mainstreamed in the NDDC as an 
organisation. Peace and conflict sensitivity is not part of the values that guide the 
Commission‘s procedures and it is not integrated in its structures. Also, the NDDC 
does not integrate peace and conflict sensitivity in the whole organisation, rather it has 
a separate unit —the Directorate of Community and Rural Development— charged 
with resolving conflicts generated by its interventions. This arrangement has the poten-
tial of marginalising peace and conflict sensitivity, which is exactly the case with the 
NDDC. Hence, PCS is not well-connected to the rest of the organisation or combined 
with other mechanisms for exchange and learning. Furthermore, the systems of ac-
countability required for mainstreaming PCS are not available. Finally, the external 
socio-political environment, characterised by bad governance and debilitating corrup-
tion is hostile to the ideals of PCS. 
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Similarly, the NDDC does not mainstream peace and conflict sensitivity in its 
intervention programming. Hence conception and planning, implementation, and 
monitoring and evaluation of its intervention are more traditional rather than peace and 
conflict sensitive. From the 12 indicators for assessing the peace and conflict sensitiv-
ity of the three main stages of intervention programming, the Commission has one in-
dicator at the C&P stage —incorporating principles of peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation in intervention policies— to its credit. Also at the stage of implementa-
tion, the NDDC superficially-trained CRD personnel intervene in intervention-
triggered conflicts to support its field operations. In quantitative terms, the NDDC 
would be scored 1.5 points (generously) out of 12 possible points, that is, 12.5% in 
mainstreaming PCS in its intervention programming.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE NATURE, DYNAMICS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
INTERACTIONS OF THE NDDC INTERVENTIONS AND 
ODI COMMUNITY 
5.0 Introduction 
Investigations revealed that Odi was a beneficiary of a number of NDDC interventions. 
Physical development projects are more notable than the human development pro-
grammes in the community. In fact, to the community members, physical development 
projects are almost synonymous with the NDDC interventions. It usually took some 
probing from the researcher for them to identify human capacity development pro-
grammes as interventions. Physical development projects in the community include 
paving of internal link roads, Odi-Trofani Road, Agberiye-Odonu to Sampo Road, 
community water project, construction of blocks of classrooms and science laborato-
ries, and community electrification (on-going at the time of the fieldwork). Also, the 
free medical campaign for the senatorial district is usually done at the General Hospital 
at Odi.  
The presence of Bioresources Development Centre (BIODEC) in the commu-
nity has attracted agricultural-support training programmes to the community. These 
often involve the whole Kolokuma-Opokuma Local Government Area. Trainings were 
provided on fish farming, grasscutter (thryonomys swinderianus) raising, snail raising, 
mushroom farming, and honey production. A rice plantation, initially a joint initiative 
of the Transformation Agric. Tech and the NDDC is also located in the community. 
However, at the time of the fieldwork, the plantation had not been in operation for 
about nine months. Members of Odi community have also enjoyed mass transportation 
scheme in form of distribution of flying boats. The community people reported that 
Odi had benefited more from the NDDC than many other communities in the local 
government and even in the NDR, especially during the tenure of Timi Alaibe as Man-
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aging Director of the NDDC. Some community people believe that this was partly as a 
compensation for 1999 Odi massacre. The massacre therefore is significant in assess-
ing the NDDC interventions in the community (Source: Fieldwork, 2011). 
This chapter discusses the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions 
of the NDDC interventions and Odi community context. In sections 5.1 to 5.3, the 
study reconstructed the picture of the intervention programming of the Commission. 
Each of the three stages —conception and planning, implementation, and monitoring 
and evaluation— of the intervention programming is reconstructed and assessed in 
each section. In reconstructing the picture of what goes on at each stage, the report 
drew on the data collected from the field, especially the lived experiences of the com-
munity people, the NDDC personnel and consultants as well as documents. It investi-
gated, first, whether the NDDC followed its own laid-down guiding policies (as de-
scribed in the Master Plan and discussed in the last chapter) in its intervention pro-
gramming. It compares relevant intervention principles and policies with each stage of 
the intervention programming. With empirical evidence to support its arguments, the 
report then presents its assessment of the degree to which the Commission‘s program-
ming of its interventions is in line with the spirit of the Master Plan. The assessment 
was done with the aid of the 10-point framework presented in the last chapter (see Box 
1, section 4.2.4). Section 5.1 presents the conceptualisation and planning stage, while 
sections 5.2and 5.3 discuss the implementation of the NDDC‘s intervention program-
ming and monitoring and evaluation respectively.  
Section 5.4 presents an assessment of the impacts of the NDDC interventions 
in Odi community. Impacts are discussed as positive and negative as argued in the 
Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach framework presented in chapter two. The im-
pacts on gender relations and dynamics were presented in Section 5.5. The chapter in-
troduces a theory of peace and conflict impact and the intervention-context interactions 
(ICI) model as a conceptual framework for understanding the interactions of the 
NDDC‘s intervention and Odi community context in section 5.6. A theoretical expla-
nation of the interactions, including concepts and propositions to understand the na-
ture, dynamics and impacts of the NDDC interventions such as resource-status of in-
tervention, black hole of interactions, likely deprivation, Ward 12, the malevolent char-
ity-beggar relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, divisiveness of intervention, 
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and the geniuses of conflict transformation in the community are discussed in section 
5.7. and conclusion is presented in  5.8. 
Some of the critical questions that this chapter answers include how did the 
NDDC implement its interventions in Odi community? Was it in line with its strategies 
laid-out in the Master Plan? What impact does this have on the community —its peo-
ple and peace and conflict environment? The assessment, therefore, focused on what 
was done, how it was done, and its implications or impacts. Assessing the impacts of 
the NDDC interventions, require an understanding of the status the interventions enjoy 
in the NDR. Also, the twin issues of corporate governance and corruption as they re-
late to the NDDC interventions need to be examined. This is done in the next two sec-
tions. 
5.1 Conception and Planning the NDDC Interventions 
This is the first stage of intervention programming where certain problems are identi-
fied, their causal linkages analysed, and effective solutions developed. It is a stage of 
formulating ideas to improve a given situation. The outcome of this process is often 
embodied in a programme or initiative designed with predefined objectives, activities, 
implementation process and verifiable indicators of progress (Resource Pack, 2004). 
Six important planning principles are applicable, and are supposed to guide the con-
ception and planning of the NDDC interventions. Firstly is promotion of good govern-
ance through ‗‗…transparent and publicly accountable practices…‘‘ development of 
‗…a greater understanding with ‗passive‘ and ‗active‘ stakeholders…‘ in order to 
‗‗…reduce corruption and increase effectiveness‘‘. Secondly is that the strategic and 
detailed planning must be integrative and process-oriented, which must ensure the start 
and continuity of the planned activities and reckon with downstream effects of change 
as well as provide for them. Thirdly, sound planning process must be based on partici-
patory decision-making involving active and passive stakeholders, which necessarily 
must involve community (women and youths inclusive) and NGOs and ensure that 
their needs are taken into consideration in formulating policies and proposals. 
Fourthly, it must involve other agencies such as NEEDS, SEEDS, and LEEDS. Fifthly, 
it must involve transparent selection criteria (of contractors, consultants, beneficiary 
communities) and public scrutiny of materials. Finally, it must be peace and conflict 
sensitive.  
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Nonetheless, empirical evidence shows that the conception and planning (C&P) 
of the NDDC interventions is more or less a resource-sharing activity characterised by 
lack of transparency. It involves actors such as the NDDC board, management, staff, 
contractors/consultants, politicians, and a unique group referred to as Ward 12 (dis-
cussed in the previous section).  
Evidence shows that C&P of the NDDC interventions is centralised at the 
NDDC headquarters in Port Harcourt. The state directorates only monitor the imple-
mentation of the interventions. So, essentially, C&P is restricted to the headquarters. 
The Directorate for Community and Rural Development that has the mandate for plan-
ning intervention for communities is conspicuously left out. The Commission‘s head-
quarters consult the Master Plan and strategic documents such as NEEDS and the UN 
Human Development Index to pinpoint the areas of needs already identified. This con-
stitutes the Commission‘s needs assessment. Moreover, budget is a strong factor in the 
C&P. However, the intended beneficiary community people —resident community 
people— are conspicuously left out as reported by NDDC staff and community mem-
bers: 
We do what we call needs assessment, and our consultants, who help us 
to develop the Master Plan, […] they‘ve identified, centres of critical 
[needs], critical to the development of the Niger Delta region. We draw 
our programmes from the Master Plan. We also draw our programmes, 
am, from the national strategic documents such as NEEDS document 
and also international document like the Human Development Index, 
you know, and other United Nations recommended policy documents. 
[…]So, we rely a lot on other, policy guidelines of government to draw 
our activities.  
—NDDC Staff, Asst. Director, Headquarters (Fieldwork: Interview, 
06/07/2011). 
 
First and foremost, there must be some conceptualisation, we must seek 
the approval of the management and the board and there must be budg-
etary provision, then we come and do the actual planning [ok]. We de-
termine the cost of the project and we determine the number of the 
beneficiaries that can benefit from that project. So it‘s all budget-
driven. 
—NDDC Top Staff, Commercial and Industrial Directorate, Headquar-
ters. (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011). 
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But to be frank with you I‘ll say that nearly 99.9% of projects are not 
initiated from the CRD [community and rural development]; if I say the 
Project Directorate or project department I‘ll also not be saying it accu-
rately as it is, you know. We hardly do needs assessment, ok, and the 
directorate that should do needs assessment is CRD. So that doesn‘t ex-
ist. But if it doesn‘t exist, you can say that most of the project that get 
into the budget for implementation come rather from people who are 
desirous of doing contract. For example, members of the national as-
sembly, you know. That‘s how our projects are generated.  
—NDDC Staff, State Directorate (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011). 
…earlier on I told you that most of the planning is done from the head-
quarters.[…] So, most of the planning is done over there. What we do is 
to implement, to monitor… 
—NDDC Staff, State Directorate. (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011). 
Now we have an NDDC Master Plan […] and it is thought that what 
went into the design of the Master Plan informs us about the gaps out 
there. The gaps in terms of knowledge, etcetera, so when we design our 
programmes, we look at the Master Plan, areas of gap, like information 
technology, that is what informs, you know, our computer training pro-
gramme. [ok]. Yeah. Basically, that‘s how…   
—NDDC Staff, Desk officer, State Directorate. (Fieldwork: Interview, 
06/07/2011). 
―…they [the NDDC] just bring the programme, [ok] which people will 
accept if they want… maybe, some people must have been agitating or 
lobbying for it…‖ —Male beneficiary, graduate of Niger Delta 
University(Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011). 
 
They [the NDDC] don‘t come. They just stay in their office and say, 
‗‗Ah, I think we suppose to construct this road for them, we suppose to 
give them en three classroom block, we suppose to give them eh a sci-
ence block […] and so the next thing is, you saw a…contractor and 
‗En, say I‘m coming for NDDC project.‘‘   
—Male member of the community (Secondary school teacher and 
graduate of the University of Ibadan) (Fieldwork: Interview, 
17/09/2011). 
NDDC top officials claim that by seeking the views of politicians —the sup-
posed representative or voice of the people— in their conception and planning, the 
Commission has already involved the community people. However, one needs to un-
derstand that those politicians are at best Ward 12 members. And like other influential 
actors in the activities surrounding the C&P, they are essentially driven by self-
interest. The needs, interests and priorities (financial, material, political or oftentimes a 
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combination of these) of Ward 12 do not necessarily coincide with those of the com-
munity. Community interests are usually secondary to Ward 12 members and thus will 
likely be jettisoned if contrary to the interests of the Ward 12 members. At best, Ward 
12 member‘s interests will probably be cloaked in community interests in order to ne-
gotiate for NDDC interventions. In essence, although they are community members, 
the involvement of members of Ward 12 does not make the C&P of NDDC interven-
tions participatory as assumed by NDDC top officials Their non-resident status (which 
is part of what earned them the Ward 12 appellation in the first place) is an indication 
that they cannot be as much part of the day-to-day realities of the community as indi-
genes resident in the community. Nonetheless, it may be argued that the Ward 12‘s 
involvement somehow links the activities of the C&P to the community context. This 
is because it is claimed that in some instances, Ward 12 members consult, even if clan-
destinely, with some actors in the community. This, at best, probably makes C&P a 
poor hybrid of top-down approach and participatory planning.  
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that peace and conflict concerns are 
not mainstreamed in the C&P of the NDDC intervention (See section 4.4 for a detailed 
discussion). There seems to be a general assumption in the NDDC that its interventions 
will naturally lead to peacebuilding in the region. This assumption is captured in the 
words of an assistant director in the Commission: 
…we‘ve discovered that the issues in the Niger Delta came as a result 
of lack of opportunities, unemployment, lack of skills and capacity. So 
if you address these issues, issues of restiveness will naturally be ad-
dressed. It‘s not a deliberate point that we address…it [peacebuilding] 
it‘s a natural consequence…when you reduce unemployment, crime, 
restiveness and other vice, similar vices will be reduced…for those who 
are actually in need of trade, of skills and of jobs, if you give them 
those opportunities it will check restiveness. (Fieldwork: Interview, 
06/07/2011). 
In conclusion, C&P of the NDDC interventions, during the period under inves-
tigation, contradicts the six strategic planning principles and the framework of action 
identified above and specified in the Master Plan. In other words, there is no explicit 
stance to promote good governance through ‗‗…transparent and publicly accountable 
practices…‘‘. Also, the C&P is not participatory with ‗‗…meaningful involvement of 
active…stakeholders‘‘, especially the resident indigenes of the beneficiary community 
—the critical stakeholders. Contrarily, it is restricted to certain influential individuals 
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—the Ward 12 group— which is a pseudo-community involvement. Moreover, the 
selection criteria of contractors, consultants and beneficiaries are not transparent or 
open to public scrutiny. Rather, they are dependent essentially on the interplay of po-
litical influence of people that are ‗‗…desirous to do contracts‘‘, the NDDC manage-
ment staff, consultants, and Ward 12. Furthermore, the Commission has a simplistic 
assumption of positive correlational relationship between interventions and peace-
building. This however, contradicts scientific knowledge in peace and conflict impact 
assessment as argued in chapters one and two. The Commission, therefore, contradicts 
its own strategic planning principles and framework for action. This has grievous con-
sequences for the NDDC, its interventions, and the beneficiary community people.  
5.1.1 Community Participation and C&P of Interventions 
Why would the resident community people be excluded from C&P of interventions 
meant for them? This contradicts the ‗‗Lessons for the Future‘‘ (page 110 of the Mas-
ter Plan), where the NDDC notes the observation of the UNDP as to the flaws of the 
previous development strategies in Nigeria (and the Niger Delta): 
The greatest flaw in these (past) poverty alleviation strategies is their 
‗top-down‘ approach…It is needless to add that the involvement of the 
supposed beneficiaries, both in the conception and the implementation 
of the programmes were conspicuously negligible. (UNDP, 2001) 
Moreover, section five of Policy G1 —Strategic Planning Principles— reads: 
A sound planning process has to be based on participatory decision 
making. This entails meaningful involvement of the ‗Active‘ and ‗Pas-
sive‘ stakeholders—public sector, private sector, community and 
NGOs—and ensuring that their respective needs and constraints are 
taken into consideration when policies and proposals are formulated, 
including attention to issues such as gender and youth.  — (2006, p. 
23). 
Furthermore, Policy HC 8 —Community Development and Social Welfare under the 
Policies for Human and Community Needs- contains a statement on involvement of 
critical stakeholders in conception and planning and implementation of the NDDC in-
terventions in communities.  
Detailed planning and implementation of all these needs will be con-
ducted in consultation with local communities and with the clear aim of 
meeting the needs of individuals and families, and enhancing the sense 
of identity, pride, and mutual responsibility in each community. — 
(2006, p. 23) 
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It needs to be re-stated that the leadership of the NDDC must uphold 
the principles of transparency and accountability and must encourage 
the full participation of stakeholders in the strategic decision-making 
processes in line with their concerns interests and well-being (2006, p. 
241). 
 
In the light of these and other similar ideas that clearly acknowledge the need 
for community participation in the Master Plan, there is need to examine why the resi-
dent community people, as critical stakeholders, were excluded from participating in 
the C&P. Empirical evidence shows that resident community people participate in 
conception and planning of interventions by I/NGOs working in the community. In 
fact, I/NGOs intervening in Odi community actively involve the community people 
throughout their intervention programming. Hence, community participation in inter-
vention programming is not an impossible task in Odi community. According to a 
member of the Odi Traditional Council, 
Maybe you are aware these few days this people they call MMP3 or 
what—a kind of nongovernmental organization, now came here and in-
form us that every community should supply information on what they 
need. So some said town hall, some said this, some said boreholes. So 
they brought money now, people are now working on it. (Fieldwork: 
Interview, 16/09/2011) 
  Given that NGOs involve the critical stakeholders in their intervention pro-
gramming in Odi community, a critical question from the foregoing, therefore, is 
‗‗why did the NDDC fail to involve the critical stakeholders as contained in the guide-
lines?‖ Probable answers could be either a naïve or deliberate misinterpretation of the 
above instructions by the NDDC. The Commission naively could presume that the 
stakeholders workshops held across the region prior to the development of the Master 
Plan already fulfilled this condition. It is noteworthy that the Commission held seven 
briefings at state capital level, 27 needs assessment workshops in the senatorial dis-
tricts and participatory rural assessments involving 54 communities. Also, it held 10 
capacity-building workshops in major towns, including state capitals, and 27 integra-
tion workshops at senatorial district level. A final round of stakeholders‘ workshops 
was also held in each of the nine states to publicise and discuss the draft Master Plan 
before presenting it to the Federal Government committees (Niger Delta Development 
Commission, 2006, p. 118). 
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 The Commission, probably, concludes that this already fulfils the condition of 
community people‘s consultations. This was implied in the responses of most of the 
NDDC staff interviewed. However, the conclusion is, at best, naïve. This is because 
the quotation from page 241 of the Master Plan comes after the summary of activities 
that went into its draft on page 118. Hence, the instruction in the plan could only mean 
that stakeholders‘ consultations should be a continuous exercise (as explicitly stated 
by some of the quotes above) even during the implementation of the Master Plan. 
Hence, deliberate misinterpretation stands to reason better than naïve misinterpreta-
tion. Excluding community people from the NDDC intervention planning appears to 
be a deliberate attempt to support the non-transparent activities and corruption sur-
rounding the sharing of the NDDC resources. Findings reveal that the board and man-
agement have deliberately misinterpreted other important due process instructions in 
order to support their corrupt practices. According to Abubakar, the Orosanye Panel 
observed that pre-qualification process in the Commission did not follow the provision 
of Sections 16 (6-9) and 23 the Public Procurement Act (PPA), 2007 for projects 
within the N250 million approval threshold of the Commission. 
The testimony of the Head of Procurement indicated that that Commis-
sion's understanding of the Circular issued by the Secretary to the Gov-
ernment of the Federation on Approved Revised Threshold means that 
prequalification is not required for works below N300 million. This is 
clearly a misrepresentation of the intention of the Circular, which sim-
ply aims at reducing the time involved in the procurement process. 
(Abubakar, 2011) 
 The initial stakeholders‘ consultations prior to the Master Plan are inadequate 
for the C&P of the intervention. This is because, first, the Master Plan, being an ap-
proximation of the aggregate situation of the region, may not fully map and/or cater to 
realities in each community. Consequently, the realities of each community context —
conflict, need gap, and peacebuilding— may slightly vary from those captured in the 
Master Plan. Second, the Master Plan was published in 2006. Since then, a lot has 
changed in the Niger Delta and its communities. Hence, the reality on ground may not 
exactly match what was in the plan. The plan, at best, would then serve as a guide, for 
needs assessment done with active participation of the community people themselves. 
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the exclusion of community people from 
the C&P of the NDDC intervention is deliberate. This may be a consequence of the 
barefaced corruption.  
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5.1.2 Implications of the NDDC Approach to Conception and Planning 
Excluding beneficiary communities from actively participating in the conception and 
planning of interventions in their communities is as a result of a structural cause of 
conflict, which triggered non-transparent and shady activities of the influential indi-
viduals struggling for the NDDC resources. This has serious implications for the 
community and the NDDC at later stages of intervention programming. First, it leads 
to duplication of projects leading to unneeded projects in the community and ulti-
mately to wastage of resources. It also increases the likelihood that an intervention will 
impact negatively on the context and reduces the chances of positive impacts at the 
implementation stage. The immediate consequences of this at implementation stage are 
oppression and division of community people by the NDDC interventions (see section 
5.4.5 and 5.4.6).  
Furthermore, non-participatory planning denies NDDC the opportunity of 
maximising the potential benefits of its intervention in the community. A former sec-
ondary school teacher described a situation that showcases this. According to him, his 
former school now has three empty science laboratories each constructed by the state 
government, the Federal Government and the last by the NDDC. However, what the 
school needed after the first laboratory was constructed is laboratory equipment and a 
perimeter fence to keep people from encroaching on the school land and driving 
through the school premises during class sessions. Another consequence of inappropri-
ate consultation is wrong siting of project. For instance, without consulting the school 
community, an NDDC contractor after consulting the Traditional Council constructed 
a block of classrooms on a parcel of school land meant for school football pitch. Ac-
cording to a teacher, 
Had it been that the school community was consulted, we know what 
would happen…and then in now organizing the plans of the schools we 
were not informed. They decided to construct the classrooms in the up-
land areas where people can use for playground and leave the swamp as 
a football field. (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011). 
Community people‘s displeasure over the arrogance of the top-down approach 
of the NDDC is evident in their suggestions for improving the NDDC intervention in 
the community. Community participation was the most frequent suggestions that 
community people (virtually all interviewed) offered for improving the NDDC inter-
vention in the community. Other participants, except few NDDC staff, also agreed that 
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the Commission needed to do more community consultation to improve its interven-
tion in the communities. However, one NDDC staff argued that the politicians were 
already representatives of people‘s views. Community people however, expressed con-
trary opinion.  
Because if they know well that this project is for the masses, at least 
they would…they should inform all the sectors. They should call meet-
ings, and tell them all. Like..., for instance, you see, as you [researcher] 
come directly to this place, if NDDC person come and said madam you 
are the community leader, you are the chief of the women of this place, 
please so-so-so date we are coming for a meeting. Things that will 
benefit the women, for that day, you have to gather, not all women but 
you can gather all representatives of all women communities in Odi so 
that we can discuss issues that will benefit all you. So also they should 
go to the youths, they should go to the CDC, the chief —Ereamini-da-
arau (women chief) (Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011). 
 
Like what they should do, town hall meeting, you gather the commu-
nity say ‗We are NDDC people we are coming here for this and this is 
what we want. So what do you want in this community? Let the people 
decide. If it‘s a road let the people decide where the road should be. 
You got my… [ yes]So let the people decide.—Secondary school 
teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
 
Most times, by the time you go out to implement… and that‘s why we 
have conflict otherwise there shouldn‘t be conflict for the CRD to go 
and resolve. Because if a community is not aware of a project until a 
contractor arrives, they are bound to say ‗contractor come and give us 
marching ground‘ ok, so there is a gap between how it should be done 
and how it is being done presently.—NDDC Staff, Desk Officer in 
State Directorate (Fieldwork: Interview, 07/07/2011). 
 
 In concluding this subsection, evidence suggests that the Commission contra-
dicted the spirit and principles of the Master Plan in the C&P of its interventions in the 
period under study. The NDDC contradicted the six principles deemed most relevant 
to the C&P stage. Instead of promoting good governance and ensuring transparency in 
its activities, findings show that bad governance and corruption characterised the C&P 
of the interventions. Consequently, leading to the deliberate exclusion of the critical 
stakeholders, this again is contrary to the guiding principle of participatory planning. 
The involvement of Ward 12 (to which some NDDC personnel referred as community 
involvement) at this stage through lobbying for the community is at best a pitiable 
mockery of community participation. Finally, there is no special sensitivity to peace 
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and conflict issues in conception and planning. It was assumed that the interventions 
would ordinarily lead to peacebuilding and reduction of conflict in the beneficiary 
communities. This, however, as has been shown, contradicts scientific knowledge on 
intervention programming in conflict context.  
5.2 Implementing the NDDC Interventions 
This stage in intervention programming involves the process of realising objectives by 
enacting the activities designed in the C&P stage. It is the operationalisation of the 
proposal (Resource Pack, 2004). At the implementation stage, the critical stakeholders 
—the resident community people— become active players in the programming. This is 
one major distinguishing factor between the previous stage and this stage. The imple-
mentation of the NDDC interventions should be guided by the nine principles in the 
framework for the intervention strategy (see box 1 in section 4.1.2). However, there is 
need to recreate what happens at the implementation stage of the NDDC interventions 
before assessing their impacts. The implementation of the two categories of interven-
tions —the infrastructural development projects and the human development pro-
grammes— is characteristically different. Hence, there is need to discuss them sepa-
rately. This is done in the following subsections. 
5.2.1 Implementing the Infrastructural Development Programmes in Odi 
As noted earlier, the study investigated physical development projects in Odi. These 
included three road construction projects, construction of blocks of class-
rooms/laboratories, rural water and electrification. Generally, implementation of 
physical projects is done with minimal consultation with the community people. Usu-
ally, community people will know about the project at the point of execution when 
they see contractors moving their machines and materials to the community in a bid to 
commence work. Sometimes, few days to moving into the community, the NDDC of-
ficials come to introduce the contractor to the community leadership in an impromptu 
meeting with the Traditional Council. Many times, some members of the council are 
unable to attend such meetings. This institutionalises and sustains the malevolent char-
ity-beggar relationship (see section 5.2.3), which is rooted in the non-participatory ap-
proach to C&P. Community people generally reported the rudeness and overbearing-
ness of this approach. Thus, the approach and the negative feelings it engenders in the 
community smear the whole process of implementing physical projects and its impacts 
in the study area. The details are discussed subsequently.  
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The exclusion of resident community people from the C&P stage is an indirect 
but major structural cause of conflict at the implementation stage. This point is under-
scored in the implementation of a number of projects in the community. The first to be 
discussed is the pavement of the internal link roads in the community. As fallout of 
inadequate consultation with the community, the contractor who executed the concrete 
pavement of two kilometres of the internal link roads, unknowingly, decided to pave 
the awarded two kilometres in one part of Odi—Asanga. The project immediately trig-
gered a low-profile conflict between the Asanga (northern Odi) and the Tamanga 
(southern Odi). The Asanga-Tamanga dichotomy, a type of what Mary Anderson re-
ferred to as dividers, has been part of Odi community life from inception. This is a 
low-profile rivalry between the two spatial parts of the town, which is indiscernible by 
outsiders. Consequently, the project pitched the 14 Tamanga chiefs against the 13 
Asanga chiefs. However, it was eventually resolved, at the Traditional Council after 
series of meetings. The resolution was that few metres of the concrete road would be 
located in Tamanga. Even in Asanga, the siting of the roads triggered competition 
among the residents. Since Odi is usually waterlogged during rainy season, concrete 
pavement became a scarce resource which chiefs and other community people wanted 
to enjoy by having the roads close to their residences paved (Anderson M. B., 2004). 
According to community respondents,  
…A too will want the company to start from their link road, en, B too 
will want to start from their link road. ‗They should start from there 
first. No from here first.‘ So, youth can even go to the company and say 
‗No don‘t do this one, this one should be the last. Go to that major road 
first, that is our major road. Finish that road first.‘ Then some of the 
elders in the community will now dictate ‗No go and do this‘ and they 
(contractors) work with the (…) council of chiefs. 
 —Odi Youth Council Executive (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
 
It‘s not an open confrontation. But people begin to murmur. Something 
like, ‗Ok, is it because I don‘t belong to this group, because I don‘t be-
long to this party that is why the road was not cited in my area…‘ All 
those things that normally happen. ‗Ah-ah, ok, the link road was given 
to the king because he‘s a king. And then we also have other places that 
supposed to have it.‘  
—Secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011). 
The quotations above show how pavement or internal link roads became a 
scarce resource and a proximate cause of conflict, impacting on actors and changing 
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the profile and dynamics of the context. It resulted in suspicion, competition, conflict 
and eventually cooperation among the community groups (Bush K. , 1998). The Odi 
Traditional Council chiefs resolved the Asanga-Tamanga conflict peaceably. Investiga-
tion showed that the Tamanga had earlier enjoyed the construction of more concrete 
roads from the local government at the expense of the Asanga. However, they still con-
tested for the NDDC concrete roads because the roads were going to be wider and of 
better quality than the ones constructed by the local government. A Tamanga chief in 
the Traditional Council reported:  
…so that period we were getting these things, it was at the expense of 
the…north. So, most of us were not serious, because development can‘t 
be in only one side. When local government was constructing all these 
walkways for the southern part, the, the people from the north never 
grumbled. So now that it is their turn, though theirs are bigger and 
wider roads, wider and the work is of a better quality than the ones that 
the local government did. 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
Community people, perceiving the project as resources to meet the need for improved 
roads, mobilised to secure their share in it. First, they mobilised along the Asanga-
Tamanga line and, later, on Asanga side, individuals (chiefs, elders) and youth group 
mobilised to benefit one way or the other. The pull-and-push of siting of the projects, 
expectedly, impacted on the contractor too. The pressure of different individuals and 
groups competing for project location and the demand for better quality job by the 
youths are specific interactions of implementation with contractors —a group of ac-
tors.  
In consonance with Bush‘s argument, therefore, physical development projects 
introduced new dynamics in Odi. A case in point, a dramatic conflict ensued between 
the Youth Council, the contractor and the Traditional Council during the implementa-
tion of the link roads. After the contractor had supposedly completed its job, the Youth 
Council seized the contractor‘s equipment. The trigger of the conflict was, according 
to the youth president, the company‘s failure to pave up to the two kilometres of roads 
awarded to Odi and that the quality of the work was substandard. The youths therefore 
demanded to see the bill of quantity. It led to a major face-off between the Youth 
Council and the Traditional Council. Observing that the contractor enjoyed the support 
of the Traditional Council, the youths insinuated that the council must have been com-
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promised. It took NDDC officials, who brought the bill of quantity and the men of the 
State Security Service to resolve the issue in the Amananaowei‘s (King‘s) palace. Yet 
the youths believed that the bill of quantity (BOQ) tendered at the meeting was not 
genuine. In this conflict case, the implementation of the project triggered aggression 
from the youths. This is because the youths believed that the community had been rela-
tively deprived compared to Sabagreya, which had better road network and asphalt-
tarred roads (as against concrete in Odi) with drainage. Also, the youths were disap-
pointed because the road did not have drainage. The ensuing fracas engendered intense 
interactions among actors. Causes of the conflict included substandard work, seizure of 
equipment, demand for BOQ, and distrust. Actors were the Traditional Council, Youth 
Council, contractors, NDDC staff and officers of the State Security Service (now De-
partment of State Security).   
Similarly, the implementation of the Odi-Trofani Road construction triggered 
conflict between the women‘s group and the construction company, between the con-
struction company and the youths, and between Odi and Trofani. The conflict between 
women and the contractor —Elite Company— was the most dramatic. The proximate 
cause of conflict was the proposed blockage of a channel that women pass through to 
harvest seafood and firewood to supplement family income. The women‘s group felt 
neglected by the menfolk and the Traditional Council due to its nonchalance over the 
issue. Community women had to embark on non-violent action to make the company 
construct a bridge instead of blocking the channel. The situation temporarily split the 
community along female-male line. The proposed action of the company initially had 
negative impact on the community, however, women‘s choice of non-violent action led 
to positive outcome for the women and the entire community. Whether the construc-
tion had positive impact on the company (perhaps in lesson learnt in community rela-
tions) or negative impact (loss of time, materials and unbudgeted expenses) could not 
be ascertained as the company was not available for the study.  
Furthermore, employment opportunities created by road construction projects 
is another interesting area for mapping the interactions between implementation and 
context. Constructions require unskilled labourers. Conventionally, the company hires 
youths from the communities in its operational context. For instance, in the case of the 
Odi-Trofani Road construction, youths were hired in both Odi and Trofani when the 
road was within Odi and Trofani boundaries respectively. However, the construction 
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triggered a low profile boundary dispute between Odi and Trofani. According to a 
former member of the Traditional Council at the time of the incident, it was resolved 
peacefully between the two communities when the Amananaowei (king) of Odi sent 
some of his chiefs to the king of Trofani. In the same light, the construction of Ag-
beriye-Odonu to Sampou Road was also a proximate cause of conflict between Odi 
and Sampou. In the words of a current member of the Traditional Council when Sam-
pou people 
…saw that the road was getting to their place, they never wanted to in-
volve Odi in anything employment, in anything [emphasis] at all, com-
pensation, nothing! Odi has to go in, telling the company that ‗This 
road passes through our land so compensation for economic crops and 
any other valuable, we‘ll benefit. Employment, we supposed to…‘[So 
we wrote] those letters…The letters we write to the company has to be 
copied to the NDDC. Because NDDC gave the contract, it‘s an NDDC 
road. So the company will tell you, even employment, NDDC gives 
them the order before they will employ people from any community. —
Traditional Council Secretary (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
Selection of beneficiaries of employment from the construction work also 
caused tussles. One such was the conflict between contractors and the youths. Contrac-
tors have tendency to pay community youths lower than what is budgeted for and ob-
tainable in cities. This leads to conflict. However, contractors and the youths negotiate 
and reach mutually-beneficial agreement. There was a case when the contractor 
wanted to pay seven10,000 naira as monthly salary for unskilled workers from the 
community. The youths expected the 30,000 which they learnt was in the project pro-
posal and obtainable in cities. The two parties eventually agreed on 22,000 naira before 
the project was allowed to commence. Hiring of workers also triggers competition, 
conflict and cooperation among community actors. The temporary nature of construc-
tion work sometimes means that there may be more hands than the work available. 
This means a youth may not be able to work with the company throughout the duration 
of the work. The community has evolved an arrangement in which someone works for 
the company for some months and leaves to give room for others. When necessary, the 
community, Youth Council, or a family introduces this arrangement. Although de-
signed as conflict-management mechanism, the arrangement sometimes brings conflict 
of its own. There are situations when someone who has spent his agreed period on the 
job refuses to leave. This brings conflict. This usually happens at the family level.  
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Land issue is another critical issue that brings conflict during the implementa-
tion of the NDDC intervention programming. The NDDC expects beneficiary commu-
nities to donate land as their equity contribution to the intervention projects. However, 
Odi community does not have land of its own. According to a respondent, ‗‗…there is 
no land in Odi called community land.‘‘ So, donation of land is a big issue in the 
community whenever it is needed. A family that donates land expects to benefit from 
such project through direct employment or contract (e.g. supply of sand) of some sort. 
This situation also brings competition, conflict and cooperation for resources to the 
family level. At times, more than one family may have to donate land for a project 
with each expecting its members to have a share of the compensatory benefits. This 
may lead to competition and conflict between affected families. Families donating land 
may sometime expect permanent employment in certain situations. In cases where land 
is donated for government establishment like school, such family may expect a quota 
of the permanent appointments in the establishment. In situations where the Commis-
sion fails to meet family expectations, conflicts may ensue, sometimes leading to re-
claiming the donated land or parts of it, as was reportedly the case in the community 
junior secondary school land.    
In conclusion, there convincing empirical evidence that implementation of 
physical projects interacts with the actors, causes, profiles and dynamics of conflict in 
the context. The physical projects represent limited resources —jobs, paved roads, and 
opportunities for income through supply of construction materials. This triggered 
competition, contest and conflict among the community people and groups, the NDDC 
and contractors. By their very nature and programming, infrastructural interventions 
become both structural and proximate causes of conflict. The physical projects are 
mostly responsible for the malevolent charity-beggar relationship (discussed later in 
section 5.4.4) between the Commission and the community. Actors‘ behaviour, moti-
vated by likely deprivation, to appropriate these resources changes the profile and dy-
namics of conflict within the context. Critical issues in these interactions include the 
lack/manner of informing about, and involving the community in, projects; selection of 
beneficiaries, access to jobs, and acquisition of land. This engenders conflicts —intra- 
and inter-communal, intra-family, and gender conflict. However, the local capacities 
for peace in Odi comprising traditional and contemporary structures and processes me-
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diate the conflicts in a way that minimises their negative effect on the community and 
on the intervention.      
5.2.2 Implementing the Human Capacity Development Programmes in Odi 
The Human Capacity Development Programmes (HCDPs) are interventions aimed at 
building the capacity of community people in selected endeavours. The most remark-
able one in Odi is the training in modern agricultural practices, which started in 2006 
with trainings in aquaculture, mushroom farming, beekeeping, and rearing of grasscut-
ter (thryonomys swinderianus). Since the trainings go on simultaneously, participants 
usually choose one or two of the trainings to participate in. The training lasts for two to 
three days and is held at the Bioresources Development Centre in Odi for communities 
in Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA. Specific number of participants was normally allotted to 
each community. The last training (before this study) was in 2009. The presence of the 
Bioresources Development Centre (BIODEC) in Odi has made the community to en-
joy many of the NDDC agricultural trainings. The process of implementing the pro-
gramme in Odi involves contacting the king who in turn sends out the town crier to 
announce in the town. Interested community members, regardless of age, gender, level 
of education then apply. Findings show that many community people have gone for the 
training more than once. Some regard it as a pastime or an opportunity to collect the 
stipends attached to exercise; while few, who are already in similar business, go to en-
hance their knowledge, as described by community members:  
They just tell the people ‗Just come‘ and they go because they know that 
at the end of the day, at least they will give them entertainment and 
maybe peanut as workshop fee. So people just go just to re-familiarize 
themselves to…they will get 1,000 naira for the training or the 
food…People don‘t go there for interest, because there is no serious 
enlightenment program. And most of the programs are even crash pro-
gramme.  
—Secondary school teacher in Odi (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
 
…but some of them that went for the training, like maybe some, they 
went their just to get more knowledge about fish farming [ok]. In fact 
some of them already have fish ponds within the community. And those 
ones they are still going on with their business.  
—Odi Youth Council Executive (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
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The NDDC HCDPs in Odi has only two success stories (from 2006 to 2009) of 
trainees that started the business from the scratch. However, none of them had a thriv-
ing business at the time of this research. One case is that of a woman who was pro-
vided with fingerlings after the training in 2009. The woman used the soak-away in a 
rented apartment as a pond for catfish farming. However, her Africa International 
Television (AIT)-televised success story did not go beyond the first harvest as her 
landlord demanded to use the soak-away. According to her, the NDDC ‗‗really wanted 
to assist‘‘ her but she could not raise enough money to buy land in a close place for 
security of her pond. Findings show that this woman was successful for two reasons 
that might have been independent of the NDDC. One, she is a staff of the BIODEC, 
(the Federal Government establishment that was the NDDC consultant for the training) 
so she had first-hand knowledge of fish farming and support from her colleagues in the 
office. Two, she could afford to buy quality COPEN feed for her fish, which majority 
of participants could not. In her words,  
…the problem there is that, the way they assist us is not really enough, 
because they gave us only the fingerlings then the next thing is for us to 
feed them. Then the feeding aspect was too much that some of us can-
not be able to make it…if the NDDC people will not assist us, we can-
not make it. We cannot make it in the sense that buying of feeds, I‘ve 
said it before, it‘s not easy. You cannot give somebody, maybe hundred 
pieces of fingerlings or one thousand pieces of fingerlings then you said 
the person should go ahead and take care of them or feed them, the per-
son cannot. (Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011). 
 
The second success story was that of an elderly man, a retired military officer, 
who specialised in grasscutter rearing. He was the only success out of six people that 
specialised in grasscutter farming in the community. His farm operated for four years. 
He closed the business because of lack of farm hands. Availability of fund was also 
critical to his success story. According to an unsuccessful grasscutter farmer comment-
ing on the man,  
He is a patient man and he has some financial backing. So he was able 
to…If they say bring B-calcium and add to the food of this things. He 
was able to do it […] I killed my last ones when my father died and we 
had…this thing [burial]. So I said that just finish all of them let me use 
the house to do even if it is poultry. (Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011). 
 
There was a remarkable evidence of interactions between implementation of 
the HCDPs and the elements of the context. The most remarkable interactions were 
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consequent on the dissonance in the Commission‘s and the community‘s understand-
ing of empowerment. To the community people, empowerment means distributing 
start-up materials and fund for participants after training. While to the Commission, 
empowerment was essentially limited to capacity-building training in modern agricul-
tural practices.  
In few instances, start-up materials such as tanks and fingerlings were ran-
domly distributed to lucky participants in the 2009 training. Some of the trainees on 
fish farming were given fingerlings, some GP storage tanks, while others were not 
given any material assistance. Fingerlings were given to participants who claimed they 
had ponds while GP tanks were distributed to those who did not have, using ballot sys-
tem. This also, expectedly, created specific conflicts.  
The community people and the NDDC consultants clearly understood training 
and empowerment as two distinct events, while the NDDC regarded training as em-
powerment. The dissonance in perspectives was an underlying cause of conflict. It led 
to conflict between the trainees and the Commission over the non-payment/non-
distribution of empowerment money (either as grant or loan) and materials. The com-
munity people and NDDC consultants‘ statements below show their understanding and 
expectations of human empowerment:  
If NDDC really want to be involved, you don‘t give people basins to 
train fish. If you want a grass-cutter, that is an expensive venture. If you 
give the person 10 thousand, 50 thousand naira, cannot, how much is 
land because the person has to acquire land to construct a pen that eh, 
for grass-cutter, it‘s not easy. So you find out that most of them receive 
the training but there is no empowerment. So after receiving the train-
ing they have nothing. Because I know of some many people…I was 
even called whether I was interested. I said after training you will not 
empower me to go into that business, so there‘s no point.—Secondary 
school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
 
One of my colleagues, we call him Odoiga, the NDDC even sent them 
for training at this…Songhai, they went there did the training and eve-
rything. Till today they have not been empowered to do anything. And 
Adoke, if…had it been he‘s here, they have not been empowered to do 
anything. Even the owner of this shop, the husband also went for that 
training and came back, till today, there is no empowerment. So you 
have on record that you have trained people, sent them to Songhai on 
how to do plantain...but where is the empowerment…So, those train-
ings, you see, is normal something, but I think it is a waste of resources. 
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If you train only five people instead of 7500 and then come and say 
‗yes where is the land?‘ Acquire that land, and you say ‗ok you people 
have acquired land, unearth the ground and prepare the fish pond for 
them.  —Secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 
16/09/2011). 
 
If you may ask others too, they may add that their programmes are not 
too bad, but one, giving me the knowledge and telling me that after the 
knowledge you will give me a little empowerment for me to start-up 
and without that it stills boils down to…that NDDC is not doing fine, 
it‘s not doing fine, maybe, in the aspect of their programs. —
Programme beneficiary (male, university graduate) (Fieldwork: Inter-
view, 16/09/2011). 
Because if they (community people) are trained and empowered they 
will be able to get employment and when you gain employment you 
won‘t be bordered about going to create problem again [ok] or ferment 
trouble…Our own is just to train the people and if we are mandated we 
will get them empowered. You know that one of the major problems 
we have in this country is that when they give you physical cash, a lot 
of people divert it to other things. So we sold the idea of instead of giv-
ing them cash, they should cost the materials that they are supposed to 
be empowered with and just mandate us to empower them, giving them 
the raw material and the enabling environment… 
—Training Consultant for the NDDC Agricultural support programme 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
But to my own candid opinion, I don‘t think that they meet up that 
[empowerment], because eh most of the people they are not empow-
ered,…because there is no way you can train somebody and you leave 
the person for a number of years and you don‘t empower the person 
and you expect the person to just relax like that. And if a person re-
laxes, everything the person learnt will be forgotten. And clearly by the 
time you think of empowering them they must have forgotten and the 
issue will now be diversion of whatever thing that is being given to 
them…Most of those people that were trained even in 2006 have not 
been empowered up till this moment…Well, eh to the best of my 
knowledge, the conflict is most of them who have not been empowered 
are aggrieved. And eh, when they hear most of the project that are com-
ing up they are still biased whether they are going to be empowered or 
not, and you know that to make a lot of people to have a kind of luke-
warm attitude towards their [NDDC] programme… Because if you 
train a person and you send the person back home, the person will rise 
his hope. And after rising hope that he‘s going to start something, one 
week, two weeks the person have not started anything, the person will 
be frustrated and eh it‘s going to affect them, negatively.  
—Training Consultant for the NDDC Agricultural support programme 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 28/11/2011). 
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The conflict inherent in the dissonance has negative impact on the community-
NDDC relations. As far as the HCDPs are concerned, therefore, the dissonance is the 
major source of negative impact of the Commission‘s intervention at the implementa-
tion stage, impacting on the actors, causes, profile and dynamics of context. The im-
pact on community actors is noticed in the indifference to future NDDC HCDPs. This 
affected the implementation as the Commission increasingly had to cajole community 
people to participate in its trainings. However, the HCDPs also had positive impacts on 
the community. A major positive impact of the HCDPs on the community people is the 
acquisition of modern skills in agricultural practices in the areas in which they are 
trained. As noted in the words of the Odi Youth Council president above, the trainings 
served as capacity-building for farmers already involved in the areas in which trainings 
were offered. Also, beneficiaries reportedly acquired the knowledge of modern agri-
cultural practices through it. Many felt that, if given the necessary financial assistance 
at the time of the fieldwork, they would be able to successfully conduct the agricultural 
businesses in which they were trained.  
There are reported cases of competition and conflict amongst community peo-
ple for participation in the programmes at the early stage of the Commission. Then, 
competition for the NDDC agricultural trainings was high enough to lead to some con-
flicts. There were few accusations of partisan political interference in the selection of 
trainees. This was probably informed by community people‘s expectation of some fi-
nancial aid (alias empowerment) to follow the training and thus get their own share of 
the national cake. According to a respondent, ‗‗But most of them (community people) 
felt, form the cooperatives, bring money, share the money.‘‘ However, persistent fail-
ure of the NDDC to live up to its promises (or participants‘ expectations) of attractive 
stipends and empowerment has made people indifferent to the HCDPs . Subsequently, 
therefore, they had to be cajoled with promises of stipends to make them abandon their 
economic activities to participate in the trainings. High expectations and promise-and-
fail syndrome of NDDC HCDPs is a major contribution to the indifference of the 
community to the programmes. Generally speaking, HCDPs are trailed by some pa-
thetic stories as related by a respondent.  
One of my friends in that place (points towards a direction) too, young, 
very young boy of my age was also doing it. So he devoted all his time 
on that stuff (grass-cutter rearing) ‗Forget about this‘, people were tell-
ing him ‗Write JAMB and go to school o.‘ Because if he now write 
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JAMB and go to school, which means who will be there to be taking 
care of those his animals? So he was devoted on those eh business…but 
on the long run all of them died. So it‘s now that he‘s now going back 
to school. 
—Odi Youth Council President (Fieldwork: Interview, 28/11/2011). 
So, initially community actors invested their resources in participating in the 
HCDPs. However, they have almost nothing to show for it except the few GP tanks 
still found in Odi community. For instance, with the hope of getting grant or loan as 
start-up capitals after the trainings, programme participants contributed money to form 
cooperative society. Eventually, their expectations were not met. Consequently, the 
youths amongst the participants (from the whole of Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA and 
other LGAs) protested at the NDDC office in Bayelsa and later at the headquarters in 
Port Harcourt. They were arrested during their protest at the headquarters. Odi com-
munity had to contribute money to bail its youths. Moreover, the agricultural support 
trainings have no criteria, except interest, for participation. The implication of this is 
that any member of the community can participate. Certain members of the community 
were of the opinion that bringing the old, young, literate and illiterate together in train-
ing is indicates the Commission‘s lack of seriousness and, therefore, a disincentive for 
participation. According to a community member,  
You don‘t just gather the old, the young, everybody without looking 
at…just come and maybe bring one lecturer from UI or one lecturer from 
UNIPORT and then the man ended up talking and talking and talking and 
at the close of the day you give them paper. Some of them cannot even 
read anything…I know the fishing own, it was everybody. And even my 
mum was involved in it. (Participant and interviewer laughed) Come to 
think of it, so, it was not just a matter of educated…and that basin (GP 
tank) up till today is lying in front of my mum‘s house…There‘s no way 
she can use it to do anything.    
—Male secondary school teacher in Odi (Fieldwork: Interview, 
28/11/2011). 
Unlike the IDPs, the interactions of the HCDPs with the community context 
were relatively fewer and less intense. This is probably due to the fact that the HCDPs 
offer relatively fewer benefits, hence actors are less motivated to compete for their re-
sources. This suggests that the resource-value of intervention drives the nature, dynam-
ics and implications of the interactions and is proportional to the intensity of interac-
tions of interventions and its context. From the foregoing, the sincerity of the Commis-
sion for its HCDPs is questionable. If it has just one success story out of dozens trained 
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in fish farming in Odi community, one wonders why the Commission could not pro-
vide financial assistance to acquire or construct a pond when it could afford to televise 
the woman‘s case on AIT. This might suggest to the community that the Commission 
would rather invest in publicity or propaganda than committing to empowerment. 
5.2.3 Assessing the implementation of the NDDC interventions for consis-
tency with the guidelines of the Master Plan 
As noted earlier, the implementation of the NDDC interventions should be guided by 
the nine principles in the framework for the intervention strategy (see box 1 in section 
4.1.2). In other words, within the community context, the intervention must bring eco-
nomic prosperity, create and expand market, promote good governance, create ena-
bling conditions and continuity of the initiative (by increasing positive impacts and 
reducing waste), involve participatory decision-making (giving special attention to 
women and youths), sustainable, partnership with other agencies, transparent selection 
decision and public scrutiny of materials, and must be peace and conflict sensitive. The 
implementation of the interventions in Odi is now examined in the light of each of 
these principles to determine the extent to which the implementation is consistent with 
the Ccmmission‘s principles and policies in the Master Plan.  
The first critical question to ask is ‗‗do the NDDC interventions bring eco-
nomic prosperity to Odi or create and expand its market?‘‘ The answer to this is in the 
affirmative. Economic prosperity and opening of the local market were part of objec-
tives of the interventions that were realised. This has been realised more through the 
IDPs than the HCDPs. For instance, the NDDC inter-communal roads opened up Odi 
market to their neighbours. Moreover, the temporary jobs, supply of construction ma-
terials, increased sales by petty traders and food vendors during construction are other 
means of economic prosperity (though temporary) for the community . However, evi-
dence suggests significant room for improvements if the principle of good governance 
is promoted in the implementation.  
To promote good governance, the intervention process must be participatory, 
consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equi-
table and inclusive, and follow the rule of law. The implementation of the NDDC in-
terventions is participatory to the extent that it involves the community people not only 
as passive beneficiaries but also in making certain decisions regarding the interven-
tions. For instance, the community is informed and participation of its members is 
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sought through the Traditional Council. Also in selecting beneficiaries, Odi commu-
nity exercises reasonable amount of control. A case in point is the selection of youths 
to participate in the NDDC training on non-violent conflict transformation. Nomina-
tion of youths was done by the community at the level of compound (referred to as 
community in Odi for political reasons). Criteria for selecting nominees were drawn by 
Odi people. In addition, selection of youths to be employed for construction works was 
left to the discretion of the community, which as earlier discussed, had evolved infra-
structure for doing this in a non-violent manner.  
However, the NDDC does not directly involve women and youth when contact-
ing the community. These two critical community groups, nevertheless, manage to in-
fluence decisions about implementing through their agitations. Inasmuch as the NDDC 
did not directly factor in the different groups in the community, most especially the 
four cardinal groups —the Traditional Council, the Community Development Commit-
tee, the women‘s group, and the Odi Youth Council— the implementation of its inter-
ventions cannot be said to be consensus-oriented. However, as noted earlier, the 
women and youth groups manage to force or negotiate themselves into such decisions, 
especially when they believe that their interests are directly jeopardised by the imple-
mentation decisions. This, nevertheless, is not the same as officially recognising them 
and deliberately including them and other interest groups in decisions about imple-
menting the interventions in their community. Only this will satisfy the condition of 
consensus orientation.  
Accountability cannot be achieved without transparency and the rule of law. 
So, these three are discussed pari passu. In the context of this discourse, rule of law 
includes protection of human rights (especially those of the minorities), impartial law 
enforcement through impartial and incorruptible police. Transparency requires that de-
cisions and their implementation are done in a manner that follows established rules. It 
also involves making information freely available and directly accessible to stake-
holders, especially, the community people who will be directly affected by such deci-
sions. And finally, it involves providing enough information in easily-understandable 
forms and media. Within this context, the NDDC should be accountable to its stake-
holders, most especially the community people, in implementing its interventions. In 
selecting beneficiaries for its HCDPs, the NDDC communicates the information 
through the media and Traditional Council. It also introduces the contractors to the 
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community in implementing its IDPs. Nonetheless, strategic document and informa-
tion about its IDPs, such as the bill of quantity is not provided to the community. This 
also contradicts the eighth guiding principle on transparent selection decision and pub-
lic scrutiny of materials. Some community people insinuated that the Commission 
sometimes uses force or threat of the use of force in securing compliance or suppress-
ing agitations. For instance, they reported that the threat of calling FANTANGBE was 
not uncommon to suppress people‘s agitations. In the case of the youth agitation 
against substandard road pavement, however, the youth president claimed that the 
leader of the State Security Service invited was fair to him. He even supported him. As 
far as selection of participants is concerned, the HCDPs are generally transparent. This 
is probably because stakeholders derive meagre benefits from it and, indeed, the 
NDDC have to cajole people‘s participation many times. However, on matters such as 
stipends, grants or loans, the Commission was reported to sometimes misinform the 
trainees to secure their participation. This, as earlier discussed, led to conflict and vio-
lence by the trainees. 
Effectiveness and efficiency in this context means the NDDC and its interven-
tions produce results that meet the needs of the beneficiary community while making 
the best use of available resources. The community people reported that some of the 
Commission‘s interventions, particularly, the road construction, on-going rural electri-
fication, and the blocks of classrooms for the community school met the needs of the 
community. However, they also reported that the borehole project was not sustainable 
because of substandard materials used and because of lack of community ownership. 
Also, the construction of science laboratory was wasteful as it was a replication of 
what the state and the Federal Government had provided. The resources that went into 
the construction of the laboratory could have been more judiciously used if invested in 
perimeter fence or provision of laboratory equipment for the school. Generally, there is 
evidence that although the Commission‘s interventions met the needs of the people, it 
does not make the best use of the resources at its disposal. Most glaring proof is the 
report of the Orosanye Panel referred to earlier. Two main factors militating against 
effectiveness and efficiency of the NDDC interventions are corruption and the top-
down approach to C&P of its intervention.  
Equity and inclusiveness in this context requires that all beneficiary community 
members feel that they have a stake in the NDDC interventions and do not feel ex-
 194 
 
cluded from the mainstream activities. It entails that all groups, particularly the most 
vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being through the 
Commission‘s interventions. However, the top-down non-participatory approach to 
C&P excludes the resident community people. They nonetheless participate at the level 
of implementation of the project as shown earlier. Responsiveness in good governance 
requires that the NDDC and its interventions serve all stakeholders within a reasonable 
time frame. There have instances where the Commission responded speedily to certain 
situations, especially when it involves agitations. A case in point is when the NDDC 
provided flying boats to some individuals in Odi after the youths protested by blocking 
the Odi-Trofane Road when the NDDC board chairman was passing. However, gener-
ally speaking the Commission is responsive to a certain degree.  
In conclusion, the implementation stage, where the NDDC execute activities 
enacted at the previous conception and planning stage, is strongly influenced by deci-
sions and processes at the previous stage. Also, certain variables such as NDDC organ-
isational culture and structure and the NDR socio-political environment of the opera-
tional context exert influences on the implementation. Resident community people are 
most active at this stage of the NDDC intervention. To a certain extent, they are in-
volved in selection of beneficiaries and, sometimes, influence project siting as well as 
benefit directly from the intervention. The power play at this stage is less intense than 
at the C&P stage and involves less influential power brokers at the community level. 
The activities of community people at this level involve competition, conflict and co-
operation over the distribution of the resources of intervention within their space. 
These were driven by the lure of the resource-status of intervention and the phenome-
non of likely deprivation. This situation creates disequilibrium in the power relations 
between the NDDC and Odi, creating phenomena such as malevolent charity-beggar, 
oppressiveness of intervention and divisiveness of intervention at the implementation 
stage. These phenomena, which essentially played out at the implementation stage, are 
inadvertently and inevitably programmed into the NDDC interventions at the C&P 
stage. Fortunately, the negative impacts, particularly on conflict, are mediated by the 
local capacity for peacebuilding available in the community.  
5.3 Monitoring and Evaluating the NDDC Interventions 
Findings show that the monitoring and evaluation of intervention is done by the 
NDDC consultants, and not the Commission itself. Even this does not involve the 
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community members at all. According to the NDDC officials, the Commission is not 
directly involved in monitoring and evaluation of its intervention because it is under-
staffed, given the number of interventions it is handling. What the Commission does 
instead is to evaluate the evaluation report of its consultants.  
What we do for most of these projects, we have external consultants… 
ok who‘ll do the supervision, the monitoring externally, and evaluation, 
ok. What we do is to evaluate their own evaluation [both interviewee 
and interviewer laugh]  
—An NDDC Top-ranking officer, CID (Fieldwork: Interview, 
06/07/2011). 
However, as far as community people are concerned, the NDDC in all practical 
terms, does not monitor or evaluate it interventions. The community people were asked 
whether the Commission comes for monitoring, and evaluation a respondent said: 
No, no, no, no. Because they also know that they‘ve not done well now. 
Because when you have not em, not completed your part of the assign-
ment now, how will you come back and then…Until they finish their 
training, if you have completed your part, that is when you can now 
come back and say we did this for you, what are you doing about it? 
What and what? 
—A secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 
17/09/2011). 
 
The evaluation too, the community is not involved. They bring in their 
engineers to come and see the job whether the job is to specification. 
They only come to the community, if the community need to hear from 
them. They will just come to his highness‘ palace and say the job is eh to 
specification. So there are no monitoring eh committees within the, the 
community to monitor the project. 
.—An executive of the Odi Youth Council (Fieldwork: Interview, 
16/09/2011).  
However, in few occasions, the NDDC state directorate staff came to see what their 
contractor was doing. At such times, comments of community members as to the stan-
dard of the project are usually not taken into consideration. As reported by a respon-
dent, 
Even if they come, to my own observation hmm, even if you make any 
comment as per their projects here that the company is not doing well. 
Those who are coming to supervise, hmmm, they are people who have 
that common understanding with the company on ground, hmmm. 
Maybe they must have compromised, en, in some way with the com-
pany and so even if they come they will not query the company on what 
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they are doing. That ‗what you have put on ground is not what we gave 
to you.‘ They will not question, will just come. NDDC is coming to su-
pervise their work, they will just come and then…Or maybe after com-
ing the company manager will just give them some package and then 
they will not say anything, they will just go. 
 —A secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011). 
The monitoring and evaluation stage has significantly less resources to offer 
any of the actors previously identified. Also, the resident community people (RCP) are 
excluded from this stage. For these two reasons, the interactions between intervention 
and context are at the barest minimum at this stage. Excluding community members 
foments suspicion of bribery and corruption between the contractor and the NDDC 
staff in the monitoring and evaluation exercise. There are claims of some low key set-
tlement between contractors and the NDDC officers (in the state directorate) responsi-
ble for monitoring and evaluation. This cast doubt on the sincerity of the Commission 
and further compounds the overall apathy of the community to the NDDC interven-
tions. 
5.4 Impacts of the NDDC Interventions 
The central notion of this study is that the interactions of interventions and context are 
never neutral. In their interactions, intervention impacts on the context and the context 
impacts on the intervention. These impacts could be unintended or intended and could 
be either negative or positive. This study measures impacts as either negative or posi-
tive rather than as peace impacts or conflict impacts. The rationale for this has been 
argued earlier (see section 2.4). The impacts of the interventions are discussed sepa-
rately for each of the two intervention strategies —the infrastructural development 
programmes and the human capacity development programmes.  
5.4.1 Positive Impacts of the NDDC Interventions 
Positive impacts are impacts that support the dynamics and structures of peace and 
weaken the dynamics and structures of violent conflict. The most significant positive 
impact of the Infrastructural Development Projects (IDPs) is the general feeling that, 
finally, the region in general and Odi in particular, is receiving the attention of the 
Federal Government, especially in the area of infrastructural development. This is sig-
nificant because of the historic neglect by the Federal Government suffered by the re-
gion, leading to the pervasive feeling of marginalisation, which constituted a major 
cause of the Niger Delta conflict. Hence, in spite of the shortcomings of the IDPs 
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(which were also identified by the community people and other respondents), virtually 
all the community people interviewed and most of other respondents agreed that the 
infrastructural development projects have impacted the community and the region 
positively with regards to removing the perception and realities of marginalisation. As 
a respondent puts it, ‗‗…you see, as a matter of fact, I can say that we were living in 
the dark ages before this time, to be honest with you.‘‘ 
Infrastructural development projects in the community included paving of two-
kilometre internal link roads, 16-kilometre Odi-Trofani Road, Agbariye-Odonu to 
Sampo Road, water project, two six-classroom blocks, two three-room science labora-
tories, staff quarters for government school, completion of guest house, and electrifica-
tion (ongoing at the time of the fieldwork). Each of these has had some positive im-
pacts on the community. Positive impacts of the pavement of the internal link roads 
include making intra-community transportation easier and safer, especially during 
rainy season. Before paving the link roads, walking after rainfall was difficult for pe-
destrians because the roads were waterlogged. Also, vehicles sometimes splash dirty 
water in potholes on pedestrians, leading to skirmishes. Also, motorcycles sometimes 
skid because of the sandy road. A member of the Youth Council reported:  
‗… like the roads they have impacted positively on us. Because for 
some years back, you dress well and then move out…your shoes will 
be passing waters and potopotos [mud]…It wasn‘t easy. But when they 
were able to construct the road…you will walk on the good 
ground…bike use to fall because we put sand on the road…Those 
things are not common again, bikes can now move freely. So it has im-
pacted positively on…everybody.‘  
(Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
Moreover, the link roads have beautified the town. In addition, the pavement of 
the link roads spread physical development to the Asanga (northern) part of the com-
munity. This is like a compensation for Asanga, earlier excluded from the local gov-
ernment road pavement project which was concentrated in the Tamanga (southern) part 
of the community. This realisation was a significant rationale for resolving the conflict 
triggered by the pavement of the internal link roads. Finally, the pavement of internal 
link roads yields economic benefits to the community. These include provision of em-
ployment for the youths (as semi-skilled labourers in the construction), income for 
suppliers of construction materials such as sand and gravel by the community people 
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and increased sales for food vendors and restaurant owners. These economic benefits 
have direct positive effect on conflict by reducing poverty, which is one of the root 
causes of conflict in the region. Inter-community road construction projects have some 
positive impacts as well. Generally, such projects bring economic benefits in form of 
creation of temporary jobs for youths (usually males), markets for suppliers of con-
struction materials such as gravel, sand, and planks for construction (since such mate-
rials must be acquired in the local environment), and increased sales for food vendors. 
Moreover, the Odi-Trofane Road opened up the Odi market to outsiders. As reported 
by a participant, a politician 
‗‗…NDDC now give us another road to Trofane, which has opened up 
our market. Because they are very good in gaari production and so 
forth, now the economic benefits are so…‘‘ (Fieldwork: Interview, 
14/09/2011). 
In addition to its economic benefits, inter-community road has reduced the dependency 
on water transportation, saving precious time. As reported by a community participant 
and beneficiary of the NDDC agricultural programme,  
‗You see, before this time, if I want to travel to Sabagreya, just a 
stone‘s throw here. I have to wait for flying boat for up to two hours. 
Except the boat is full you cannot move. But NDDC now made the road 
to Sabagreya, to even, eh, Opokuma, Egbedi.‘ (Fieldwork: Interview, 
14/09/2011). 
In replacing the community secondary school converted to Federal Government col-
lege, the NDDC prevented the sense of loss and deprivation that was consequent on 
such development. Generally speaking, the physical construction projects, health ser-
vices and occasional aid by the NDDC reinforce the presence of the Federal Govern-
ment in the community, further confirming that benefits from the central government is 
finally trickling down to the community. Therefore, it reduced the feeling of neglect 
and marginalisation. This include construction projects discussed above, the rural elec-
trification project the free medical campaign for the senatorial district, which is usually 
done at the General Hospital, Odi, and the NDDC diesel provided for generator during 
the Odiogorugbaogbe festival. As captured in the words of a religious leader in the 
community: 
Now, everyone now, they see that light is coming and the youths, they 
are happy, they are waiting for the time when the light will fully be op-
eration, you understand, so,…it‘s…the NDDC contribution is some-
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thing that has to do with making the local people feel that they are part 
and parcel of the country, number one. Number two, it gives them 
sense of belonging. Because those things they are hearing that is hap-
pening in urban area is like they are seeing, they are trying to see them, 
small, so they are...they see that ah, with this one now something may 
happen. So they now feel eh, concern or feel belong, you understand 
that.  (Fieldwork: Interview, 18/09/2011). 
 Another positive, though unintended, impact of the projects is the indirect way 
it builds the conflict transformation capacities of the community due to the commu-
nity‘s engagement in managing communal conflicts arising from the interventions. 
Conflicts that emanated from the intense interactions among community groups and 
individuals are mediated by the local capacity for peace existing in traditional and con-
temporary institutions alongside structures for conflict management. The frequency of 
intervention-triggered conflicts necessitates the frequent engagement of these groups 
and thus builds their capacities for mediating in the conflicts. A noteworthy instance is 
the opportunity to showcase community women‘s group‘s capacity for non-violent 
conflict transformation. Non-violent direct action increases the cohesiveness of such 
group and makes the members conscious of their potential influence.  
 The human capacity development programmes also contribute positively to the 
community. Through the agricultural support trainings, community people have ac-
quired the knowledge and skills in modern agricultural practices. Capacity acquired 
has been deployed in personal agricultural practices and agro-businesses like 
FADAMA. This, to an extent, addresses the issue of occupational disorientation, 
which was identified as one of the root causes of conflict in the region. Many of the 
beneficiaries believe that if given necessary material and financial support, they are 
still able to practice, successfully, what they have learnt. According to a community 
member,   
…even their programs, as you get that knowledge, I think you will now 
improve on it…Like those who were trained to…en rear en grass-cutter 
and all those stuff, even if the thing stopped halfway, because of the 
knowledge they have gained from NDDC, even if you now give them an-
other opportunity they can now excel again. Like people for fish farming, 
those people too, I think they have gained more knowledge and they are 
using it. (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011) 
Moreover, the trainings provided platform for various categories of community 
people —old, young, female, male, educated, and illiterate— to come together in a fo-
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rum. This serves as an opportunity to mingle and strengthen social relations. Also, it 
provided a break from the monotony of their daily lives. In addition, stipends paid at 
the end of the training serve as economic benefit for some of the participants. The dis-
tribution of fishing nets and flying boats doused the tension that rose between Odi and 
Trofani communities when Odi youths complained that since the assumption of office 
of the NDDC‘s board chairman by the Trofani-born Larry Koiyan, Odi had not en-
joyed NDDC intervention. These conflict-resolution initiatives yielded immediate 
positive results by dissipating the negative feelings of rivalry, subjugation, and sys-
tematic neglect that was building up in Odi. Training youths on non-violence is a di-
rect peacebuilding initiative. It builds the capacity of the youths for nonviolent conflict 
transformation.  
In conclusion, the NDDC interventions have a number of intended and unintended 
of positive impacts on the study area. Some of the impacts address the causes —
structural, proximate and triggers of conflict. The most significant positive impact 
identified is making people feel the presence of the Federal Government in the com-
munity (addressing feelings of neglect and marginalisation). Others include spreading 
physical development to the community and infrastructural development to the erst-
while disadvantaged part of the community, better intra-community transportation, 
improving the community physical aesthetics, economic benefits (addressing unem-
ployment, poverty), human capacity building in modern agricultural practices (address-
ing occupational disorientation and low human capacity), self-awareness of commu-
nity groups‘ influence, community groups internal cohesion, creating a new platform 
for social interactions among community people, opening up of community market and 
improving trade among the communities. Also, the need to mediate in frequent inter-
vention-triggered conflicts provided an opportunity for the community‘s conflict trans-
formation capacity to be built.  
5.4.2 Negative Impacts of the NDDC Interventions 
The root and supportive framework of the negative impacts of the NDDC interventions 
are the endemic corruption and widespread bad governance characteristic of the Nige-
rian society. Thus, the negative impacts are inadvertently and inevitably created 
throughout the stages of the programming. This starts right from the C&P stage when 
the critical stakeholders are excluded from the conception and planning of interven-
tions. Having thus been provided the necessary conditions at this stage, the spirals of 
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negative impacts inevitably become persistent feature of subsequent stages of the in-
tervention programming, culminating in negative impacts. The most significant of the 
negative impacts of the interventions are described by such phenomena as the promo-
tion of corporate bad governance and entrenchment of corruption, malevolent charity-
beggar relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, disempowerment of the commu-
nity people, and divisiveness of intervention discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
Other negative impacts include intra- and inter-communal conflicts, unneeded initia-
tives and waste, informing and compounding indifference to the NDDC, poor quality 
physical infrastructure, weakening of the peacebuilding capacity of the community, 
entrenching gender inequality (see section 5.7), disappointments and frustrations, and 
dissent. These are discussed subsequently.  
The black hole of interactions of influential players at the C&P stage institu-
tionalises and entrenches corruption in the Commission. A similar phenomenon is 
transferred to less influential actors within the Commission and the beneficiaries com-
pelled by the resource-status of intervention struggle to appropriate available resources 
at subsequent stages of the intervention. This mainstreams corruption into the interven-
tion and eventually leads to substandard service delivery. As a community youth, a 
Political Science graduate of Niger Delta University, commented,    
…when company A…take the contract to himself and then sublet it to 
another, maybe…if the contract is two billion…and then you just take 
one billion and then you too you now give it as sub-contract to another 
person. This one too will now take its own and give it to another per-
son. So what do you expect this last man to do with the, 
300…(Chuckles). What was the contract sum—2 billion. Other persons 
have taken theirs and they are not even coming down. They have col-
lected theirs at the top. And what is coming to you is 300 million, what 
are you going to do? You too will want to have your own gain here, at 
least maybe 100 million or 50 million gain. So the other 250 million, 
which means you too you want to do a job that can, that this money can 
cover. So the quality they are talking about that they have written to 
Abuja is not obtainable at the grassroots. (Fieldwork: Interview, 
17/09/2011). 
The exclusion of the critical stakeholders from the C&P stage paves way for 
the unequal power relations between the Commission and the communities. This leads 
to the malevolent charity-beggar relationship between them and the phenomena of op-
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pressiveness and divisiveness of intervention. Moreover, by excluding the community 
people from C&P, the Commission‘s interventions sometime are at variance with the 
felt need of the beneficiary community. Hence, implemented projects sometimes do 
not address the need of the community. It also leads to lack of community ownership 
of the interventions. Hence, some projects, like the water project, fall into disrepair. 
Such edifices regularly remind the community people of resource mismanagement and 
wastage in the Commission. This has implications on the community psyche as it 
gives the people the impression that the NDDC is heading towards failure like its 
predecessors and that the community will slip back into the old situation of neglect 
and marginalisation. The most recurrent advice offered by all community participants, 
experts, and some NDDC personnel is that the NDDC needs to bring the community 
into the C&P stage as recommended by the Master Plan.  
As a consequence of excluding the RCP, most interventions lead to conflict 
among the community people as earlier discussed. The conflicts range from low pro-
file to open conflict and occur at the levels of individuals, families, groups as well as 
between the community and neighbouring communities. This is part of the divisive-
ness of the NDDC intervention. However, in Odi community, the painful memory of 
the 1999 massacre and the local capacity for peace in the community prevent such 
conflicts from degenerating into violent conflict. Moreover, the interventions impact 
negatively on the community through oppression. Excluding resident community peo-
ple, that is, the critical stakeholders, from having a say in crafting the solutions to their 
community problems sends a negative signal —powerlessness. Hence, it is a form of 
disempowerment. Since they have to accept whatever is given to them. This is further 
emphasised through the Commission‘s threat to blacklist a community as trouble-
maker if their problem is too much‘. This reinforces the charity-beggar relationship, a 
situation of acute power disequilibrium between the Commission and the community, 
in which the community power is regularly depleted in favour of the Commission with 
regard to the intervention.  
As regards the HCDPs, the most significant negative impact is the pervasive 
feelings of disappointment and apathy towards the programmes. Having perpetually 
failed to live up to its promises in the HCDPs, the community people have come to 
perceive the programmes as hopelessly moribund. A central issue is empowerment, 
that is, material and financial support for trainees after training. The issue of empow-
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erment sometimes leads to violent demonstrations, culminating in the arrest of some 
demonstrators. Disappointment on stipends is also a cause of conflict between the 
NDDC and the community people. Consequently, the HCDPs have become very un-
popular amongst the community people. Its negative impacts have smeared positive 
impacts of the Commission‘s interventions. In fact, most of the participants have to be 
prodded before they remember the HCDPs as NDDC intervention, and after the prod-
ding, they are not so enthusiastic to discuss the issue.   
Table 5.1. Positive and Negative Impacts of the NDDC’s Interventions  
S/N Positive Impacts Negative Impacts 
1 Brought the presence of the Federal 
Government into the community (ad-
dressing feelings of neglect and mar-
ginalisation). 
Black hole of interactions.  
2 Spread physical development to the 
community and infrastructural devel-
opment to the erstwhile disadvantaged 
part of the community. 
Oppressiveness of intervention. 
3 Improved intra-community transporta-
tion. 
Divisiveness of intervention. 
4 Improved the community physical aes-
thetics. 
Entrenched acute power disequilib-
rium between the NDDC and the 
community, leading to charity-beggar 
relationship. 
5 Economic benefits (addressing unem-
ployment, poverty). 
Disempowerment of the community 
people. 
6 Human capacity building in modern 
agricultural practices (addressed occu-
pational disorientation and low human 
capacity). 
Intra-communal conflicts at the levels 
of individuals, family, and commu-
nity groups (e.g. Youth Council ver-
sus Traditional Council; Tamanga-
Asanga conflict). 
7 Self-awareness of community group‘s 
influence. 
Inter-communal conflict (e.g. Odi-
Sampo conflict; Odi-Trofane con-
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S/N Positive Impacts Negative Impacts 
flict). 
8 Community groups internal cohesion. Community-contractor conflict (e.g. 
Odi Women versus Elite Company). 
9 Trainings provided a diversion from 
the monotony of everyday activities. 
Disownment of unneeded initiatives, 
leading to disrepair and waste of pro-
ject, ultimately informing and feeding 
apathy for the NDDC. 
10 Created a new platform for social in-
teractions among community people. 
poor quality physical infrastructure. 
11 Opened up community market and 
improved trade among the communi-
ties. 
Weakened the peacebuilding capacity 
of the community. 
12 The need to mediate in the frequent 
conflict created provided opportunity 
for building the community‘s conflict 
transformation capacity. 
Entrenched gender imbalance (e.g. 
giving more benefits to male; some 
programmes designed for women en-
trench their traditional roles as 
homemakers).  
13 Distribution of flying boats resolved 
an immediate conflict by dissipating 
the negative feelings of rivalry, subju-
gation, and systematic neglect that was 
building up in Odi. 
Feelings of disappointments and frus-
trations, dissent. 
14 Training youths on non-violence built 
the capacity of the youths for non-
violent conflict transformation and 
peace. 
Entrenched corruption through lack 
of transparency and accountability. 
 
Source: Author‘s Assessment, 2013 
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5.5 Gendered Impacts of the NDDC Interventions 
In order to determine the extent to which the NDDC interventions were engen-
dered, the study first evaluated the extent to which gender is mainstreamed in the 
NDDC institutional context. It determined whether the NDDC has a gender policy. 
Adoption of a gender policy is one of the first steps in mainstreaming gender in an or-
ganisation. This is because adopting a gender policy is a conscious effort to have gen-
der mainstreamed in an organisation‘s structure and culture. Moreover, an intervention 
agency with a gender policy is more likely to have a gender mainstreamed in its inter-
vention. To assess the level and implications of gender mainstreaming of the NDDC 
interventions, the study participants were asked questions relating to gender-sensitivity 
of the intervention. The questions included gender disaggregated community mem-
bers‘ participation as planners, beneficiaries and evaluators; gender disaggregated 
analysis of consultants/trainers in the NDDC intervention; and on gender policy of the 
NDDC and its intervention programming. These were the main basis for the analysis 
of gender-sensitivity of the Commission‘s interventions. Secondary documents includ-
ing the Master Plan and brochure containing the list of beneficiaries of the NDDC 
skill-acquisition programmes were also consulted.  
Empirical evidence shows that the Commission does not have a gender policy 
as an organisation or, if it does, the policy is not well-known outside the Commission‘s 
board membership, which is highly unlikely. A participant —a high ranking NDDC 
official— noted:  
…my sincere answer to that question is that I have not seen…NDDC 
policy, ok…I wouldn‘t say it doesn‘t…, such a policy concerning gen-
der equity, eh, whatever, doesn‘t exist, I‘ve not seen any, ok. It could 
be there and I, I guess that, you know, if you have the opportunity of 
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talking with a board member or a management staff they‘ll be able to 
answer that question better, authoritatively as well.  (Fieldwork: 
Interview, 08/07/2011). 
Nevertheless, one cannot say that the Commission discriminates against women in job 
opportunities. A male respondent, an assistant director in a directorate, authoritatively 
claims ―Oh, sure, sure we have more women than men in this directorate, but it may 
not have been deliberate. Sometimes you look for the very best.‖ Another NDDC Staff 
in a State directorate claims  
―We don‘t look at gender in being assigned to do work. But as you can 
see, we have many women in the directorate. But to say this is number 
of women must go to the field or do this or that, we don‘t.‖  
(Fieldwork: Interview, 08/07/2011). 
Participant observation by the researcher confirms that, in number, women are not dis-
criminated against. In fact, at the time of fieldwork, the Community and Rural Devel-
opment and the Agriculture and Fisheries Directorates were headed by women. How-
ever, only four of the 23-member management board are women. 
Similarly, empirical evidence reveals that the Commission does not have a 
gender policy for its intervention programming. The NDDC Strategic Policies for 
Change is documented in page 22 to 46 of the Master Plan. The plan has 86 policies 
covering five thematic areas of economic development, human and community needs, 
the natural environment, physical infrastructure, and human and institutional resources. 
None of the policies was solely on gender. Although gender issues were mentioned in 
Section A in Goals on Education (pp. 34-35) under Policy for Human and Community 
Needs. One would have expected women and girls to be listed amongst vulnerable 
groups that deserve special attention in Social Welfare and Community Goals. The 
need to build the capacity of women in conflict resolution is also mentioned in Policy 
HR 14 —Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution. Section five of Policy G1 —
Strategic Planning Principles— reads: 
A sound planning process has to be based on participatory decision 
making. This entails meaningful involvement of the ‗Active‘ and ‗Pas-
sive‘ stakeholders—public sector, private sector, community and 
NGOs—and ensuring that their respective needs and constraints are 
taken into consideration when policies and proposals are formulated, 
including attention to issues such as gender and youth. 
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In spite of the above quote, none of the study participants knows of any NDDC 
gender policy on its intervention programming or of any deliberate attempt by the 
Commission to ensure gender equity in its intervention programming. In other words, 
there appears to be no framework to ensure that women and girls, men and boys have 
equal access in the conception and planning, implementation, monitoring and evalua-
tion of the NDDC interventions. As earlier discussed, the Commission only involves 
members of the intended beneficiary community in the implementation of its interven-
tions. The current Ereamini da-arau —the women leader/chief— a primary school 
head teacher, who had held this position for over a decade at the time of the fieldwork) 
claims she had never participated in such meetings. Moreover, unlike some NGOs 
working in Odi, the NDDC had never directly sought the participation of women group 
in its activities through their leader. She explained the situation as fallout of the patri-
archal nature of the traditional African society.  
I was not informed….I only heard of it. I only heard of their meet-
ing…I wasn‘t informed at all…You know, in everything there is mo-
nopoly now. In our African society, even this eh…especially Ijaw cul-
ture everybody want to bring women down. Everybody wants to put 
women down. They feel if women come out they will usurp our power. 
I think that‘s my belief. So most of the things they refuse to involve 
women, unless women will react on it. 
    (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
 
So-to-say, I am part of it [the Traditional Council]. So they say I am 
part of it, but when you are not called upon, you will…you will not 
even know what they are doing. Because you won‘t know when pro-
grammes are going to…[trails off] and women we are not involved, so 
you have to wait and look what they are going to do. (Fieldwork: 
Interview, 16/09/2011). 
 
A male respondent and member of the Traditional Council, corrobo-
rated her,  
You know, I will say African System. The Africans, we look down at 
women. We feel women can‘t do anything, they are housewives. They 
remain in the house and then bring up children. That is, that is the way 
[…] we see our fathers manage their households.   (Fieldwork: Inter-
view, 17/09/2011). 
Since gender is not mainstreamed in the NDDC interventions, the NDDC poli-
cies and interventions are gender-neutral or gender-blind. That is, the Commission im-
plicitly assumes that its policies and interventions affect everyone the same way re-
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gardless of gender. Using the Gender Based Analysis of Intervention (GBAI) Frame-
work presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2), results show that the Commission does not 
make any deliberate effort to ensure that women and girls are especially encouraged to 
participate in the programme. This is the case throughout the stages of intervention 
programming as confirmed by the submissions of community people: 
I‘ve not heard any of their programs specify, given number of 
women.[…] Because most of these their programs they only come to 
the Bioresource and they will organise it and go. Because they don‘t 
come to the community, enlighten the council, [or] sensitise the people 
ever before they start. They just say they have so-so-so program, they 
can write to the community or they announce over the radio. Every 
community just pick; politicians will pick their people, there is so-so-so 
program the NDDC is trying to organise in Bioresource, Odi. I have in-
cluded your name o, you go, like that. They just come and go. And 
those people picking too, unless […] maybe their girlfriends or their 
own sisters, if not…it is the male, because we the male take care of the 
women.—a male beneficiary (over 70years) of the Agricultural training 
programme (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011). 
…when they tell the town crier to announce, they didn‘t say anything 
about only female or male. But they talk about the both people. The 
both, not only one group of people, or not only youth, or not only 
women, or the men or something like, no. Everybody should be there, 
so that they will benefit. 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011, a female programme beneficiary). 
It is open for everybody, of which, maybe, they said they want to train 
hundred so they will put it in quota form. And the quota, anybody can 
come to represent their community. (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011, 
a male programme beneficiary). 
In fact, not giving women special encouragement to participate generally low-
ers women‘s participation in the NDDC intervention. Casual observation in the com-
munity showed that during the day, Odi women were busy, perhaps, more than their 
men. A number of men (game men, as they were called) were busy playing draughts. 
However, throughout the five days in the community, hardly was any woman found 
idle. Women were usually engaged in agricultural and economic activities such as 
small-scale farming, fishing, frying gari, collection of firewood, retail businesses, 
among other endeavours. However, this does not imply that all Ijaw men do is play 
draughts as some scholars erroneously concluded. Rather, men are usually involved in 
more physical activities such as large-scale farming and fishing in the high sea. Fishing 
in the high sea is seasonal and the fish migrate periodically. The migration of fish de-
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termines the location of the men —in or out of town. Also, men fish in the night. So 
during the day when they are in the town, most of them engage in leisure activities un-
til the night time when they embark on their vocation. At times, they leave the town for 
days.  
However, women are usually involved in reproduction activities, which often 
require personal involvement. The traditional division of labour in the community, 
therefore, naturally favours men‘s participation in the NDDC intervention. Women 
would therefore require special encouragement and accommodation within the NDDC 
programme schedule in order to be able to participate. They typically find it difficult to 
abandon their responsibilities in order to attend the NDDC HCDPs. Although the 
Commission pays stipends to participants, and equal stipends are paid to women and 
men, both complain that the stipends paid after the training is lower than what was 
promised. For instance, they claimed that they were paid between 1,000 and 2,000 
naira (instead of 15,000 promised) after participating in a two to three day workshop. 
For women, this amount is too low incentive to make them leave their agricultural and 
economic activities which yield greater income. Past records of the Commission‘s fail-
ure to pay promised stipend and   provide post-training financial and material empow-
erment seem to further discourage women and girls‘ participation.    
She say the people that they came to train they promised them that they 
would give them because…they delay them in their farming work, they 
said they will give them 15,000 [Naira] each but they only bring one, 
one thousand to them. And they said that they hear, that they have paid 
the money into their account and they contributed some amount of 
money, but still they have not seen anything. (Fieldwork: Interview, 
18/09/2011, a female beneficiary speaking through an interpreter). 
Such disappointment lowered women‘s participation in the NDDC interventions. In 
fact, some women would rather give out their nominations to their male counterparts.  
As I told you, the list came out and there were a lot of women but most 
of the women did not participate hoping that this is something that we 
have been seeing. What is there? And they did not go further…there 
were less women, you see. Because a lot of these women feel that these 
things they are not relevant. So, probably in a hundred you see about 
ten or fifteen. 
—A male beneficiary (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011). 
…sometimes they [women] even give out their spaces. Their names 
might be there [on the list of successful applicants] all right. They will 
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give it to one of their brothers. ‗Go there abeg. Every time we dey go 
there wetin we dey benefit?‘ There was this…commissioner or some-
thing in Niger Delta representing Bayelsa State. The woman from 
Mende, she came and open this thing there. She actually said ‗The 
women population is so few, why?‘ So she made an effort to lure 
women but it was not possible.  
— A male beneficiary and politician (Fieldwork: Interview, 
16/09/2011). 
Moreover, facilitators of training do not have gender training, hence their lan-
guage and that of the materials provided for participants are not gender-sensitive. Fur-
thermore, the logistics was not gender-sensitive. For instance, there are no special ar-
rangements for child-care for nursing mothers during the training. There was no evi-
dence of deliberate effort by facilitators to empower female participants during the 
training. Empirical evidence suggests that in organising and executing training pro-
grammes, female and male participants were treated as if their social, economic, politi-
cal realities, experiences and needs are the same. There was no special recognition and 
acknowledgement of the inferior status of women in the community and no provision 
to improve their lot. Hence, gender equity was not considered in the NDDC interven-
tion programming in Odi community. The policy and programming of the NDDC, as 
the findings reveal, inadvertently support patriarchy. In other words, it maintains an 
unjust system for the male to benefit more from the NDDC intervention programming 
at the expense of the female members of the beneficiary community.  
However, the NDDC designed some programmes —the Home Management 
Business Skills (HMBS) —specifically for women. This, nonetheless, may not indicate 
gender sensitivity. This is because HMBS is designed with a view to helping women 
perform their traditional roles as homemakers. Therefore, this initiative has the poten-
tial of entrenching women as homemakers and preventing men from benefitting in 
such programmes. So, it will likely lock women and girls, men and boys in their tradi-
tional gender roles. This is consistent with the argument of the socialist feminists that 
patriarchy in the structure of the human society subjugates the female to the male. 
Hence, there is need to overcome gender blindness in the struggle for development and 
against shared oppression of women, especially in the developing world.  According to 
an NDDC staff in the CID, 
But on the other hand, we do design programmes specifically for the 
girls and women. We call them home management business skills, ba-
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sically designed to cater for the needs of our ladies, girls and ladies. 
Bearing in mind that if you have a wife and a mother that is being en-
gaged, it might contribute to the well-being and stability of the family, 
so we do have programmes specifically designed for women. That‘s not 
to say that we are shutting women out of the other ones…They select 
the very best, the most qualified and I do see a couple of ladies there. 
But the home management skills is specifically designed for our girls 
and women. So if you see a few men there, it‘s just by accident.  
(Fieldwork: Interview, 07/07/2011, NDDC Staff, Headquarters) 
The response of the NDDC Staff, ―…if you see a few men there, it‘s just by ac-
cident‖, shows that already men are considered misfit in HMBS. Therefore, men inter-
ested in such programmes may be discouraged or reluctant to apply for such pro-
grammes because the HMBS is ―…specifically designed for our girls and women.‖ 
This implies that the Commission by its intervention is suggesting that there are some 
business skills for women, which men do not have to acquire, and from the list of the 
HMBS programmes, they are skills for less paying, inferior, women jobs like baking 
and sowing. This inadvertently indicates the NDDC endorsement for labelling low-
paying, low-skill home management jobs as women‘s jobs, which are not meant for 
men. This implies that the Commission supports the view that men deserve more re-
warding, high profile or highly-skilled work, thus strengthening the traditional view of 
men as the superior sex group.  
Findings also show that, while women are not exempted from other NDDC in-
terventions, special provisions or considerations are not made for them to compete fa-
vourably with their male counterparts in benefiting from the programmes. Literature 
on gender equality and feminism asserts that women have been disadvantaged by the 
dominant patriarchal structure in the society (Aina, 2009; Mejiuni, 2012). This makes 
it slightly difficult for them to compete favourably with their male counterparts. 
Hence, there is need to recognise their disadvantaged position and make deliberate at-
tempt to make them benefit equitably from social programmes. However, this is not 
the case with the NDDC intervention. According to a high-ranking officer of the 
Commission: 
As I speak to you there is aprogramme we are running in Turkey, and 
it‘s an international welders‘ programme…I saw a lady there, she came 
there on merit. She passed the aptitude test. Yes, at the maritime trades. 
The ladies that came on merit, they did not come as ladies. They came 
because they were qualified. They passed the aptitude test and every 
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other test that was required. Those kind of things, I wouldn‘t say they 
are not gender sensitive, but they are gender blind.  (Fieldwork: Inter-
view, 07/07/2011, NDDC Staff, Headquarters) 
However, findings show that some desk officers may use their initiative in main-
streaming gender in implementing some NDDC programmes. A desk officer of the 
Commission reported: 
No, for me, ok, I have a background, before coming to NDDC, I 
worked with several non-governmental organisations, so I have, you 
know, schooled in the culture of being gender-sensitive, [ok] ok, so 
there is nothing that I do, eh, if we have, say maybe a conference, a 
seminar, I ensure that even if it‘s not fifty-fifty, then it‘s sixty-forty 
[male-female ratio], that‘s a personal… 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 07/07/2011, NDDC Staff, State Directorate) 
Findings revealed that gender had been mainstreamed by certain NGOs in their inter-
ventions in Odi community. Participants reported that NGOs bring women empower-
ment programmes and involve women in the intervention programming. According to 
the chairman, Community Development Committee: 
Our women leader and her group, they have many projects…programs 
that they used to attend na [now] and then they have some projects 
which they want the government to help them. They have programs, 
like they want to build town hall. That is their meeting hall…It 
was…only NGOs used to bring, bring those…eh programs. (Fieldwork: 
Interview, 14/09/2011) 
 
From the above, mainstreaming gender in NDDC‘s interventions in the community is 
not an impossible task. The question then is why is gender not mainstreamed? Is it a 
consequence of ignorance or nonchalance? 
5.5.1 Implications of Gender-Neutrality of the NDDC Interventions 
The gender-neutrality of the NDDC interventions has implications for the context of 
the intervention. These are evident in four main ways. First, it sometimes brings ten-
sion between female and male community members; and often brings tension and sus-
picion between the women chief and the Traditional Council. As noted earlier the 
women chief (a member of the Traditional Council herself) claimed she had never 
been invited to any meeting between the NDDC and the Traditional Council (Actually, 
the meetings are briefings in the real sense, as NDDC only comes to inform the com-
munity leaders of their intervention and introduce the contractors to them. This is 
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strictly about the IDPs and occurs shortly before the commencement of the interven-
tion).  
I was not informed….I only heard of it. I only heard of their meet-
ing…I wasn‘t informed at all. 
 
So-to-say, I am part of it. So, they say I am part of it, but when you are 
not called upon, you will…you will not even know what they are doing. 
Because you won‘t know when programmes are going to…[trails off] 
and women we are not involved, so you have to wait and look what 
they are going to do. 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011) 
Apparently, from her facial expression and choice of words (the underlined), 
she resents the idea of excluding her from meetings with the NDDC. The NDDC 
meetings (or rather briefings) are usually impromptu and this makes it impossible for 
every member of the Traditional Council, especially, civil servants (which she is), to 
participate. However, not to have been informed at all is a different case entirely. An-
other male member of the Traditional Council, also a civil servant (a teacher, like the 
women chief), reported inability to attend such meetings in some cases, but at least he 
was informed when the NDDC officials arrived for the impromptu meetings. The 
women chief interprets this situation as a continued deliberate subjugation of women 
in the African society, especially the Ijaw culture. The second quotation shows that 
she feels that the council makes deliberate effort to make her redundant.  
 ―You know, in everything there is monopoly now. In our African soci-
ety, even this eh…especially Ijaw culture everybody want to bring 
women down. Everybody wants to put women down. They feel if 
women come out they will usurp our power. I think that‘s my belief. So 
most of the things they refuse to involve women, unless women will re-
act on it.‖ 
 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011) 
 
The quotation above also hints at deliberate male subjugation of women. She 
became reflective and distant when she made the statement above (As if it is some-
thing she had contemplated and confirmed many times). The tone of her voice sug-
gested to the researcher that men are so afraid of women‘s power that they have suc-
cessfully invented several ways to tame them to satisfy men‘s selfish ends (The way 
the respondent described the situation made the researcher somehow ashamed of being 
a man. At the same time, the researcher was slightly jittery thought that the respondent 
was going to vent her anger on him at this point in the interview. Although not directly 
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linked to the NDDC intervention, the researcher gathered from some members of the 
community that the women‘s leader, a former head teacher in a public primary school, 
had been recently demoted to a class teacher as a punishment for her political party 
affiliation. The Labour Party, of which she is a member, ousted Peoples Democratic 
Party in the election for the House of Representatives. The PDP-controlled state and 
local government therefore decided to punish her for her political activities). 
Also, not involving women in the conception and planning has a tendency to 
impact negatively on women culturally and economically and, consequently, lead to 
conflict. For instance, there was a communal conflict involving the traditional ruler, 
the NDDC contractor and the community women. An NDDC contractor —the Elite 
Company— had been awarded the construction of Odi-Trofani Road. The road would 
pass through a channel of a river where women harvest fish, lobster, and firewood for 
home use and sale. In short, the channel had been a source of household food and in-
come for women for generations. Thus, women have higher stake in the channel. 
However, Elite Company decided to block the channel since that was cheaper than 
constructing a bridge. When the community women realised that the men and the Tra-
ditional Council were not going to intervene in this, they took charge of their own af-
fairs and reacted. According to the Ereamini da-arau: 
They wanted to block the place instead of making bridge so that even 
this rainy season people can pass through. They were blocking it—the 
Elite Company—because they think that will be cheaper for them. The 
community women reacted…Yes the women reacted. So we were 
called to the king‘s palace, because we find out that they were not do-
ing anything. So we…we reacted. And actually we went to the Elite, eh 
the company had to take the complaint of the women and they had to 
do it. Though the bridge was not properly done, but at least, people can 
pass through (even this [rainy] season) to go and bring whatever they 
want to bring… 
They [women] were concerned. They are in the kitchen so they‘re con-
cerned. So if the easy means to go and bring their woods is being 
blocked and in this [rainy] season, this lobsters that they bring, this sea-
son, they make a little money out of it. And even the family they will 
eat part of it. But most of our men they are feeling unconcerned. If not, 
the channel is for everybody but you know at least if something hap-
pens some people will be touched the most. So the women…felt that it 
is their right because they are the people going there more, you know 
the population of the women are more. And people using the place…, is 
women that uses the place more than the men, so…we went there later 
and we succeeded in making that bridge…  
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According to him [king], he set up three committees to go and meet the 
company. But the company or the people that are working there, but we 
don‘t know, that is what we don‘t know. We now went to take permis-
sion from him that whether they agree or not we have to go there. So 
we went there and got in touch with the white man that was in charge 
and that unless they agree with us then the road can be built… (Field-
work: Interview, 15/09/2011) 
Yes, the whole community women, the whole community women went 
there. The crowd was so much mighty that eh… (Fieldwork: Interview, 
16/09/2011) 
…so when they are trying to build that place, they were trying to close 
up that place. The women now woke up, they said ‗You cannot.‘ The 
company said that they will. So the women, the women leader and all 
the women in the community stood up and say ‗No, we are making use 
of that place and the company cannot close down that place.‘ …So all 
the women went there when the company was working; went there, 
stopped the company. All the women o…stopped the work. And the 
company was trying to prove stubborn. Some of the women that knows 
how to drive cars took their keys from them, drove the car to different 
corner, charge [rev] them very well. 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011, male respondent).  
The above showcases the Ereamini-da-arau submission ―so most of the things 
they [men generally] refuse to involve women, unless women will react on it.‖ And in 
this case, women reacted, although in a non-violent way. The women‘s reaction was a 
non-violent demonstration involving almost all the community women. Men felt less 
concerned and the sincerity of the king‘s committees set up to look into the case before 
women intervened directly was questionable.  
As well, not mainstreaming women in the Commission‘s interventions creates 
more power imbalance between female and male community members by directly em-
powering men economically. In respect of the IDPs, one way men and boys benefit 
directly is through direct employment as labourers —semi-skilled and unskilled. Con-
sidering that the IDPs have been more regular than the HCDPs and that this has been 
the trend since the inception of the Commission, one begins to have an idea of what 
this meant in financial advantage to men and boys over women and girls. As of the 
time of this fieldwork, the Home Management Business Skills had not been kick-
started (although interested people had submitted their applications. The researcher 
even sighted some applications at CID office at the NDDC headquarters). Male youths, 
as militants or demonstrators, are usually the beneficiaries of marching ground paid by 
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NDDC contractors to allow them to execute their projects, since they are those that 
demand it through violent agitations. Hence, through direct employment and marching 
ground, men and boys benefit exclusively from the NDDC physical development pro-
jects. As commented by an NDDC staff, 
…most times when we talk about youth, especially in the Niger Delta 
region where, eh, youth, you know, have seen violence, as, you know, 
as a vehicle for agitation, it tends to exclude women. Young girls, who, 
naturally, should see themselves as, part of…you know, that category 
called youth, so because of violence they are unable to come out openly 
when young people come out, you know, to participate in that process 
of agitation or advocacy, whatever. (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011). 
Also, in its ad-hoc responses to agitations arising from its interventions, the 
NDDC has not been gender sensitive. The Commission‘s settlement usually takes care 
of the males who are more likely to champion such violent agitations, either against the 
NDDC or their contractors. As noted by an NDDC staff in the quote above, young fe-
males seldom participate in agitations and, since the agitations yield fruit for the head 
ones, that is, the leaders as indicated by a programme beneficiary, females are not 
likely to reap the fruit of such agitations. Thus, male youths benefit exclusively from 
NDDC as reapers of tangible fruits of violence —in cash and in kind. 
Finally, gender neutrality of the NDDC intervention misses the opportunities 
for women and girls empowerment, especially through its HCDPs. Women involve-
ment in the entire intervention programming are good avenues for empowering 
women and promoting gender equity. If, as noted by the Ereamini-da-arau, the Ijaw 
culture subjugates women, affirmative action to empower women and girls would be a 
worthwhile goal for the Commission to pursue. However, the Commission fails to ex-
ploit this opportunity in programming its intervention. This probably is a case of un-
derutilisation or a skewed prioritisation of the NDDC resources. Empowering women 
this way may reduce the likelihood for violent agitations in the Niger Delta. Casual 
observations on the pattern and dynamics of agitations in the Niger Delta reveal that it 
is engendered. It appears that violent and non-violent agitations are characteristic of 
male and female agitations respectively in the NDR. In other words, the NDR women 
are more likely to be involved in non-violent agitations (Aina, Adeyemi, Waziri, & 
Samuel, 2009) while their male counterparts are more likely to employ violent tactics. 
Militants are essentially males, and empirical women‘s non-violent tactics appear to be 
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more effective. As noted by the Odi youth president in his comment on women‘s non-
violent demonstration against Elite Company, 
At that time point in time, are you going to bring police there, when 
women are taking action? Now because of that action now, that led to 
the construction of bridge at that place. If not for the women they 
would have closed up the place. People are now passing there, to go 
and fetch firewood and do their farming activities. (Fieldwork: Inter-
view, 16/09/2011). 
The underlined shows the strategic effectiveness of non-violent agitation by 
Niger Delta women. Hardly can any government justify the use of force against 
women engaged in non-violent protest. As the case of Odi community shows, women 
appear to be able to get result for their agitations than youths. Also, the outcome of 
women‘s protest is more likely to produce result for the benefit of all. The phenome-
non of settling the head ones syndrome did not come up during the women‘s protest, 
unlike the youths. Hence, it was difficult to discredit their movement. If in their pre-
sent relatively subjugated state, women are able to achieve this feat, one wonders what 
they will achieve in their empowered state. Although this aspect of the study is incon-
clusive, the potentials of women group taking the lead in improving the interventions 
of the NDDC is worth exploring. 
5.6 A Peace and Conflict Impact Theory (PCIT) 
An outcome of this study is that a theory of peace and conflict impact emerged as a 
theoretical explanation of the interactions of NDDC‘s interventions and Odi commu-
nity context. The peace and conflict impact theory offers a theoretical explanation of 
the nature, dynamics and implications of these interactions. The theory has eight con-
cepts including resource-status of intervention, black hole of interactions, likely depri-
vation, the malevolent charity-beggar relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, di-
visiveness of intervention, local capacities for peace, and Federal Government atten-
tion. The theory suggests that the NDDC‘s interventions are perceived as resources in 
the Niger Delta and this perception drives the interactions of the interventions and the 
context from the macro level to the micro level, producing both positive and negative 
impacts.  
In brief, the theory suggests that resource-status that interventions enjoy com-
pels actors at various levels to compete or struggle for it. The struggle takes place in a 
socio-political and cultural environment characterised by bad governance and endemic 
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corruption. This lead to black hole of interactions among influential actors at the macro 
level (country and ND region) as they decide who get what, when and where, thereby, 
impacting on and being impacted by the conception and planning stage. The combined 
effect of the resource-status of intervention, black hole of interactions, and bad gov-
ernance and endemic corruption provides sufficient conditions for spirals of negative 
impacts down the remaining stages of the intervention programming, and thus signifi-
cantly reduces the positive impacts of the NDDC‘s interventions in Odi. An immediate 
outcome of this is that it makes the interventions a scarce commodity, acutely com-
peted for by potential beneficiary communities, thus bestowing the status of charity on 
the Commission and imposing the status of beggars on the communities in a relation-
ship (malevolent charity-beggar) characterised by acute power disequilibrium. As a 
charity, the Commission bestows its interventions on communities who usually have 
no choice but to accept whatever is graciously awarded to them be it good, bad, or 
ugly. As a direct consequence of the prevailing conditions, the Commission enjoys a 
considerable amount of power in the power relations in the Commission-community 
relationship. Taking advantage of this, the Commission programmes its interventions 
with the barest minimum involvement of the beneficiary community. This makes the 
intervention programming somewhat oppressive to the community (oppressiveness of 
intervention). The possibility of being deprived —likely deprivation— of the NDDC‘s 
interventions compel the community actors to struggle for the resources at the commu-
nity level, creating divisions among them (divisiveness of intervention) from the com-
munity level to the family and individual levels. In spite of these, the feeling of 
‗‗…finally we are getting federal government‘s attention‘‘ (in physical and socio-
economic deliverables) and the existence in the community of traditional and contem-
porary institutions as well as processes that moderate intervention-triggered conflicts 
(local capacities for peacebuilding) cushion the effects of the negative impacts on the 
community.  
5.6.1 Intervention-Context Interactions (ICI) Model 
Several authors have convincingly argued the inevitable interactions of interven-
tion and the context where it is situated (Resource Pack 2004; Anderson 1999 & 2004; 
Bush 2003c and Bush 2009). As earlier discussed, intervention in conflict setting im-
pacts on elements of the context and vice versa. Empirical evidence from the field 
supports this notion. Against this background, the intervention-context interactions 
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(ICIs) framework emerged and was adopted as the basis for assessing and explaining 
the impacts of these interactions on the Odi community context.  
As noted by Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, and Sheriff (2005), conceptualising 
impact in terms of interactions is helpful. They submit ―new thinking on topics such as 
‗interaction indicators‘ shows promise worthy of application and subsequent learning.‖ 
The ICI matrix is based on such thinking. The intervention-context interactions (ICIs) 
are the mutual interactions between stages of an intervention programming and ele-
ments of a given conflict context, with their potentials for positive or negative impacts 
on the conflict situation. This is captured in an ICI Matrix. In the Matrix, alphabets 
represent the stages of an intervention and elements of a context. P stands for plan-
ning, I for implementation, ME for monitoring and evaluation, while, A stands for ac-
tors, C for causes, Pr for profile and D for dynamics.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Intervention-Context Interactions Matrix 
Source: Fieldwork, 2010. 
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PA represents the impact of planning on actors, while AP stands for the impact of 
actors on planning. PA—AP, therefore, represents the interactions between planning 
and actors. PA may be positive or negative, same goes for AP. In essence, in planning-
actors interactions, there are four potential impacts: positive planning-actors (+PA) 
impact; positive actors-planning (+AP) impact; negative planning-actors impact (-PA); 
and negative actors-planning (-AP) impact. +PA describes a situation where the plan-
ning of an intervention has positive impacts on the actors. Positive AP (+AP) is when 
actors, through their contributions, impact positively on the planning of an interven-
tion. -PA and -AP are negative impacts of planning on actors and of actors on planning 
respectively. For instance, planning may involve a party and neglect other(s) or give 
better treatment or special recognition to a party at the expense of the other(s). This 
may sustain old tensions or foment new ones among parties. Alternatively, actors‘ con-
flict behaviours may disrupt planning or inform bad decisions. The same could be said 
about other stages as well. 
From the foregoing, the planning stage has four potential impacts with each of 
the four elements of the context. In all, it has sixteen potential impacts with all the 
elements of the context —actors, causes, profile and dynamics. These potential im-
pacts have equal number (eight each) of both positive and negative charges. Similar 
cases can be made for other stages (implementation and monitoring and evaluation) as 
well. This brings the total number of potential impacts between intervention and con-
texts to 48 —24 potential positive and 24 potential negative impacts. This implies 
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(mathematically speaking) that ICIs carry equal potential to contribute positively or 
negatively to a given conflict situation. 
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Figure 5. 2. Intervention-Context Interactions Framework  
Source: Fieldwork, 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ICI framework represents potential, multi-layered, multidirectional interactions 
between intervention and context. The ICIs potential impacts on the context are in the 
emergent loop of multi-layered, bi-directional interactions. These interactions produce 
the dynamics that support peace or conflict in a conflict situation. The ICI perspective 
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measures impact in terms of the implications of the interactions on conflict situation. It 
shows the measurable potential impacts that interactions of intervention and conflict 
context have for the conflict situation. Therefore we can conceive of ICI‘s negative 
impact and ICI‘s positive impact on a conflict situation. The ICI is a useful framework 
for understanding and explaining the nature, dynamics and implications of the interac-
tions of the NDDC interventions and the context of Odi community. Subsequent sec-
tions present phenomena that aid such understanding. 
5.7 The Nature, Dynamics and Implications of the Interactions of the 
NDDC Interventions and Odi Community Context 
Certain phenomena are critical in understanding the nature, causes, and dynamics; and 
the short-term and the long-term implications of the interactions of the NDDC inter-
vention and Odi context. The crux of the argument, in general terms, is that stake-
holders perceived the NDDC interventions as resources and compete for it in a socio-
political environment characterised by pervasive corruption and bad governance. This 
provided sufficient conditions for spirals of negative consequences that ultimately re-
duced the overall effectiveness of the interventions. The resource-status of interven-
tion, in a wider geopolitical context characterised by bad governance and corruption, 
triggers a black hole of interactions (at the conception and planning stage) and likely 
deprivation (among community people at implementation stage), that is, situations in 
which actors, propelled by greed, need, and fear of marginalisation in distribution of 
benefits mobilise to appropriate the NDDC resources and benefits for themselves. The 
interplay of the resource-status of intervention, the Bhis and likely deprivation leads to 
phenomenon such as the malevolent charity-beggar relationship, which is an acute 
power disequilibrium characterising the Commission-community relationship in the 
intervention programming. This relationship manifests in form of oppressiveness of 
intervention and leads to divisiveness of intervention. Understanding the interconnect-
edness of these phenomena is critical in understanding the nature, causes, and dynam-
ics; and the short-term and the long-term impacts of the Commission‘s interventions in 
the context. These are elaborated in the following subsections.  
5.7.1 The Resource-status of the NDDC Interventions 
A proper understanding of the impacts of the NDDC interventions requires an under-
standing of intervention as a resource within a given context. This view of intervention 
as a resource is consistent with Anderson‘s conceptual assumption that ‗‗[a]lid pro-
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grammes involve the transfer of resources (food, shelter, water, health care, training, 
etc.) into a resource-scarce environment‘‘ (1999; 2004; 2004, p. 47). Expectedly, in-
terventions enjoy the status of a resource in most contexts because it is a socio-
economic solution package intended to improve a given social situation. As a solution 
package, it comes with tangible (financial and material) and non-tangible (prestige, 
influence, etc.) benefits. These benefits are potential resources that could be exploited 
by various actors from within and outside the intended operational context of the inter-
vention. According to Anderson, ‗‗…these resources represent power and wealth and 
they become an element of the conflict‘‘ (2004, p. 47). Bush concurs with this view 
when he opines that intervention introduces new dynamics in the context, creating 
winners and losers (1998; Bush & Opp, 1999) as actors sometimes ‗‗…attempt to con-
trol and use aid resources to support their side of the conflict and to weaken the other 
side‘‘ (2004, p. 47). 
The NDDC as an intervention agency (and its interventions) is clearly a resource 
in the NDR. Its tangible benefits include, Federal Government jobs (for staff and pro-
spective members of staff), contracts (for contractors and consultants —real, pseudo 
and ghost), physical projects and human capacity development programmes (for Niger 
Delta communities) and money. The Commission is one of the wealthiest Federal 
Government parastatals. For instance, funding provisions of the Commission is pro-
vided in Part V of the NDDC Act and include: 
1. 15 per cent of the total monthly statutory allocations due to member states of 
the Commission form the Federation Account.  
2. 3 per cent of the total annual budget of any oil-producing company operating, 
onshore and offshore, in the Niger Delta area; including gas-processing com-
panies.  
3. 50 per cent of monies due to member states of the Commission from the Eco-
logical Fund. 
4. Miscellaneous sources. 
The above translate into an annual budget of billions of naira. Although the 
sources for NDDC funding identified above (especially government) do not always 
provide the fund in due time, the Commission‘s funding is still attractive enough to 
compel various actors to mobilise to share in the resources it offers. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that the NDDC interventions are perceived as resources by stake-
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holders. As such, they become reasons for legitimate and illegitimate motivations to 
satisfy legitimate needs, actors‘ insatiable wants and/or opportunities (actors do not 
want to miss). This showcases the impacts of intervention on actors and vice versa. 
Actors‘ perception of intervention as a resource is the main driver of the ICI in Odi. Its 
occurrence and influence is pervasive throughout the stages of the intervention pro-
gramming. As a resource in an environment characterised by endemic corruption and 
bad governance, the NDDC becomes something for which various actors struggle at 
different levels and stages of the intervention programming. Thus, actors, motivated by 
need and/or greed, were inspired and compelled to act to appropriate the resources for 
themselves. The immediate consequences of this compulsive response to resource 
sharing are the phenomena of black hole of interactions (Bhis), which is triggered at 
the stage of conception and planning and exert a strong influence on the entire pro-
gramming; and likely derivation, which is a direct fallout of Bhis and the main factor 
compelling as well as propelling community actors‘ interactions with intervention as 
they struggle for its benefits.  
5.7.2 Black hole of Interactions (Bhis) 
The black hole of interactions is a phenomenon characteristic of the conception and 
planning stage of the intervention but which exert very strong negative influence on 
subsequent stages and consequently reducing their effectiveness and positive impacts 
significantly. It refers to the intense interactions between the resource-rich NDDC in-
terventions and influential actors such as NDDC board members and management 
staff, politicians, contractors/consultants, high-ranking government officials and a 
unique phenomenon call Ward 12. Bhis was so christened because of its similarity of 
behaviour with the celestial black hole theorised to exist in the universe. The black-
hole concept was developed by the German Astronomer Karl Schwarzschild in 1916, 
based on Albert Einstein‘s general theory of relativity. Celestial black holes have 
gravitational field so strong that, with a body large enough, nothing, including elec-
tromagnetic radiation, can escape from its vicinity (Black-hole, Microsoft Encarta 
Premium, 2009). Light enters but cannot escape the black hole, hence it appears totally 
black. Similarly in the Bhis, influential actors lobby, manoeuvre, and negotiate in shar-
ing and exploiting the resources of the NDDC interventions in an environment of non-
transparency, endemic corruption and bad corporate governance that eventually leave a 
permanent dent on the whole intervention programming.  
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The Ward 12 constitutes an important group in the Bhis, hence the need to un-
derstand the phenomenon in theorising the impacts of the NDDC intervention in Odi. 
The Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA has 11 wards (electoral divisions), three of which are 
in Odi. The Ward 12 phenomenon according to a respondent refers to ―…our people 
that are living outside, that are in Yenagoa (the state capital and largest Ijaw city), that 
are close to the government…sometimes even if you are not close to Ward 12 you will 
not have anything (that is, benefits, including NDDC intervention).‖ Ward 12 constitu-
ency thus includes influential individuals such as the NDDC staff and politicians who 
are indigenes of various communities in Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA and who lobby the 
NDDC and government on behalf of their communities for a share of the NDDC inter-
ventions. How influential a community‘s Ward 12 members are determines the type, 
quality and quantity of the NDDC intervention in the community.  According to resi-
dent community people, 
…like if you have somebody there, like we have a daughter there [the 
NDDC] that is…influential there, hmm, she can, she can work out 
something and say look come and meet the CEO, see what I‘ve done 
for the town. Like we have this rest house that was just lying fallow 
[uncompleted], so, the girl now moved and before we knew, they sent a 
proposal that this thing should go on. (Fieldwork: Interview, 
14/09/2011). 
 
The road network at Sabagreya is more than this place [Odi]…it‘s be-
cause some of their people are in the NDDC. Even in the state here. 
The state NDDC representative, the state coordinator or whatever, is 
from Sabagreya. Then sometimes they also have some of their big men, 
hmm, they are concerned about the village and so they move to NDDC 
to lobby for more…projects. They will now liaise with the deputy 
speaker. The deputy speaker of…the house [the state‘s House of As-
sembly] is from Sabagreya too, he‘s from there. So, all of them will 
now put heads together, hmm, and then see how they can now [facili-
tate NDDC interventions for their community]…it‘s all about the gov-
ernment…if they are assigning project to you, if it‘s two kilometres, 
you lobby for more kilometres. (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
 
The existence of the black hole of interactions is supported by the report of a 
probe panel and the participants‘ responses. The panel, set up in 2011 and headed by 
Mr Steve Orosanye, was to identify factors hindering the Commission from perform-
ing its statutory functions. The report indicted the former Managing Director/CEO of 
the Commission, Mr Chibuzor Ugwuoha for misappropriating N511 billion in two 
years. It also indicted consultants of the Commission and aides to the Nigerian Presi-
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dent. It led to the dissolution of the NDDC board, chaired by retired Air Vice Marshal 
Larry Koiyan, in September 2011. Corrupt practices identified by the committee in-
clude zero procurement procedure (contrary to the provisions of Section 16 (6-9) and 
23 of the Public Procurement Act (PPA), 2007), and lack of pre-qualification processes 
for projects within the N250 million approval threshold of the Commission. The black 
hole appeared to be a characteristic feature of the NDDC since inception. According to 
an NDDC consultant on agricultural programmes, 
…on the books they [NDDC] seem to be doing it, but it…tilts towards 
interests. Interest of those who…want to…gain from [it].Whereby the 
core people in the rural areas are not benefiting from it. So…you know, 
even though the office is under the presidency…the oversight…is not 
really…being done in the way it should. And also the finances of…the 
NDDC is not being monitored…You will see a project, ordinarily, that 
will not cost up to ten million naira…the Commission end up saying it 
is 100 million, 200 million and nobody seems, seems to question it. 
There is no…accountability…You still see…over so many years now 
that the Commission has started there have not really been emancipa-
tion of the Niger Delta region. 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 05/07/2011).  
Also, an NDDC desk officer commented, 
But to be frank with you…I‘ll say that nearly 99.9% of projects are not 
initiated from the CRD [the NDDC‘s Directorate of Community and 
Rural Development] but from eh, the Projects…ok, if I say the Project 
Directorate or project department I‘ll also not be saying it accurately as 
it is, you know. We hardly do needs assessment…most of the project 
that get into the budget for implementation come rather from people 
who are desirous of doing contracts. For example, members of the na-
tional assembly, you know. That‘s how our projects are generated.  
 (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011). 
Some of the activities that suggest the presence of the Bhis, and identified by 
the panel, are non-compliance with extant regulations and statutes; and acrimonious 
and poor interpersonal relationship between the board, the managing director, the ex-
ecutive directors and among top management staff of the Commission (probably due to 
contention over resources). Others are structural defects and over-centralisation of the 
Commission's activities; widespread misconception of the role of the Commission by 
staff and people of the region; ethnicity and factionalisation. The remaining are routine 
and rampant externalisation of internal problem and disagreements; ineffective super-
vision by the supervisory agencies of the Commission; and inadequate funding and 
staffing of the state offices. The report revealed a characteristic high level corruption in 
 228 
 
awarding contracts and that the quality of the NDDC projects is generally far below 
acceptable standards. Thus the Bhis jettisons the injunction for transparency, account-
ability and full participation of critical stakeholders provided in the Master Plan: ―It 
needs to be re-stated that the leadership of the NDDC must uphold the principles of 
transparency and accountability…‖ (2006, p. 241).  
However, rather than uphold the principles of transparency and accountability 
or promote good governance, the NDDC interventions promote bad governance by en-
trenching corruption and ineffectiveness (real and perceived) through its activities. 
More than 90% of participants reported various forms of corruption in every stage of 
the interventions. This was also supported by the report of Orosanye Probe Panel high-
lighted above. The report led to the dissolution of the NDDC board, chaired by retired 
Air Vice-Marshal Larry Koinyan, in September 2011. Abubakar in a newspaper report, 
―Nigeria: NDDC Dirty Deals Exposed,‖ stated the involvement of aides to the Nige-
rian president in the NDDC scandal. However, the dissolved board is not the only 
NDDC board that was reported to be characterised with corruption and bad govern-
ance. Empirical evidence shows that, to a lesser or greater degree, this is the character-
istic feature of the Commission. The non-transparent and publicly-unaccountable prac-
tices characterising the Commission has a general effect of reducing the overall effec-
tiveness of its intervention. The setting up of a probe panel by the Federal Government 
to investigate the Commission for non-performance testifies to the crippling effect of 
the corruption in the Commission. The Commission‘s usual manner of doing its busi-
ness, due to the impact of the Bhis, jettisons the injunction for transparency, account-
ability and full participation of critical stakeholders.  
The Bhis thus has a crippling effect on the overall effectiveness of the NDDC 
interventions. As would be discussed later, the Bhis excludes the resident community 
people (RCP) from the conception and planning (C&P), limits their participation at the 
implementation stage and discourages participation at the monitoring and evaluation 
stage.  The immediate negative impact of the Bhis is to exclude critical stakeholders —
RCP— for whom the interventions were planned from the C&P stage. This is because 
the dynamics of the Bhis has little or no concern for the interests of these actors. It is a 
function of the competition for the resources of the intervention driven by the interplay 
of outrageous greed, and sometimes business exigencies against the backdrop of en-
demic bad governance and corruption. These forces are too strong to accommodate the 
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interests of the RCP, hence their exclusion from C&P. The RCP becomes more ac-
tively involved in the intervention process at the level of implementation in the com-
munity.  
5.7.3 Likely Deprivation 
The RCP activities are driven by a phenomenon conceptualised as likely deprivation, 
which appear to be an indirect consequence of the Bhis. Although the NDDC interven-
tions are not the main cause of this phenomenon, they do become sufficient motiva-
tions to resuscitate and reinforce it. Likely deprivation is a psycho-social and social-
psychological condition in which, driven by fear of real possibility or likelihood of 
deprivation of benefits (including rights, privileges and other opportunities), individu-
als and/or groups take actions to secure her/its share of the perceived benefits. This 
phenomenon resurges among the community actors at the stage of implementation of 
the intervention. As would be discussed later, individuals and groups in Odi competed 
for the NDDC resources allocated for the community. The underlying driver of the 
competition was the fear that, unless they fought for their rights, they would not get it. 
Likely deprivation can therefore be argued to be prevalent in socio-political arrange-
ments in which the rights and privileges of citizens are not guaranteed in fair and just 
processes. Thus, they learn to use every means, fair and foul, to secure benefits. Indi-
viduals‘ psychology and groups‘ social-psychology in Odi is characterised by antici-
pated deprivation of the benefits/resources of the NDDC unless they struggle for it. 
This mind-set drives the competition, conflict and cooperation over the resources of 
the NDDC among the RCP at the implementation stage.  
Likely deprivation is a different phenomenon from relative deprivation in the 
sense that the former is a priori (that is, in anticipation of deprivation) while the latter 
is a posteriori (that is, consideration of past deprivation relative to others). It could be 
argued that likely deprivation is somehow characteristic of the Nigerian society. It is, 
however, more pronounced in the NDR due to the interplay of the long history of mar-
ginalisation and deprivation and the availability of the intervention benefits and other 
resources to struggle for. Likely deprivation is both a structural cause and consequence 
of conflict in the NDR. It results from a loss of faith in public institutions to distribute 
public goods and services in a fair and equitable manner. The intersection and cross-
fertilisation of the resource-status of intervention, Bhis, and likely deprivation lead to 
more negative impacts of the NDDC interventions in the study area. These impacts 
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include the malevolent charity-beggar relationship characterising the NDDC-
community relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, and divisiveness of interven-
tion. These are explored in the next section. 
5.7.4 The Malevolent Charity-beggar Relationship 
The NDDC intervention programming establishes and sustains acute power disequilib-
rium between the NDDC and the beneficiary community  (It is probably an extension 
of the power disequilibrium characterising citizen-state relationship in Africa where 
citizens are generally made to feel that government responsibilities towards them are 
privileges, rather than right). The power relation confers the status of charity on the 
NDDC and forces the status of a beggar on the community. Over time, the relationship 
has become malevolent, due essentially, to the effect of the Bhis. Odi community has 
been compelled to perceive the NDDC interventions as a rare charity and scarce re-
source. So, in whatever form it comes to the community —good, bad or ugly— the 
community cannot reject it even if it is clearly not needed or there are significant ways 
to improve it. According to a participant,‘ ‗they are developmental projects, people are 
looking for them and they don‘t get and you, you have the opportunity to…you are 
given the opportunity, will you reject it?‘‘ 
Apparently, the interventions are privileges that the NDDC endows on those 
who are in its good records. This relationship is most evident in the oppressiveness of 
the Commission‘s intervention. The subtle disempowerment of the community starts 
right from the C&P stage (with the exclusion of the RCP) and runs throughout the en-
tire programming cycle. The community is oppressed when provision of social ser-
vices put them in a ‗‗beggar has no choice‖ situation. The malevolent charity-beggar 
relationship makes the NDDC intervention oppressive leading to the phenomenon op-
pressiveness of intervention‘  
5.7.5 Oppressiveness of Intervention 
Empirical evidence suggests that the NDDC interventions are oppressive in 
Odi. Oppressiveness of intervention is a situation in which beneficiaries are directly 
oppressed by the intervention either as a consequence of insensitive programming or a 
by-product of corruption in programming.  In the programming of the NDDC interven-
tions, oppressiveness of beneficiaries begins right from the conception and planning 
stage and runs throughout the entire programming cycle. The oppressiveness of inter-
vention has negative impact on the intervention programming. It manifests in various 
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forms. The first form is in imperious and imperial manner of excluding RCPs from 
C&P, thus giving the community no voice in the interventions meant for them. This 
arrogance suggests that the intervenor assumes knowing and ability to proffer solution 
to the problems of the intended beneficiaries without necessarily consulting them. This 
is tantamount to a doctor treating a conscious patient without consulting her. It presup-
poses that the RCP does not know what they need. Certain key NDDC personnel jus-
tify the exclusion of RCP on the grounds that since the politicians, the presumed repre-
sentatives of the people are involved (as Ward 12, earlier discussed), the community 
has been involved. Nevertheless, to assume such and thus limit community participa-
tion in C&P to Ward 12 elite suggests naivety or deliberate scheme to cover up the 
Bhis. Marginalising the entire community people this way entrenches the power im-
balance between the Ward 12 and the community people. According to a community 
respondent, 
These things [interventions] can only be brought through our big men 
outside. …we can do the writing thing but if there‘s no follow-up from 
our elite people in the township, they don‘t care. They don‘t, they don‘t 
care at all [visibly dissatisfied]. Because when they were making the 
roads, we said look, we wanted more roads to cover certain areas that 
have not been covered. We wrote that letter but there was no response. 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
Members of Ward 12 are usually motivated by the personal desire to increase 
their influence in the community. Hence interventions attracted by Ward 12 may not 
necessarily be needed by members of the community. Moreover, inasmuch as mem-
bers of Ward 12 do not appropriately consult the members of the community, their in-
volvement in the Bhis does not constitute community participation in intervention pro-
gramming. Evidently, from the quote above, the NDDC interventions become com-
modities that the community can enjoy through the benevolence of its elite. Ineffective 
communication between the community and the Commission foments dissatisfaction 
as shown in the participants‘ (elderly man) visible dissatisfaction. Non-participatory 
intervention programming is the main cause of oppressive intervention. 
The second way by which interventions oppress is in the high-handed manner 
in which the NDDC personnel, contractors/consultants relate with the community 
when implementing interventions. The responses of RCP are suggestive of this fact: 
 232 
 
Even if they [NDDC contractor/consultant] meet the paramount ruler, 
they will just go out and do what they want to do. The paramount ruler 
has no control over them that this and this are what and what I want in 
my community so that it won‘t bring problems. So they just come and 
map out the roads. So when they come with the contractor, the contrac-
tor will just come with his drawing, say ―This to this will have one 
road, from so-so-so kilometre, this, this, this, this or this to this will 
have another road.‖ That is all what the consultant will just come to tell 
you. That ―I‘m an engineer and I know what I‘m telling you. If we go 
to the road and we measure it, you will see it‖ Just like that. So that‘s 
the way they do their things.  
—A youth (Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011). 
The moment I hold the file, the file opened and I saw the number of 
projects meant for the school. And that was why I begin to see…some 
of the things that were supposed to be done. And immediately, I fired 
back, I cried out, but I was silenced from Port Harcourt office. Say that, 
‗You, a civil servant you don‘t talk anything, because is it only your 
community that is there? Are there no other communities?‘ The people 
that came from the headquarters office are the same people silencing 
me from telling the truth. It‘s funny…so, that‘s the situation. —A sec-
ondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
Thirdly, oppression manifests in the promise and fail syndrome, a situation 
whereby the Commission promises and delivers less than promised or the case of se-
lective distribution of benefits. A case in point is the Commission‘s practice of paying 
lower stipends than what it promised its beneficiaries in its agricultural capacity-
building programme. A case of selective distribution of benefits is evident in the giv-
ing of computers to the leaders of agitators in its computer-training programme. This 
is captured in the view of an elderly female beneficiary,  
…the people that came to train promised them that they would give 
them because…they delay them in their farming work, they said they 
will give them 15,000 (Naira) each but they only bring one, one thou-
sand to them. And they said that they hear, that they have paid the 
money into their account and they contributed some amount of money, 
but still they have not seen anything.      
  (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/09/2011). 
The threat of and the use of force against disappointed and protesting benefici-
aries is another form of oppressing the community people. This comes in form of ar-
rest of protesters and exploitation of the community‘s fear of repetition of the 1999 
massacre and fear of further bad publicity for Odi community. According to trainees of 
the agricultural programmes, the Commission asked beneficiaries to form cooperatives 
in order to access start-up loans. After they expended their hard-earned financial re-
 233 
 
sources forming those cooperatives, the Commission failed to fulfil its promise. Con-
sequently, according to a participant, 
So our boys went over to NDDC [headquarters in Port Harcourt]. They 
locked our boys, arrested them, locked them. We had to contribute 
money here again to go and release them. —A beneficiary (Fieldwork: 
Interview, 15/09/2011). 
Oppressiveness is also evident in the real threat of blacklisting any community 
the Commission considers troublesome —a decision that is entirely at the Commis-
sion‘s discretion. Community people‘s fear of losing potential interventions, a fear, 
mainly entertained by the community elders, is regularly exploited by the Commission 
and its contractors. A protesting community stands the risk of being blacklisted as a 
trouble-maker. This comes with the possibility of stopping the intervention and allo-
cating it to another community as a punishment to the hostile community. The fear has 
become an instrument for pacifying or sometimes beating youths to submission in le-
gitimate and illegitimate agitations. Elders on the other hand, have become placid. The 
attitude of the elders is expressed in a participant‘s response: 
―…anything about development, I don‘t want any conflict. Anything 
that will bring development…there should be no conflict at all because 
these are things you are not, eh, benefiting from before. Like a commu-
nity over this way, in the thirties or so, they could have been the first 
Ijaw…town to get a road but because of their hostile this thing, they 
[benefactor] withdrew and I think that school that was to be established 
there too was moved, the utensils were moved to Government College 
Umuahia. I was told that they are now trying to find the roads now by 
themselves…Something that could have benefitted the whole commu-
nity in the thirties, see the development that were missed…manpower 
development, if that thing has been there since the thirties…that‘s what 
I continue to tell the youths, anything about development, don‘t hinder, 
don‘t hinder. Because you will benefit at the long run.  
   (Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011). 
The allow development to take place attitude, though commendable, is an ef-
fective exploitative instrument in subduing the community youths even at such time 
when they have legitimate reasons to assert their rights as stakeholders in the interven-
tion. According to the Youth Council president:  
Sometimes they [the NDDC] will also say that eh, if they [contractors] 
come to a place and if the community is trying to make trouble they 
should pack out of that…community and the project will come to an 
end. Then our community leaders will now fear. ‗We don‘t want what 
will make this company leave this place o, and all the rest, so nobody to 
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ferment trouble.‘ [The elders will] say ‗This company is not going 
anywhere.‘ Company that is looking for their job, they will not go. So 
sometimes our leaders too, our leaders too out of fear and maybe their 
level of understanding, sometimes, you know, do certain things in a dif-
ferent manner to the benefit of the company. You‘re not even killing 
the company, this is what they are supposed to do. Then the leaders will 
now say ‗Leave this people o, if you worry them too much, if dem carry 
their properties go we don lose the work o. This one wey don come we 
should take am o.‘ All those stuff.   (Fieldwork: Interview, 
16/09/2011) 
The Odi 1999 massacre has also been exploited as an instrument of oppression 
in the NDDC intervention programming in the community. It has a restraining and 
mollifying impact on the Odi community, thereby making the community to be careful 
in protesting, even when they have legitimate reasons to do so. It has been employed 
as self-restraint by the youths themselves or by the elders against the youths. The 
memory of the incident was still very fresh in the community at the time of the field-
work. Though it might have attracted sympathy from NGOs and probably, the NDDC, 
it appears to also be a source of oppression. Community participants reported: 
…you know, because something like Odi is said to be a volatile com-
munity because of the 1999 and all those things…people are a bit very 
careful. They are very, very much careful about what happen. But I 
know that the project…the light [electricity] own [agitations] happened 
because of youths and contractor. That project was almost suspended 
for one year because of, eh, crisis like that.   (Fieldwork: Inter-
view, 14/09/2011). 
So it is youth within themselves, they [say] ‗look remember what hap-
pened in our community. The town was just burned down. If we do 
anything now they‘ll say we have started. That intimidation!…Ah you 
people have started again, can‘t you people learn from your mistakes? 
We‘ll call FANTANGBE‘ [a special security task force squad]. And 
people will say please instead of innocent people to die…(laughs). So 
People are intimidated. So you only grumble if you don‘t want open 
confrontation with the special force, you mellow down. Because if you 
don‘t take time, what they will do is selective picking [arrest].    
 (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
 
…and when you just think about this community and say if you do any-
thing now, the name will now go up again that Odi people are trying to 
come up again, all those stuff. That thing for [will] hold us still and you 
just stay. 
   (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011). 
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The fear of bad publicity for the community therefore restrains the community 
people from protests. The relatively few intervention-triggered protests are those that 
reached the breaking point. Even at that, these were still mellowed down by the effect 
of the 1999 massacre.  
5.7.6 Divisiveness of Intervention 
Intervention is by nature divisive. This may be due to the fact it has its own goals and 
become goals of several actors simultaneously. Intervention triggers greed or the desire 
to satisfy needs among actors, thus inspiring them to deploy their resources in contest 
for it. In context characterised by conflict where actors are already primed as well as 
possess soft and hardware for conflict, intervention becomes another goal for which 
actors compete, creating winners and losers, successful and unsuccessful, the happy 
and the unhappy. Hence divisiveness is inherent in intervention. In the NDDC inter-
vention in Odi, divisiveness takes the form of unintended effect of intervention and a 
deliberate divide-and-rule strategy by the NDDC and its contractors.  Intervention di-
vides the community people right from the stage of informing them about it. For in-
stance, the Community Development Committee chairman reported  
Anything that‘s outside the community was where I was involved. So 
anything they are doing within the community they don‘t want to tell 
me…  
(Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011). 
The comment shows that he feels that there were deliberate attempts to leave 
out the CDC out of the scheme of things in NDDC intervention. The women leader 
shares similar feelings. Also, the NDDC intervention causes division among and 
within families. For instance, job opportunities and supply of construction materials 
split members of families donating land for the intervention. Selective fulfilment of 
promise to beneficiaries (or settlement) of HCDPs also constitutes a form of divisive-
ness of intervention. As noted by community respondents, 
…like we that benefited from them, you know, we are very happy. 
But those people that, you know, did not benefit from them, you 
know some of them are not happy.(Fieldwork: Interview, 07/09/2011) 
And they [NDDC] promised that they will pay them some amount of 
money but the head ones [leaders], that is, the higher ones ah, they 
don‘t…, she don‘t know whether they bring them money or they did 
not bring. But they [other beneficiaries] hear that they bring the money 
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and people eat [embezzle] the money.(Fieldwork: Interview, 
14/09/2011) 
The one person [NDDC computer skill trainee], which I came across, 
he told me categorically that the NDDC promised, so with agitations 
they only settled persons in the frontline. So as there will be no pressure 
on them. 
(Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011) 
We always tell them [youths] that this is a development program. 
NDDC comes with development. NDDC is not Oil Company that you 
will say because of this and that... Allow development to take place. Al-
low development to take place [for emphasis].(Fieldwork: Interview, 
1/09/2011) 
Also, through a divide-and-rule strategy, the NDDC contractors deliberately 
divide the community for their selfish interests.  
…the company‘s even paying him [former youth president]…so that 
they [contractor] will take the youth president to themselves so that if 
there is any conflict that is trying to arise from the youth group in the 
community, you know that the president will now… (Fieldwork: Inter-
view, 16/09/2011) 
Indeed, the NDDC interventions divide. For instance, competition and conflict over 
the resources of intervention create winners and losers from the C&P stage (among the 
influential actors) and at the implementation stage among community people. It di-
vides the influential actors in the black hole of interactions at the C&P stage. At the 
implementation stage, it regularly pitches groups in the community against each other 
—women‘s group against the Traditional Council, women against men, the youths 
against the Traditional Council, thus fracturing the community. It also divides the 
community along the traditional Asanga-Tamanga geographic line. The division pene-
trates to the family level as family members are pitched against each other in attempt 
to appropriate direct and indirect benefits of the NDDC for themselves. 
5.7.7 The Local Capacity for Peace in Odi 
The full impacts of the negative implications of the NDDC interventions are 
not directly unleashed on Odi community. There is a screen of community mecha-
nisms and processes, acting like the ozone layer that shields the community from the 
direct impacts of the negative consequences, and transforms them to less-destructive 
impacts. These are the geniuses of Odi conflict transformation, that is, its local capac-
ity for peace, in Mary Anderson‘s term. They include prominent traditional and con-
 237 
 
temporary institutions and/or groups in Odi community that actively participate in cul-
tural, economic, political and social activities of the community. They are therefore 
inevitably involved in the NDDC interventions brought into the community. These in-
clude the Traditional Council, the Youth Council, the women‘s group and the Com-
munity Development Committee. These groups frequently have divergent goals as re-
gards the NDDC interventions. However, they have evolved norms, processes and 
practices that enable them to manage intervention-triggered competition and conflicts 
arising among themselves, other members/groups in the community or between Odi 
and other communities to ensure peaceful genius loci for the community. These groups 
and their activities, including the norms, processes and practices governing them and 
their relationships constitute the local capacities for peace in Odi. However, the Com-
mission does not make deliberate effort to strengthen these capacities; rather, it inad-
vertently and sometimes deliberately weakens them. The geniuses have the credit of 
keeping Odi peaceful in spite of the NDDC‘s peace and conflict blind approach to in-
tervention programming in the community. 
5.7.8. Federal Government’s Attention 
The NDDC IDPs are constant reminder of Federal Government‘s presence in the 
community. This is the most significant positive impact of the interventions in Odi. 
Receiving the attention of the federal government this way is significant because of the 
historic neglect by the Federal Government suffered by the region. Construction of 
roads, rural electrification, and construction of school facilities, among others address 
the pervasive feeling of marginalisation, which constituted a major cause of the Niger 
Delta conflict. Federal Government attention, therefore, is a strong positive impact that 
offsets some of the negative impacts of the Commission‘s interventions in the commu-
nity.  
5.7.9 Summary 
The NDDC interventions, perceived as resources by various actors, compel 
them to mobilise and compete for its benefits. This way, the intervention impacts on 
the actors. Actors mobilise and appropriate the resources, thereby impacting on the in-
tervention. Thus actors‘ mobilisation drives the interactions of intervention and con-
text, thus impacting the causes, profile and dynamics of context. Hence, the resource-
status of intervention is the epicentre and driver for the ICIs in Odi community. The 
desire to appropriate the NDDC resource leads to intense interactions among influen-
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tial actors —the black hole of interactions— which is supported by endemic bad gov-
ernance and corruption in the NDR. The black hole exerts strong negative influence on 
the entire intervention programming cycle, making the intervention programming non-
participatory for the resident community people. Odi has influential individuals (Ward 
12) who, for various reasons, lobby the NDDC for interventions on behalf of their 
community, thus participating in the Bhis. Individuals and groups in Odi, like other 
parts of the Niger Delta and Nigeria, experience likely deprivation, which is a perva-
sive psycho-social and social-psychological feeling of anticipated possibility of depri-
vation of the NDDC benefits compelling them to struggle and fight for it. The inter-
play of the resource-status of intervention, the Bhis and likely deprivation leads to 
phenomenon such as the malevolent charity-beggar relationship, which is an acute 
power disequilibrium characterising the Commission-community relationship in the 
intervention programming. This relationship manifests in form of oppressiveness of 
intervention and leads to divisiveness of intervention. However, existing geniuses of 
conflict transformation in Odi mediate the conflict-inducing impacts of the NDDC in-
tervention in the community to ensure that the genius loci of the community is peace-
ful. Having explained these phenomena, the chapter turns to discussion of the NDDC 
intervention programming. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Five physical development projects and four human development programmes in the 
community were identified in Odi. They are the internal link roads (concrete roads); 
Odi-Trofani Road; Agberiye-Odonu to Sampo Road; construction of blocks of class-
room/laboratories; and the construction of Odi Guest House. The HCDPs assessed in-
clude the agricultural-support programme (different sets of training on farming, fishing 
and rearing of snail and grasscutter); rice plantation; distribution of flying boat; and the 
training of youths on non-violence. These were the basis of investigating the interac-
tions between implementation and the context and assessing the impacts of the NDDC 
interventions. The perception of intervention as resources and the activities it compels 
from various actors at different stages of the intervention is central to understanding 
and assessing the impacts of the NDDC intervention in Odi. Also critical to this is the 
twin evil of corporate bad governance (in the NDDC) and endemic corruption (in the 
NDR, as in other parts of Nigeria) as providing the environment conducive to such 
motivations and activities that set in motion spiral of negative impacts throughout the 
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intervention cycle. The pervasive feeling of likely deprivation is naturally a conse-
quence of the interplay of these factors. These constitute the structural factors that pro-
vide the context for, and determine the nature, dynamics and implications of, the 
NDDC interventions.  
At the conception and planning stage, the interplay of these factors makes the 
intervention interest-driven rather than driven by community needs. Consequently, 
C&P is almost reduced to resource-sharing activity involving very influential actors 
such as NDDC board members, NDDC consultants, high-profile politicians and the 
Ward 12. The resident community people —the critical stakeholders— are conspicu-
ously excluded from this stage. This leads to series of negative impacts in the subse-
quent stages of intervention. At the implementation stage, when the intervention is 
fully brought into the community, there are spirals of negative and positive impacts of 
the intervention in the community. The most notable positive impact is that the inter-
ventions are evidence of government‘s attention, which addresses the pervasive feeling 
of neglect and marginalisation. Other notable ones include creation of jobs, income-
earning activities, opening-up of local market, and capacity-building in modern agri-
cultural practices for the locals. Notable negative impacts of include the institutionalis-
ing of the malevolent charity-beggar relationship in the Commission-community rela-
tionship, the oppressiveness of intervention, divisiveness of intervention, and ulti-
mately conflict among the community groups and individuals. However, the competi-
tion, contest, and conflict in the community are mediated by the geniuses of the com-
munity conflict transformation mechanism. The monitoring and evaluation stage of the 
intervention is relatively less dramatic because, in all practical terms, it is more of rub-
ber-stamping whatever intervention has been implemented. This, empirical evidence 
suggests, is a consequence of the structural factors identified above.     
Certain changes need to be made to the NDDC‘s strategies in order to minimise 
the negative impacts and maximise the positive impacts of the NDDC interventions. 
These changes would need to address how the Commission does its intervention and 
not the written strategies or i (the projects or programmes) the Commission does. 
These include institutionalising good governance in the NDDC and promoting good 
governance by its intervention. Also, there is need to change the asymmetric relation-
ship characterising the Commission-community relationship. This will ensure that the 
resident community people actively participate throughout the stages of the interven-
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tion programming. Moreover, there is need for mainstreaming peace and conflict and 
gender-sensitivity in the NDDC‘s organisational structure and culture; and in its inter-
vention programming. Furthermore, there is need for explicit and affirmative action on 
using each intervention to build local capacities for peace. In addition, there is need for 
I/NGOs to participate in the NDDC interventions in capacity building for locals and 
the NDDC on certain focus areas and in monitoring and evaluating the NDDC inter-
ventions for compliance. Finally, there is need to change the perception and organisa-
tional culture of the Commission to intervention programming. Retraining and reorien-
tation may be needed for the NDDC personnel to see themselves as social physicians, 
like health workers. With these changes in strategies, the likelihood that the Commis-
sion will fulfil its mandates will be significantly enhanced.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.0 Introduction 
This study was an ex post facto impact assessment of the interventions of the Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC). It assessed the Commission‘s physical In-
frastructural Development Projects (IDPs) and Human Capacity Development Pro-
grammes (HCDPs) in Odi community executed between 2006 and 2011. The over-
arching objective of the study was to explore the interactions of the interventions and 
the Odi community context, with a view to explaining their nature and dynamics in 
peace and conflict terms in the study area. The study assessed the relationship between 
the interventions, the NDDC mandate and community needs. Also, it assessed the in-
stitutional capacity of the Commission for peace and conflict sensitivity as well as the 
peace and conflict sensitivity of its interventions. It explained the nature, dynamics 
and implications of the interactions of the interventions and the context.  
This investigation was based on the assumption that stages of intervention —
conception and planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation— inevitably 
interact with elements of a conflict context, namely causes, actors, profile and dynam-
ics. And that these interactions do not necessarily translate into peacebuilding in the 
context. Rather, they have the potential to contribute negatively, exacerbating conflict 
or positively, building peace in the context. Hence, the interactions of intervention and 
context have measurable implications. Against this background, the study expected 
that the interventions of the NDDC must have been interacting with elements of the 
Odi community. Thus, it presents a good opportunity for empirical investigation into 
the nature, dynamics and implications of intervention-context interactions (ICI) and 
ontological claims made in the literature about it. Also, the policy-orientation and 
normative commitment of Peace and Conflict Studies to emancipatory politics, and 
values such as social justice, sustainable peacebuilding and development, gender 
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equality, and so on compel an empirical investigation into the contributions of the 
NDDC to the NDR conflict situation. This necessitated an evaluation of the capacity 
of the NDDC for peace and conflict sensitivity alongside gender-based assessment of 
its interventions. The epistemology of the study, therefore, encompasses both empiri-
cal and critical peace studies.  
The study was a qualitative research, which combined the Grounded Theory 
approach and instrumental case study designs. Primary and secondary data were col-
lected for the study. Primary data were collected through key informant and in-depth 
interviews, content analysis of documents, and non-participant observation. One hun-
dred and one interviews were conducted in Odi. Interviewees included a traditional 
ruler, secretary, and members of the traditional ruling council, chairman, secretary and 
members of the Community Development Committee, the oldest man in the commu-
nity, religious leaders, women‘s leaders, female and male executives and members of 
the Odi Youth Council, NDDC project beneficiaries (females and males), school prin-
cipals and teachers in the community, I/NGOs/ CBOs staff, politicians, and law-
enforcement agents. Twenty-three external stakeholders (non-resident of Odi commu-
nity) were interviewed. This included NDDC staff, NDDC consultants, experts on Ni-
ger Delta, I/NGOs staff, activists, academics, religious leaders, and professionals. 
These categories were selected to reflect different aspects and make an objective ac-
count of the phenomenon under investigation. The interview guides addressed ques-
tions covering the mandate of the NDDC and its fulfilment; identification of NDDC 
intervention in the community; and stage and level of community involvement. NDDC 
official documents such as the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan, 
NDDC Act, official brochures, chairman and managing director/Chief Executive Offi-
cer‘s speeches at various NDDC events, and NDDC website contents were analysed. 
Unstructured non-participant observations were carried out at NDDC offices and its 
interventions‘ sites in Odi. Two conceptual frameworks adopted for the study are the 
Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Capacity, and Gender-Based Analysis of Intervention 
frameworks. Summary of key findings are presented in the section below.  
The remaining part of this chapter is in three main sections —first is a section 
on summary of key findings of the study; the second discusses the contributions of the 
study to knowledge, and the third contains conclusion, policy recommendations and 
recommendations for further study. 
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6.1 Summary of Key Findings 
This section presents a summary of key findings and the contributions they 
make to knowledge. A key finding of this study is in describing and explaining the na-
ture, dynamics and implications of the relationship between intervention and context, 
generally, and particularly between the NDDC‘S interventions and Odi community 
context. It introduced new concepts to understand and explain these phenomena. It ac-
counted for the factors in the phenomena investigated and the relationships between 
them. It showed the connection between the wider macro socio-political context, the 
perception of intervention as resources, intervention programming, and impacts at the 
regional and community levels. Through the ICI, the study showed the possibility of 
measuring impacts as consequence of the interactions of intervention and context and 
of theorising the nature, dynamics and implications of these interactions. 
6.1.1 The NDDC Intervention Strategies 
The NDDC strategy for change is enshrined in the Niger Delta Regional De-
velopment Master Plan. ―The Strategy for Change in the Niger Delta Region‖ is rooted 
in the vision to improve the quality of life of the Niger Delta people by making good 
use of the region‘s rich natural resources for the prosperity of the region. The strategy 
specifically addresses how to create enabling conditions for enterprise, efficient 
agriculture and industrialisation to utilise the rich natural resources to achieve its 
vision and mission. The strategy is rooted in an integrated consideration of the 
dynamic relationship between all aspects of life in the NDR. The strategy includes pur-
suing poverty reduction; and development of micro and small-scale enterprises; im-
proved infrastructure and industrialisation as engines of accelerated economic growth; 
institutional development, capacity building and environmental protection as general 
foundations and enablers. These essential elements of the integrated strategy and their 
relationships are captured in the Integrated Development Strategy. The strategies are 
grouped into strategic goals for change and strategic policies for change. The Master 
Plan‘s five thematic areas of intervention are economic development, community 
needs, the natural environment, physical infrastructure, and human and institutional 
resources constituting the strategic goals and policies for change. In implementing 
these strategies, the NDDC groups its interventions into Infrastructural Development 
Projects (IDPs), that is, physical development projects and Human Capacity Develop-
ment Programmes (HCDPs). Ten policies guide the implementation of the interven-
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tions. They are economic prosperity; market creation and expansion; promotion of 
good governance; integrative and process-oriented planning (enabling conditions and 
continuity; impact assessments; increase positive impacts, reduce waste, income effi-
ciency); participatory decision-making; sustainability; partnership with other agencies; 
transparent selection, decision and public scrutiny of materials; peace and conflict sen-
sitive, involvement of women and youth. 
6.1.2 The Relationship between the NDDC Intervention Strategies, Man-
date and the Needs of the People 
Findings show correlations between the NDDC intervention strategies and its mandate. 
Obviously, the NDDC intervention strategies correspond with mandates one to four. 
The strategic goals and policies of the Commission correspond with the very first 
mandate of the NDDC. Moreover, its IDPs and HCDPs correlate with the second man-
date. However, the conception, planning and implementation of the projects and pro-
grammes are not in accordance with set rules and regulations as required by this man-
date. This is the locus of the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies characteristic of the 
Commission during the period under study. In other words, the discrepancy in the in-
tervention strategies and the mandate of the Commission is in how things are being 
done rather than what is being done. In addition, there is congruence between the in-
tervention strategies of the NDDC and the needs of people. The NDDC interventions 
in Odi met the critical and felt needs of the community. However, this should be un-
derstood against the background of neglect and marginalisation suffered by the region. 
The historic neglect and marginalisation make any intervention by the NDDC welcome 
by the people and such necessarily addresses certain aspects of people‘s long-felt 
needs. Hence, there is hardly an intervention that does not meet some needs in some 
ways. The incongruence comes in in the NDDC and community‘s prioritisation of 
these needs. 
6.1.3 Institutional Capacity of the NDDC for Peace and Conflict Sensitivity 
The study reveals that the institutional capacity of the NDDC for peace and conflict 
sensitivity is abysmally low. Firstly, the five components of mainstreaming peace and 
conflict sensitivity (PCS) in organisations intervening in conflict contexts —
commitment and motivation, organisational culture, capacity building, accountability 
and conducive external relations—are not well mainstreamed in the NDDC. Secondly, 
PCS is not mainstreamed in its intervention programming. Hence, the NDDC interven-
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tion programming —conception and planning, implementation and monitoring and 
evaluation do not show concerns for peace and conflict issues in the context of inter-
ventions. The Commission‘s interventions score abysmally-low on peace and conflict 
sensitivity. Although there is a policy on peace and conflict issues, and these issues 
receive scanty references in some other policies, the study found that the available pol-
icy does not inform the intervention programming. The availability, therefore, indi-
cates a weak sensitivity to PCS.  With abysmally-low capacity for peace and conflict 
sensitivity, the NDDC cannot, expectedly, deliver peace and conflict-sensitive inter-
vention in the NDR. However, it is possible for an agency to make unintended nega-
tive or positive impact in a conflict-prone region, hence the need to still assess the ac-
tual impact of the NDDC interventions. 
6.1.4 The Impacts of the NDDC Interventions on their Context 
6.1.4.1 The Intervention-Context Interactions 
This study confirms the existence of bilateral impacts between the interventions 
and the context. There are indications of interactions between the stages of the NDDC 
interventions and micro and macro contexts of the beneficiary community and of the 
NDR respectively. In other words, each stage of the NDDC intervention (conception 
and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation) impacts on and is impacted 
on by each element of the community context (actors, causes, profile and dynamics of 
conflict), NDR and even Nigeria at large. These interactions constitute both negative 
and positive impacts on the context of the intervention. This was represented in a con-
ceptual framework —the intervention-context interactions (ICI). At the C&P stage, the 
interactions between actors and the intervention is evident in the competition, contest, 
and conflict over the NDDC resources by influential players such as members of the 
NDDC board and management, influential politicians, top government officials, and 
the members of Ward 12. This struggle for resources is intense and takes place within 
the psycho-social and socio-political space characterised by endemic corruption and 
bad governance. These interactions are conceptualised as the black hole of interactions. 
The interactions at this stage sometimes get to the community through the activities of 
Ward 12 and unsolicited letters for intervention from the community. However, the 
dynamics of the interactions excluded the resident community people (RCP) from the 
C&P in a direct contradiction of the guiding principles of the NDDC as contained in 
 246 
 
the Master Plan. It also triggered series of negative impacts throughout subsequent 
stages of the NDDC intervention.  
The interventions interact most intensely with elements of Odi community at 
the implementation stage. The ICI is most intense here because the intervention moves 
into the community context and actors, causes, profile as well as dynamics interact 
with the implementation of the intervention. Interactions at this stage are mostly driven 
by the activities of the community actors as they mobilise at the individual, family, 
group and community levels to share in the benefits of the intervention. The RCP are 
the most influential actors in determining the dynamics of the interactions at this stage. 
Legitimate need, greed and likely deprivation motivate RCP as they compete, contest 
and cooperate to share the resources of interventions. The RCP‘s activities sometimes 
change the implementation of an intervention. Implementations also change RCP‘s 
intergroup relations. RCP‘s activities influence other actors‘ (contractors/consultants, 
or NDDC staff) decisions and actions, which also impact (positively or negatively) on 
the intervention. The implementation therefore changes the dynamics of intergroup 
relations within the community, between the community and external actors, and be-
tween the community and other communities. As such, new causes of conflict may 
emerge, thus impacting the old causes; and thus changing the profile and changing the 
dynamics of conflict within the community. However, four cardinal groups in the 
community  —the Traditional Council, the Youth Council, the women‘s group and the 
Community Development Committee— mediate in the ensuing competition and con-
flict to guarantee the peaceful genius loci of Odi community. This is discussed below 
(section 6.1.5.5).  
The interaction of intervention and context at the monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) stage is minimal. A persuasive explanation for this low key interaction is that 
the stage involves the barest minimum resources. Hence, the motivation to be involved 
is weak. This suggests that the NDDC intervention programming is driven by the per-
ception of intervention as resources. In addition, the RCP are totally excluded from 
this stage of intervention. In fact, the M&E is done by the NDDC consultants while the 
Commission examines the evaluation of its consultants. Practically excluding RCP 
from M&E has an overall negative impact on the intervention programming. It fo-
ments suspicion of bribery and corruption between the contractor and NDDC staff and 
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thus cast doubt on the sincerity of the Commission, thereby contributing to community 
apathy about NDDC interventions.  
6.1.4.2 Positive and Negative Impacts of NDDC’s Interventions 
The interactions of NDDC‘s interventions and the context of the study area have both 
positive and negative impacts. The IDPs have the most significant positive impacts by 
bringing the presence of the Federal Government to the community, thus addressing 
the historic pervasive feeling of neglect and marginalisation in national development. 
Road projects, electrification and construction of blocks of classrooms have all im-
pacted positively on the study area. However, the processes of deciding on, and im-
plementing, them have significant attendant negative impacts such as creating a black 
hole of interactions, acute power disequilibrium between the Commission and the 
community, leading to malevolent charity-beggar relationship in favour of the Com-
mission, oppressiveness of the intervention, divisiveness of the intervention, and con-
flicts. Therefore, there are ample opportunities for the Commission to improve on its 
positive contributions to the NDR and minimise its negative contributions. This will be 
possible by focusing more on how things are being done rather than what is being 
done. A significant improvement will be made by involving the critical stakeholders, 
that is, resident community people in the whole intervention programming cycle right 
from the conception and planning. 
6.1.4.3 The nature, dynamics and implications of ICI impacts in Odi 
Some unique phenomena are germane to understanding the nature, dynamics, and im-
plications of the interactions of intervention and context in the study area. These in-
clude resource-status of intervention black hole of interactions, Ward 12, likely depri-
vation, the malevolent charity-beggar relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, di-
visiveness of intervention and the geniuses of Odi conflict transformation (described 
above). The resource-status of intervention is a phenomenon explaining how actors‘ 
perception of intervention as a resource is the main driver of the interactions of stages 
of intervention and elements of the context. This perception compels actors (motivated 
by legitimate need, greed, and likely deprivation) to mobilise and compete in access-
ing/appropriating the intervention‘s benefits for themselves and their constituencies. 
Thus, intervention and actors interact, and impact on the causes, profile and dynamics 
of conflict within the context of intervention. The intensity of interactions is influenced 
by the amount of resources available. This explains why the interactions are intense at 
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the C&P and implementation stages. Therefore, the status of intervention as resources 
is the epicentre and driving force for the intervention-context interactions (ICIs). 
The interactions at the C&P stage where interventions and beneficiary commu-
nities are determined is characterised by corrupt and non-transparent transactions in-
volving influential actors such as the NDDC management staff, high-profile politi-
cians, contractors/consultants, top government officials, and Ward 12. This constitutes 
the black-hole of interactions and is supported by the endemic corruption and bad gov-
ernance in the NDR. The black hole of interactions is intense and non-transparent ac-
tivities of the influential big players as they lobby, manoeuvre, and negotiate in sharing 
and exploiting the resources of the interventions. The black hole of interactions consti-
tutes the conception and planning of the NDDC intervention. It is characterised by 
barefaced corruption, lack of transparency and bad corporate governance. It led to the 
dissolution of the NDDC Board in 2011. The black hole is the singular, most signifi-
cant source of negative impact —the black-hole effect— of the intervention-conflict 
interactions on the conflict situation. It thrives on the non-participatory approach, that 
is, excluding the critical stakeholders —resident community people (RCP)— from the 
conception and planning of the NDDC intervention programming. It is the direct cause 
of likely deprivation, oppressiveness of intervention, divisiveness of intervention in the 
beneficiary community. It causes, sustains and expresses the power disequilibrium that 
characterises the NDDC-communities relationship described as the malevolent charity-
beggar relationship. The black hole of interactions itself is nested in the characteristic 
bad governance, weak institutional capacity, and debilitating corruption of the Nige-
rian social, political and bureaucratic environment. It is thus an expression of the struc-
tural violence in the Nigerian state system. 
Another remarkable phenomenon is the Ward 12. It is a group of actors com-
prising influential individuals resident outside Odi community, including politicians, 
indigenes working with the NDDC or in relevant government establishments who 
lobby and negotiate on behalf of the community for NDDC interventions. Members of 
Ward 12 are motivated by the personal desire to increase their political rating in the 
community. The relative political influence of members of Ward 12 of a community 
determines the type, quality and quantity of the NDDC interventions the community 
will enjoy. Interventions attracted by Ward 12 may not necessarily be needed by mem-
bers of the community. Moreover, inasmuch as members of Ward 12 do not appropri-
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ately consult the members of the community, their involvement in attracting interven-
tions to the community does not constitute community participation in intervention 
conception and planning.  
Individuals and groups in the study area experience pervasive psychological 
and social-psychological feeling of high possibility of deprivation of their rights and 
privileges except they struggle and fight for it. This is the likely deprivation phenome-
non, which is a negative impact of the Bhis. Although the NDDC interventions are not 
the main cause of this phenomenon, they become sufficient motives to resuscitate it. 
Likely deprivation resurges and is reinforced among the community actors at the stage 
of implementation of the intervention. Individual psychology and group social-
psychology in Odi are characterised by anticipated deprivation of the bene-
fits/resources of the NDDC unless they struggle for it. This mind-set compels the com-
petition, conflict and sometimes cooperation over the resources of the NDDC among 
the RCP at the implementation stage. Likely deprivation is a manifest form of loss of 
faith in public institutions to distribute public goods and services in a fair and equitable 
manner. The intersection and cross-fertilisation of the resource-status of intervention, 
black hole of interactions and likely deprivation provide necessary conditions for other 
negative impacts of the NDDC interventions in the study area. These impacts include 
the malevolent charity-beggar relationship characterising the NDDC-community rela-
tionship, oppressiveness of intervention, and divisiveness of intervention.  
In spite of the negative impacts discussed above, the overall impact of the 
NDDC interventions to the conflict situation in the study area and the NDR is rela-
tively positive. This is consequent upon two factors. First is the fact that the Commis-
sion‘s interventions are perceived as the fulfilment of the long-desired Federal Gov-
ernment tangible presence in the region. The historic neglect by the government (fed-
eral, state and local), especially in the area of infrastructural development, suffered by 
the region makes any intervention in this regard appreciated by the people. Therefore, 
the long history of marginalisation and underdevelopment in the region makes the 
NDDC and its activities to represent at least a response to many decades of neglect. 
Before the advent of the Commission, the community was, as it were, in the dark ages. 
With the NDDC came a light of hope to a land long forgotten. This view is shared by 
all community people and some external stakeholders interviewed. However, from the 
point of view of peace and conflict sensitivity, the Commission‘s interventions repre-
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sent first aid to the long-open wounds of the NDR. The second reason for the relatively 
positive impacts is the presence of geniuses of intervention-triggered conflict trans-
formation that exist in Odi (and most Niger Delta communities), that is, a repertoire of 
traditional and contemporary institutions and processes for managing intervention-
triggered conflicts, ensured the peacefulness of the community (see 6.1.5.5 below). 
6.1.4.4 The Malevolent Charity-Beggar Relationship, Oppressiveness and Divisive-
ness of Intervention  
The NDDC intervention programming establishes and sustains acute power disequilib-
rium between the NDDC and the beneficiary community. The power relation confers 
the status of charity on the NDDC and forces the status of a beggar on the community. 
The subtle disempowerment of the community starts right from the C&P stage (with 
the exclusion of the RCP) and runs throughout the entire programming cycle. Over 
time, the relationship has become malevolent. The community is oppressed when in-
tervention positions them in a beggar- has-no-choice situation. Odi community has 
been compelled to perceive the NDDC interventions as rare charity, scarce resource 
and privilege that the NDDC endows on those who are in its good records. So, in 
whatever form it comes to the community —good, bad or ugly — the community must 
not reject it. The malevolent charity-beggar relationship is most evident in the oppres-
siveness of the Commission‘s intervention, leading to the phenomenon oppressiveness 
of intervention. Empirical evidence suggests that Odi community is oppressed by the 
NDDC intervention in two ways —as a consequence of insensitive programming or 
by-product of corruption in programming. In the programming of the NDDC interven-
tions, oppressiveness of beneficiaries begins right from the conception and planning 
stage and runs throughout the entire programming cycle. The oppressiveness of inter-
vention has negative impact on the intervention programming. It manifests in various 
forms.  
This includes, first, the imperious and imperial manner of excluding RCPs 
from C&P, thus giving the community no voice in the interventions meant for them. 
Although key NDDC personnel justify the exclusion of RCP on the grounds that since 
the politicians (the presumed representatives of the people) are involved, that is, as 
Ward 12, the community has been involved. Nevertheless, to assume such and thus 
limit community participation in C&P to Ward 12 elite suggests naivety or deliberate 
scheme to cover up corruption. Marginalising the entire community people this way 
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entrenches the power imbalance between the Ward 12 and the community people. The 
second way by which interventions oppress is the high-handed manner in which the 
NDDC personnel, contractors/consultants relate with the community when implement-
ing interventions. In the third sense, oppression manifests in the promise-and-fail syn-
drome, whereby the Commission promises and delivers less than promised or the case 
of selective distribution of benefits. The threat of and the use of force against disap-
pointed and protesting beneficiaries is the fourth form of oppressing the community 
people. This comes in form of arrest of protesters and exploitation of the community‘s 
fear of repetition of the 1999 massacre and fear of further bad publicity for Odi com-
munity.  
The fifth manifestation of oppressiveness is the real threat of blacklisting any 
community the Commission considers troublesome. Community people‘s fear of los-
ing potential interventions is regularly exploited by the Commission and its contrac-
tors. A protesting community stands the risk of being blacklisted as a trouble-maker 
with the consequence of benefactor stopping the intervention and allocating it to an-
other community as a punishment to the hostile community. The Odi 1999 massacre 
has also been exploited as an instrument of oppression in the NDDC intervention pro-
gramming in the community. It has a restraining and mollifying impact on Odi com-
munity, thereby making the community careful in protesting, even when they have le-
gitimate reasons to do so.  
The NDDC intervention in Odi is divisive. This takes the form of unintended 
effect of intervention and a deliberate divide-and-rule strategy by the NDDC and its 
contractors. Intervention divides the community people right from the stage of inform-
ing them about it. They trigger greed or the desire to satisfy needs among actors, thus 
inspiring them to deploy their resources in contest for it, thereby creating winners and 
losers as well as the successful and unsuccessful, the happy and the unhappy factions. 
It divides the influential actors in the black hole of interactions at the C&P stage. At 
the implementation stage, it regularly pitches groups in the community against each 
other —women group against the Traditional Council, women against men, thus divid-
ing the community people along gender lines; the youth against the Traditional Coun-
cil. It also divides the community along the traditional Asanga-Tamanga geographic 
line. The division penetrates to the family level as family members (especially males) 
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are pitched against each other in attempt to appropriate direct and indirect benefits of 
the NDDC for themselves. 
6.1.4.5 The Local Capacity for Peace in Odi 
There are notable traditional and contemporary institutions and groups that are active 
in the cultural, economic, political and social activities of Odi community. They were 
therefore inevitably involved in the NDDC interventions brought into Odi. These in-
clude the Traditional Council, the Youth Council, the Women‘s group and the Com-
munity Development Committee. The groups and their activities, a combination of tra-
ditional and contemporary institutions and processes for transforming intervention-
triggered conflict non-violently, ensure the characteristic peaceful atmosphere in the 
community. These groups and their activities, including the norms, processes and prac-
tices governing them and their relationships constitute the community mechanisms of 
conflict transformation. The phenomena could be described as the geniuses of Odi con-
flict transformation. Although they frequently have divergent goals as regards the 
NDDC interventions, they have evolved norms, processes and practices that enable 
them to manage the competition and conflicts arising from the NDDC interventions in 
such a way as to maintain the characteristic peaceful environment in Odi. Essentially, 
they are what Mary Anderson indicates as local capacities for peace.  
Regarding the NDDC interventions, the groups have a number of motivations 
in managing the intervention-triggered conflicts. One is the fear of the consequences of 
being blacklisted by the NDDC as troublesome. Two is the fear of losing the much-
desired development that has long eluded them. This is consistent with an Ijaw adage 
that translates as ‗‗…if your animal is running into the bush, if, you could even cut the 
tail, you can manage with that tail.‘‘ The third reason is the fear of reliving the 1999 
massacre experience. Thus, the geniuses have the credit of keeping Odi peaceful in 
spite of the NDDC‘s peace and conflict blind approach to intervention programming in 
the community. In spite of the peacebuilding potentials of these groups, the Commis-
sion has not make adequate effort to exploit or strengthen these local capacities for 
peace. Rather, it inadvertently weakens them.  
6.1.5 Gender-Neutrality of NDDC Interventions and Implications 
In spite of the popularity of both international and national policy frameworks on gen-
der equality, the NDDC does not have a gender policy. There is also no such policy for 
its intervention programming. Hence, both the NDDC and its interventions are gender-
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neutral or gender-blind. Despite this, women are well-represented (in staffing) in the 
Commission. Gender-neutrality of the interventions, however, has negative implica-
tions for gender equality in the study area. The NDDC interventions entrench the 
power disequilibrium between females and males in the community. The program-
ming of the interventions systematically gives males more benefits at the expense of 
their female counterparts. Also, it engenders conflict between the gender roles and dis-
criminates against women. By not mainstreaming gender in its intervention, the 
NDDC loses by being denied the unique perspective that women could bring to enrich 
its interventions. In cases where intervention impacted negatively on their livelihood 
and income, community women took collective non-violent action to demand a change 
in the implementation, and they succeeded. Women non-violent collective action 
achieved better result than the usual violent agitations of the youths (essentially male). 
Hence, the women‘s non-violent approach offers a potential source of leverage for 
communities in negotiating intervention with the NDDC. With abysmally-low capac-
ity for gender sensitivity, the NDDC cannot deliver gender-sensitive intervention in 
the NDR; rather, it entrenches the traditional power imbalance and roles between fe-
male and male members of the beneficiary communities. 
6.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
This study has made some modest contributions to knowledge in the area of peace and 
conflict impact assessment and Niger Delta studies. In PCIA, it showed the possibility 
of measuring impact in terms of the interactions between the stages of interventions 
and the elements of context. Although this was suggested by scholar-practitioners such 
as Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, and Sheriff (2005), Paffenholz (2005), and Lange 
(2006), the researcher is not aware of any empirical work in this regard. It introduced 
the intervention-context interactions (ICI) framework and showed viability in 
assessing impacts in context. It thus provides a basis for a policy on ICI analysis before 
projects are implemented, particularly in conflict contexts. This will help to make de-
velopment more supportive of peace and sustainable development. The ICI is valuable 
in the area of planning and feedback mechanism in peacebuilding and development. 
Also, the study introduced frameworks —Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework 
and Gender-Based Analysis of Intervention Framework— for assessing the institu-
tional capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity and gender sensitivity, respectively. 
 254 
 
Another notable contribution is its grounded theory on the nature, dynamics 
and implications of ICI in the study area, using conceptualisations (e.g., resource-
status of intervention, and black hole of interactions) and propositions, which provided 
the explanatory framework for the phenomena investigated. The theory is particularly 
useful in that it shows how the combined effect of the subconscious motivations of 
individuals and groups such as greed, need and likely deprivation is connected to the 
conscious level of group dynamics and power relations to drive and determine the 
nature, dynamics, and implications of the ICI. It thus links the micro, meso and macro 
levels of interactions and their implications for the context at the micro level of 
individuals and the community.  
The study contributes to Niger Delta studies, in calling attention to the negative 
aspects of the NDDC‘s interventions in the Niger Delta, and Odi in particular. It con-
tributes to understanding why despite the enormity of investment in the Niger Delta, 
very little has been achieved in terms of poverty reduction and economic growth 
through infrastructural and human capacity development. It described and explained 
factors as well as their relationships to map the conceptual landscape of the 
relationship of intervention and context in the study area. This is achieved by 
emphasising how (the resource-status of) intervention in an environment characterised 
by corruption and bad governance can trigger a spiral of  negative impacts  throughout 
the stages of intervention. In addition, it emphasised  the strong influence of the wider 
geopolitical context on government interventions in context of conflict. It also shows 
the critical role of the institutional capacity (for peace and conflict and gender sensitiv-
ity) of an intervening agency in peacebuilding through intervention. Nevertheless, it 
also confirms the existence of local capacity for peace in mediating negative impacts. 
The grounded theory, ―…forged in the crucible of social-political, cultural, and eco-
nomic conditions of African realities…‖ (University for Peace Africa Programme, 
2007, p. 75) might also prove useful in building the long-sought explanatory theories 
in PCIAs. The study thus advances scientific knowledge as it generates new concepts 
and frameworks for understanding intervention programming in conflict contexts.  
Findings add to the body of evidence supporting the need for conflict sensitiv-
ity, particularly in relation to service delivery. It is innovative as it brings a fresh per-
spective to understanding how development has the potential to drive conflict. Though 
this has been known much earlier, it is an insightful method of scientifically proving it. 
Findings could promote peace in a post-conflict environment if the stakeholders are 
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made aware of the negative aspects of economic intervention measures or if stake-
holders are mindful of this. Hence, it could inspire thinking and action to promote 
peace. Also, it has logically shown what leads to what, how, why, and who, where, and 
when. 
6.3 Conclusions 
The NDDC adopts the Integrated Development Strategy, which focuses on five themes 
—economic development, community needs, the natural environment, physical infra-
structure, and human and institutional needs— to reduce poverty through industrialisa-
tion and economic growth. Specific strategies for achieve this are codified in the 12 
strategic goals and three policies for change articulated in the Master Plan. These are 
broadly grouped into the Infrastructural Development Projects (IDP) and Human Ca-
pacity Development Programmes (HCDP). Although there is congruence between the 
Commission‘s mandate and its strategy, the prioritisation of the interventions in the 
community is slightly out of tune with the felt needs of the community. This might 
have been contingent on the inevitable change that would have occurred in the socio-
economic, political and environmental contexts in the Niger Delta communities, given 
the time lag between the development of the Master Plan and the implementation of 
the interventions. Another possible explanation is that the specificities of the micro 
context of every community in the Niger Delta were not factored into the development 
of the plan.  
The Commission has abysmally-low capacity for peace and conflict and gender 
sensitivity. While peace and conflict sensitivity is included in its policies, the Commis-
sion has no such policy as an organisation and it is very weakly mainstreamed in its 
interventions. The implication of this is that the Commission is inadvertently doing 
harm as well as good in its intervention programming. It has no gender policy as an 
organisation or for its intervention programming. Hence, its interventions are gender 
blind. This entrenches the traditional gender roles and power relations between females 
and males in the community. In other words, the NDDC interventions support patriar-
chy.  
The study confirmed that stages of intervention programming interact with 
elements of the context of the intervention to produce both negative and positive im-
pacts. These interactions are driven by the perception of intervention as a resource in 
the study area. From the conception and planning stage, the huge resources available in 
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the NDDC interventions attract powerful actors such as members of the NDDC board 
and management staff, influential politicians, and contractors/consultants. These ac-
tors, characteristically propelled by self-interest, in an environment notorious for bad 
governance and corruption struggle to appropriate the resources for themselves. This 
leads to the phenomenon of black hole of interactions, which triggers other negative 
impacts down the intervention programming process. One of the most notable is its 
instituting acutely-skewed power relations between the NDDC and the community in 
favour of the former, leading to the malevolent charity-beggar relationship and ulti-
mately oppression of community through the interventions.  
At the implementation stage, when the intervention finally comes into the 
community, the possibility of losing out on the benefits of the intervention triggers the 
phenomenon of likely deprivation in the community people. This drives competition 
for the resources and divides the community along individual, family, group, gender 
and geographical lines. The monitoring-and-evaluation stage is the least dramatic as 
the resources available are relatively unattractive and because the participation of the 
resident community people is not encouraged. The most significant positive impact of 
the interventions, especially the IDPs, is their role in bringing the presence of the Fed-
eral Government into the community or attesting to Federal Government‘s attention in 
the community. This countered the effect of neglect, marginalisation and deprivation, 
and poor infrastructure, which are core conflict causes in the region. It positively im-
pacted on the psycho-social and socio-psychology of individuals, groups and the 
community. Other positive impacts include economic benefits in form of income gen-
eration through job creation, supply of construction materials, compensation, and 
opening of local market. Also, the IDPs enhance the physical aesthetics of the commu-
nity.   
NDDC interventions are always perceived as resources and thus inspire differ-
ent motivations in various actors to compete in an atmosphere characterised by en-
demic corruption and bad governance. The presence of these two phenomena portends 
great difficulty to preventing and breaking the cycle of negative impacts triggered by 
the NDDC intervention programming. Overcoming this difficulty requires that NDDC 
improves how it does what it is doing by following its articulated guiding principles 
and policies such as promoting good governance, transparency, participatory decision-
making, and mainstreaming peace, conflict and gender sensitivity in its programming. 
The Commission‘s best chances of building sustainable peace in the region lies in 
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bringing the resident community people into its intervention programming right from 
the C&P. The RCP should be involved through their representatives in the four cardi-
nal groups and directly through town meeting on NDDC intervention. This might shift 
the power disequilibrium in favour of the community. 
6.4 Recommendations 
Recommendations of this study cover both policy recommendations and recommenda-
tions for further study.  
6.4.1 Policy Recommendations 
The study suggests the following policy-relevant recommendations which can enhance 
service delivery of the NDDC. 
6.4.1.1 Address Endemic Corruption and Bad Governance in the NDR 
The wider social and political contexts of the NDDC operations have impacts for the 
programming of the NDDC interventions. Although corruption and bad governance 
are not peculiar to the region, the presence of resources makes it more susceptible to 
conflict. This makes the task of building peace through the interventions more diffi-
cult. Hence,     there is a need for stakeholders (compulsorily involving resident com-
munity people) to be very conscious of, and sensitive to, the evil twins of corruption 
and bad governance alongside the negative effects of these on the overall intervention 
programming. In addition, stakeholders need to jointly evolve strategies to check cor-
ruption and bad governance in the overall intervention programming of the Commis-
sion. Furthermore, these checks should be strictly-guarded and continually-evaluated 
for performance by the stakeholders. Accountability and transparency will be critical 
in such strategies. Addressing the wider contexts of the NDDC operations is important 
because, expectedly, whatever happens there, will seep into the Commission and its 
interventions through a sort of social and political osmosis.     
6.4.1.2 Active Resident Community People Participation in all Stages of Interven-
tion Programming 
The current malevolent charity-beggar relationship between the RCP and the NDDC 
should be addressed. Changing this relationship should start with an affirmative action 
to empower the RCP by involving them throughout the intervention programming, 
from the C&P stage onward. Many works in peace and conflict impact assessment 
have recognised that making beneficiary community own the intervention as a right 
rather than a privilege is a way of empowering them (This is also consistent with the 
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emancipatory dimension of PCIA). This will discourage the emergence of the malevo-
lent charity-beggar relationship and its consequences. Making community people own 
the intervention should therefore be actively encouraged. This could be achieved by 
bringing the C&P into the community (as practised by I/NGOs) for participation by the 
RCP. However, in the minimum, the leaders of the four cardinal community groups 
could represent the community during the C&P. RCP‘s participation not only empow-
ers them but also fosters a sense of community ownership of the project, thereby in-
creasing sustainability of interventions. Also, it reduces wastage of resources due to 
unneeded interventions and duplicity of interventions. Finally, changing the current 
asymmetric relation may involve a reorientation of both parties (separately and in joint 
sessions) in which the two parties are made aware of what the appropriate relationship 
between them should be.  
6.4.1.3 Affirmative Action on Building and Exploiting Local Capacities for 
Peacebuilding through each Intervention 
There is a need for affirmative action on using each intervention to build local capaci-
ties for peace. The NDDC is required to identify, acknowledge and utilise the local 
capacities for peace in the community. This will increase the likelihood that its inter-
ventions will support sustainable peacebuilding rather than conflict. The four cardinal 
groups in the community —Traditional Council, Community Development Commit-
tee, the Youth Council and the women‘s group-- should be involved throughout the 
programming of the NDDC intervention. 
6.4.1.4 Transparency and Accountability 
Making information on budgetary allocation on interventions available and accessible 
to stakeholders should be made mandatory for the Commission. From the stage of 
conception, planning and subsequent stages, all actors, most importantly RCP, should 
have information on budgetary allocations, bill of quantity (in case of IDPs) and other 
relevant documents. As such, community people can have their own engineers to 
monitor the service delivery by contractors. Transparency throughout the stages of the 
intervention will discourage suspicion, which stimulates most conflicts. Information 
on budgetary allocations and others mentioned above for each project/programme 
should be made available on website.  
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6.4.1.5 Mainstream Peace and Conflict and Gender Sensitivity into Interventions 
There is need to mainstream peace and conflict sensitivity and gender in the NDDC 
organisational structure and culture as well as its intervention programming. Two ba-
sic requirements for mainstreaming these are well-articulated policies on conflict, 
peace and gender in the organisation alongside its intervention programming as well as 
building the institutional capacity for conflict, peace and gender sensitivity. A clear 
policy will articulate the goals with clearly-formulated concepts, organisational com-
mitment and practical steps to achieve the goals. Mainstreaming peace and conflict 
sensitivity and gender has always been a profound political process in organisations 
because the exercise challenges existing authority and resource allocations, structures, 
cultures, and norms (Lange, 2004). However, there is need to make the NDDC per-
sonnel see PCS and GAD frameworks as means to long-lasting transformation in the 
Commission and not pure technical frameworks. Such perception might improve their 
support for the frameworks. To be gender sensitive may require affirmative action for 
womenfolk to benefit from the NDDC interventions. Moreover, the HMBS pro-
grammes should not be marketed as women-specific. Not only will it demean the pro-
grammes, it will also entrench the demeaning perception of women‘s reproduction ac-
tivities. 
6.4.1.6 Changing the NDDC’s Perception and Organisational Culture to Interven-
tion Programming 
There is need for change in the perception and organisational culture of the NDDC so 
that personnel see themselves as social physicians curing the gangrene of conflict in 
the region. Galtung repeatedly draws a corollary between peace workers and medical 
practitioners. He describes peace workers as social physicians. The spirit with which 
medical practitioners are trained to work, which is also evident in the NDDC free 
medical health team, should therefore be espoused in the Commission. This spirit 
should be inculcated in the Commission‘s personnel through reorientation and train-
ing.   
6.4.2 Recommendations for Further Study 
There is need to replicate this study in a multiple case study research. This will test the 
transferability of concepts and propositions developed in this study. Such studies, 
which could be qualitative, quantitative or mixed method, will include more communi-
ties in the region. The validity of such ideas as resource-status of intervention, black 
hole of interactions, Ward 12, divisiveness and oppressiveness of intervention, likely 
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deprivation, local capacities for peace, and malevolent charity-beggar relationship 
need to be tested in settings similar to the one investigated. Besides, propositions on 
the nature, dynamics and implications of the ICI need to be tested in studies. Findings 
from such studies may inform better theorising and theory development in impact as-
sessment. Development of such theories will inform better programming that contrib-
utes to peacebuilding rather than conflict exacerbation in conflict-prone settings.
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Dear Ma/Sir: 
 LETTER OF INFORMATION  
Research Project: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of the Niger Delta Develop-
ment Commission Interventions  
Dear Participant, 
I wish to invite you to participate in my research on the above topic. The details of the study 
follow and I hope you will consider being involved. I am conducting this research project for 
my PhD at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.  
This research titled Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of the Niger Delta Develop-
ment Commission Interventions concerns examining the interactions between interventions 
and its (conflict) contexts. The study seeks to determine the contributions of the Commission 
to the Niger Delta conflict in order to understand how interventions can contribute positively 
(i.e. build peace) rather than negatively (exacerbate conflict) in the Niger Delta conflict set-
ting.  
The objectives of the study, therefore, include determining the impact of the intervention on 
the conflict contexts and vice versa. It will evaluate the impact that completed projects or 
programs have had on the structures and dynamics of peace and conflict in the host commu-
nities. Specifically, I am interested in undertaking an empirical analysis of the NDDC capac-
ity for peace and conflict sensitive programming; the peace and conflict sensitivity of its pro-
gramming; the interactions of selected projects and programmes and their contexts; and the 
gender sensitivity of the Commission‘s programming. 
The research outcome will contribute to the growing volume of literature on the nexus of 
peace, conflict, intervention, and gender mainstreaming in conflict situations. It hopes to ex-
tend the frontier of knowledge in this field of study. Thus, it is expected to produce findings, 
rooted in the rigorous analyses of empirical data, which will inform and improve theories, 
policies and practice in intervention programming. Specifically, it will help us to determine 
NDDC‘s current capacity as an agency intervening in conflict situation. Lessons learnt will 
be useful for policy makers, intervention and funding agencies. 
The exercise will rely on semi-structured method using the in-depth interview, with ques-
tions already prepared, and other questions that may come up during the exercise. I will need 
your consent to include you as a participant in this study. This means oral and tape-recorded 
 
Demola AKINYOADE 
Doctoral Research Candidate 
Peace and Conflict Studies Program 
Institute of African Studies 
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria 
GSM 0805 770 2787 
demolaakinyoade@yahoo.com 
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consent or endorsing a consent form. Your participation will be confidential as your identity 
will not be revealed to anybody except me. Nothing learnt from you will be revealed to other 
participants, any staff of your organisation or any member of your community. The exercise 
is voluntary and you are free not to respond to the entire questions and also free to stop the 
interview at any time. This is to ensure your comfort. Should you agree to take part in this 
research, we will meet for about forty-five to sixty minutes and the interview will normally 
be audio-taped unless you have objections. If audio-taped, a copy of the transcribed version 
will be provided and you are free to make necessary changes as you deem fit. In case you are 
not interested in being audio-taped, then, handwritten notes will be made or made on a lap-
top, transcribed and a copy will be given to you. You are free to withdraw consent and to dis-
continue participation in the activity at anytime without prejudice. The audiotapes and tran-
scriptions will be kept in a locked filing cabinet at the researcher‘s office for five years fol-
lowing thesis submission and then destroyed. 
Please be informed that, if at any time you want further information on this research, please 
feel free to request it. You can contact me by e-mail at demolaakinyoade@yahoo.com. It is 
anticipated that this research will be completed by the third quarter of 2011. The results may 
also be presented at conferences or written up in journals without any identifying informa-
tion. 
This project has been approved by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan. 
Should you have any complaints concerning the manner in which this research is conducted, 
please contact the Postgraduate Coordinator at the following address: 
The Postgraduate Coordinator 
Peace and Conflict Studies Programme 
Institute of African Studies 
University of Ibadan 
Nigeria. 
 
Please keep a copy of this information for your record and accept my sincere appreciation for 
your participation, insights and valuable knowledge, which would be of great importance to 
this project and I look forward to further contact with you. 
Sincerely, 
 
Ademola Victor AKINYOADE,                                                   
Peace and Conflict Studies Programme,                                              
Institute of African Studies,                                                  
University of Ibadan, 
Nigeria.                                  
GSM: +234 805 770 2787 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
 
 
 
 
1 June 2011 
The Director 
Commercial and Industrial Directorate 
NDDC 
Port Harcourt 
 
Dear Ma/Sir: 
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH PURPOSES 
I am Akinyoade, Victor Ademola, a doctorate candidate of Peace and Conflict Studies Pro-
gram, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan. I write to request information on 
three programmes in your directorate, namely, the Skills Acquisition Programme, the Mass 
Transit and the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises. 
 
The needed information include: 
1. Institutional policy on the programming of your projects (i.e. how projects and bene-
ficiaries should be selected, community participation, etc.); 
2. Institutional framework for implementing, monitoring and evaluating the policy; 
3. Official documents detailing the activities of your directorate; 
4. Database (online, electronic or hard copy) of your beneficiaries; 
5. The challenges your directorate faces in delivering its mandate. 
 
The information requested is required for an evaluation of the contributions of the NDDC to 
the Niger Delta since its establishment till date. It is therefore needed strictly for academic 
research purposes and will be treated with utmost confidentiality.  
 
I will be most grateful, therefore, if you can designate one office and one field staff (for each 
of the three programs) with whom I can conduct in-depth interviews to get the required in-
formation. The interview will last between forty-five to sixty minutes. I will like to hold the 
interview anytime between 7
th
 and 17
th
 June, 2011. I include a letter of information for your 
attention and that of the prospective interviewees. Should you so desire, a copy of the study‘s 
findings will be made available to your directorate.  
 
I thank you for your anticipated cooperation. 
 
Faithfully, 
 
AKINYOADE, V. ADEMOLA, PhD (in view) 
+2348057702787 
demolaakinyoade@yahoo.com
 
Demola AKINYOADE 
Doctoral Research Candidate 
Peace and Conflict Studies Pro-
gramme 
Institute of African Studies 
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria 
GSM 0805 770 2787 
demolaakinyoade@yahoo.com 
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APPENDIX V 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
I, ________________________________________________________________ have read 
the information contained in the Information Sheet for Participants and any questions I have 
has been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this activity, realising that I 
may withdraw at any time. I agree that the research data gathered for the study may be pub-
lished, provided my name is not used. 
 
Signature                                                     Date                                                                                                                                                         
               _________________________       ______________________ 
I agree/disagree to my interview being audio-taped 
 
Signature                                                        Date 
              ________________________                 _______________________ 
This project has been approved by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.  
Should you have any complaints concerning the manner in which this research is conducted, 
please contact the Postgraduate Coordinator at the following address: 
Peace and Conflict Studies Programme  
Institute of African Studies 
University of Ibadan 
Ibadan, Nigeria.
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APPENDIX VI 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
IDI FOR NDDC STAFF (OFFICE AND FIELD/COMMUNITY LIAISON OFFICERS) Evaluating 
the Capacity of the NDDC for Peace and Conflict Sensitive Programming 
 
1. Explain the mandate of the NDDC and your role in realising it. 
 
2. What is your understanding of the idea of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) or ―conflict 
sensitivity‖? 
 
3. Describe the NDDC policy on PCIA or conflict sensitivity. How is it implemented in the field? 
Probe: Does it include staff capacity building? Which category of staff? Is it mandatory? Does it in-
clude field staff? Who conducts the training? Have the respondent been trained? Ask to see or get a 
copy of the official document on the policy. 
 
4. Have you heard about the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution‘s document Mainstreaming 
Peacebuilding in Development Programming in Nigeria: A framework? (if yes, probe: does the 
NDDC make use of it?) 
 
5. (a) How does the NDDC select projects for implementation in host communities? 
(b) How are the beneficiaries of projects selected? 
Note whether stakeholders‘ participation (especially community people) is mentioned in any of the 
two instances above. 
 If yes, probe:  the participants (who are they? How and why are they selected?); 
The format of the forum (briefing, workshop, conference, village square meeting); 
   Is it organized for every new project? 
If it is not, probe: ask directly whether stakeholders‘ participation is part of the project and benefici-
aries‘ selection phases.  
 
6. (a) How is the NDDC project planned, implemented, monitored and evaluated?  
Note whether conflict analysis, PCIA or conflict sensitivity is mentioned. 
If it is, probe: who participates and how are they selected? How is it done? When is it required in the 
programming? Name and/or describe the framework of conflict analyses. 
If it is not, probe: is analysis of conflict in the host/neighbouring communities part of the project 
planning, implementation and monitoring? 
 
7. (a) Describe a typical crisis that occurs around the NDDC projects in host/neighbouring communities. 
(b) At what stage of the project did the crisis happen? 
(c) How did the NDDC manage the crisis? 
 
8. How does the NDDC ensure that its projects do not lead to conflict in host/neighbouring communi-
ties? 
 
9. How does the NDDC ensure that its projects build peace in or among the beneficiary communities? 
Describe a typical case, please. 
 
10. Does the NDDC a gender policy that it applies to: (a) staff; (b) beneficiaries of it human development 
projects). 
If yes: ask respondent to tell you the policy and request to see a copy of it. 
 
For Field Officers Only 
 
11. (a) When did you join the NDDC? 
(b) How many times have you been trained? 
 277 
 
(c) What did these trainings focus on?
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INTERVIEW GUIDE 
IDI FOR COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS (Excluding Project Beneficiaries) 
Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Evaluation of the NDDC Programming in the Beneficiary 
Communities  
 
1. What is your understanding of the purpose for which the NDDC was established? 
 
2. Mention some projects that your community has benefited from the NDDC since it was 
established? 
 
3. How does the NDDC inform the community about the projects to be implemented and the 
progress of projects being implemented? 
 
4. How were the projects selected before implementation in your community?  
 
5. Describe your community‘s involvement in the project programming cycle.  
Note whether the respondents mention community involvement at the project planning and 
selection of beneficiaries, implementation, or monitoring and evaluation stages.  
If not, probe: at what stage of the project was your community involved—project planning 
and selection of beneficiaries, implementation, monitoring and evaluation?  
If at any stage, probe: who are the members of the community involved? How were they se-
lected? 
 
6. Describe your community members who benefited from this project(s)? 
 
7. (a) What kind of conflicts did these projects cause? 
(b) How was the conflict handled? 
(c) Please mention the category of people that managed the conflict? 
 
8. To what extent have the NDDC projects contributed to peace in your community or between 
your community and neighbouring communities?  
 
9. What is your understanding of the idea ―Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment‖ or ―conflict 
sensitivity‖?  
a. If known or understood, probe: was it used for the NDDC projects? Could you de-
scribe it and how it is typically used, please? At what stage?  
b. If unknown, would you say that the NDDC made any deliberate efforts to ensure that 
the projects did not start a fresh or ignite old conflicts in your community and or be-
tween your community and neighbouring communities? Explain your response, please. 
OR 
c. Would you say that the NDDC made any deliberate efforts to reduce tension, resolve 
conflict or build peace in your community and or between your community and 
neighbouring communities through its projects? How? Explain your response, please. 
 
10. Would you say that the NDDC make any deliberate efforts to ensure that both genders—girls 
and boys, women and men—benefit equitably from the projects? Explain your response, 
please. Or which gender benefit more? In what estimated ratio/percentage? 
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11. What can (a) the NDDC, (b) your community, or (c) other stakeholders do to reduce conflict 
and build peace in your community. 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE 
IDI FOR PROGRAMME BENEFICIARIES 
 
1. What is your understanding of the purpose for which the NDDC was established? 
 
2. Mention some projects that your community has benefited from the NDDC since it was 
established? 
 
3. How did you hear about the NDDC projects from which you benefited? 
 
4. Describe the criteria and the selection process of the beneficiaries, please. How and why were 
you selected to benefit from the project?  
 
5. (a) What kind of conflicts did this project(s) cause? 
(b) How was the conflict handled? 
(c) Please mention the category of people that managed the conflict? 
 
6. To what extent have the NDDC projects contributed to peace in your community or between 
your community and neighbouring communities? 
 
7. Would you say that the NDDC made any deliberate efforts to ensure that the projects did not 
start a fresh or ignite old conflicts in your community and or between your community and 
neighbouring communities? Explain your response, please.  
 
8. Would you say that the NDDC made any deliberate efforts to reduce tension, resolve conflict 
or build peace in your community and or between your community and neighbouring com-
munities through its projects? How? Explain your response, please. 
 
9. Would you say that the NDDC make any deliberate efforts to ensure that both genders—girls 
and boys, women and men—benefit equitably from the projects? Explain your response, 
please. Or which gender benefit more? In what estimated ratio/percentage? 
 
10. Describe the attitude of staff (NDDC, consultants) in charge of the project.  
 
11. Which of the following term did you hear the project staff use in the course of the project? 
―conflict sensitivity‖, ―peace and conflict impact assessment‖, ―peacebuilding‖, ―community 
participation‖, ―gender sensitivity‖, ―gender mainstreaming‖, ―peace impact,‖ ―conflict im-
pact‖ 
 
12. What can (a) the NDDC, (b) your community, or (c) other stakeholders do to reduce conflict 
and build peace in your community?  
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INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
IDI FOR THE NDDC CONSULTANTS, EXPERTS AND OTHER AGENCIES WORKING IN 
THE NIGER DELTA 
Evaluating Field Staff and Process Capacity for Peace and Conflict Sensitive Programming 
Consultants, Experts and other Agencies 
1. What is your understanding of the mandate of the NDDC? And to what extent has the NDDC been 
delivering on this mandate?  
 
2. How does the Commission execute its projects in the host communities? 
 
3. Would you say that the NDDC makes any deliberate efforts to ensure that the projects did not start a 
fresh or ignite old conflicts in host communities and or between host communities and neighbouring 
communities? Explain your response, please.  
 
4. Would you say that the NDDC made any deliberate efforts to reduce tension, resolve conflict or build 
peace in your community and or between host communities and neighbouring communities through its 
projects? How? Explain your response, please. 
 
5. Would you say that the NDDC make any deliberate efforts to ensure that both genders—girls and 
boys, women and men—benefit equitably from the projects? Explain your response, please. Or which 
gender benefit more? In what estimated ratio/percentage? 
 
6. Are you aware of the NDDC policy on PCIA, conflict sensitivity or gender sensitivity of its projects? 
If yes, could you describe it, please? 
 
7. (a) Describe any crises that the NDDC projects have caused, please. 
(b) How was the conflict handled? 
(c) Please mention the category of people that managed the conflict? 
 
8. To what extent have the NDDC projects contributed to peace in the Niger Delta, especially in this 
community and neighbouring communities? Cite typical examples, please. 
 
Consultants and Agencies only 
9. Kindly give background information about your organisation. 
 
10. What is your relationship with the NDDC? When did it start? What has your organisation done 
with/for the NDDC and what is it doing now, if any?  
 
11. How is your organization helping to fulfil the NDDC mandate? 
 
12. At what level of the NDDC programming is your organization involved? 
 
13. (a) What does your organization do before implementing projects in beneficiary communities? 
(b) Describe your organization‘s policy on PCIA or conflict sensitivity policy and gender sensitivity, if 
any? 
(c) What are the entry strategies of your organization into beneficiary communities? 
(d) How do you handle crises arising from your projects during and after implementation? 
 
14. How would you describe the contributions of the NDDC to the Niger Delta situation? How can it be 
improved? 
